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REALITY

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REALITY

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

His Grace, Finbar Ryan, O.P., Archbishop of Port-of-Spain, Trinidad

DEDICATION

Reality owes its appearance to the continuing efforts of many of the students and fathers of the Province of St. Albert the Great. Perhaps even more so, *Reality* owes it's appearance to the encouragement and interest of its friends around the world. It is to one such friend that we wish to dedicate this present issue.

This outstanding Dominican is by no means unknown to us, It was just over six years ago that the philosophy students at the Dominican House of Studies, River Forest, received word that the Archbishop of Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, would speak to the students. We gathered in the common room and awaited the coming of Archbishop Finbar Ryan. At the time we couldn't describe the impression he made on all of us. But now, in retrospect, it is easy to see that before us that night we had a man who embodied in his own personal life the great ideal of which he spoke with such zeal and conviction.

Many of the things he said to us that night have lingered in our minds and have been a source of inspiration. He was very anxious to impress upon our minds the unique vocation to which we had been called. He likened our vocation to that of the higher angels in heaven. "Their duty," he reminded us, "is to contemplate the Holy and Undivided Trinity and then to turn around, as it were, and to break-up that Truth which contains all truth and to dispense it to the angels below them. So too is your vocation. You are the dispensers of the Word made flesh. You are to contemplate the truths of Faith and to break them up and to give them to the faithful. And what is even greater, you are called to dispense the living bread of life, to break it up and to feed the faithful. This is your unique vocation. Live it and you will be the happiest people in the world."

His Grace did not leave us on the high plain of the ideal without some practical advice. He told us: "It is common for the devil to insinuate himself into our lives and to weaken us in the very work at which we are supposed to excel." He urged us to be particularly on our guard, "against losing our love for study and our corresponding duty of communicating that knowledge and love for truth in an understandable and simple fashion. To fail in one or the other of these duties is to fail in our vocation. But," he concluded, "to strive to do both is the ideal." This was the message the Archbishop left with us.

Before his elevation to the bishopric, our distinguished guest had been twice elected Provincial of the Irish Dominican Fathers. He held this office from 1921 to 1934, manifesting to all, his ability as a leader and a father of souls. In November of 1937, he was consecrated as the Titular Bishop of Gabula and Coadjutor with the right to succeed to the Archiepiscopal see of Port-of-Spain, Trinidad. In 1940, he succeeded to that see as the fifteenth prelate of the island and its seventh Archbishop. On the occasion of His Grace's Golden Jubilee to the priesthood in 1955, the late Holy Father, Pope Pius XII, wrote these words in praise of Archbishop Ryan:

> The outstanding evidences of his activity are many; churches built, the foundation of a seminary for local priests, an auspicious increase in the clergy, a restless zeal for the doctrines of the Church and providing for the upbringing and education of youth in Catholic schools.

Under the aegis of the Archbishop during the last twenty years, thirty-five grade schools have been built and many more have been rebuilt and extended. Also under his direction, seven high schools have taken shape. In all, the archdiocese has flourished to the point that at present there are 125 grade schools, five junior high schools and eleven senior high schools. This prodigious growth of school facilities reflects His Grace's consuming desire to provide for the proper education of youth. Recently, in using the words of St. John Chrysostom, the Archbishop summed up his own attitude towards the growing needs of fashioning more and more youths into the Image of Christ.

> Far more excellent than anyone in any other profession, do I consider him who knows how to mold the character of youth.

Of all his educational labors the one which brings him most satisfaction is the archdiocesan seminary. Begun in 1943, under the direction of the Benedictine Fathers, it has continued to grow. Just last year, the major seminary moved into its new modern quarters. Eight local priests have already been ordained and with the completion of the new building a continued flow of local vocations is assured. Under the double patronage of St. John Vianney and the African Martyrs, no doubt the seminary will continue to prosper.

Over the years the Archbishop has not lost that filial love and devotion to the Blessed Virgin Mary which marks a true son of St. Dominic. This devotion to the Mother of God has found tangible expression in the popular shrine of Our Lady of Laventille and Fatima. Our Lady has been proclaimed patroness of the whole island. Each year thousands attend the devotions in May. So strong and energetic is the people's devotion that it elicited the following tribute in the Chicago Archdiocesan newspaper, THE NEW WORLD, shortly after the late Cardinal Stritch visited the shrine enroute home from the Eucharistic Congress in Rio de Janiero, in 1955:

> One thing we will swear to is that the Catholics of Trinidad really have the Faith . . . The indomitable force behind all the progress of Catholic education, instruction and even prestige in Trinidad is the Most Reverend Finbar Ryan, O.P., Archbishop of Port-of-Spain . . . Seeing this saintly, scholarly, witty, stimulating and totally unselfish man . . . the thought struck us that like Moses of old, this leader had truly led his people to the dawn of a great new day of the Faith in Trinidad.

Such spontaneous praise of Archbishop Ryan's leadership testifies to his dynamic spirit as priest, and father of his people.

Over the years his friendship and paternal encouragement have meant much to the Dominican students of the Province of St. Albert the Great. Whenever he could pay us a visit, he has done so; and out of these visits has grown our warm admiration and affection. No doubt his continued interest in the publication of *Reality* can be traced in part to his own founding of an Irish Dominican publication when he himself was a young student. In any event, his many kindnesses and his enthusiastic interest have been the source of much inspiration to us.

Such a friendly bond would itself justify our desire to dedicate this issue of *Reality* to His Grace. But we have a further reason for this dedication. This year of 1962 marks a very special occasion in His Grace's life. On the fourth of March, 1962, he celebrated his eightieth birthday. On that day many extended their best wishes and congratulations. To these greetings we wish to add our own. As a token of our affection, we dedicate this issue to him whose young heart has inspired his life and our youth.

Valentine A. McInnes, O.P.

JOHN-BAPTIST GERLACH, O.P.

THE BAPTISM OF JESUS

God anointed Jesus of Nazareth
with the Holy Spirit and with power,
and he went about doing good and healing
all who were in the power of the devil;
for God was with him.
Acts of the Apostles

The synoptic gospels agree substantially in their accounts of the baptism of Jesus by John the Baptist. Mark, "the faithful echo of the primitive oral tradition," gives the basic sketch of the event (1:9-11). Jesus was baptized in the Jordan by John, and this action was followed by a theophany comprising the following elements: the opening of the heavens, the descent of the Spirit as a dove and a voice from heaven saying "Thou art my beloved Son, in thee I am well pleased." The account in Matthew's gospel, 3:13-17, retains these essential notes, but it is characterized by an addition which is considered a theological elaboration. St. Luke's treatment, 3:21, 22, is especially succinct. There is only an indirect reference to the baptism, the theophany is reported with all elements present, but the incident is given a theological and literary cast which is typical of Luke. St. John does not repeat a description of the incident in his gospel but he refers to it in the words of John the Baptist (1:31-34). This individual viewpoint will be important in considering the nature and purpose of the theophany.

Regarding the context of the acount, it is important to note that in each of the gospels the baptism opens the public life of Jesus. The infancy narratives and the account of John's preparatory mission culminate at this point; attention is now focused on the words and actions of Jesus himself.

Father Lagrange indicates that this event in Christ's life is actually two distinct and separate happenings, the baptism and the subsequent theophany.[1] Consequently, we will examine them separately, give the exegesis of the texts and relate them to one another. Secondly, we will consider the theological interpretation of the event and we will attempt to present the theological understanding of Christ's baptism which is that of the apostles and evangelists themselves, more or less explicit in the gospels and Acts of the Apostles.

ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT

> And it came to pass in those days, that Jesus came from Nazareth in Galilee and was baptized by John in the Jordan. (Mark 1:9)

John the Baptist's office is unique in the history of salvation. His function was two-fold, to preach and baptize. But each of these activities was essentially and immediately related to the impending arrival of the Messiah. He preached a moral reform which would prepare the Jews to receive and follow their Deliverer. The interior conversion of life was to be visibly proclaimed and confirmed by the act of baptism with water. Added to this there seems to have been a confession of sins by the proselytes. This baptism of John had no connection with Jewish ritual ablutions or rites of initiation, and it is only intelligible in relation to the new order which it anticipated.[2] Through John's mission there was established, within the Chosen People, a group of pious Jews who were especially prepared to receive the redemptive gift of the Messiah. This was a provisional order, more closely related to the new era than to the old, whose insufficiency was admitted by John. "I indeed baptize you with water. But one mightier than I is coming . . . he will baptize you with the Holy Spirit and with fire." (Luke 3:16) Baptism with water alone seemed to signify renunciation of the past, a change of one's way of life. The new life, which John could only prepare for, would come with baptism, in water *and* the Spirit. This new life could only be initiated in the repentant soul by "he who is to come."[3]

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[1] M.-J. Lagrange, *Évangile selon saint Marc* (Paris: Gabalda, 1922), p. 12. "Ce n'est pas grâce à Jean que Jésus a reçu l'Ésprit, car déjà le rite était terminé, mais c'est aussitôt après, avant même qu'il soit sorti de l'eau."

Jesus left his hidden life at Nazareth and stepped into this milieu of religious reform and messianic expectation. Just as other men of good faith were baptized by John, he also was baptized by him. There is no indication that his baptism was conspicuous or unique. There is only the merest, off-hand mention that it happened. Exegetes in the past have been greatly concerned with the possible circumstances. Was it private, or were others present? Only Luke refers to other people: ". . . when all the people had been baptized, Jesus also having been baptized. . . ." The obvious indication is that Jesus came just as the others, as one of the crowd. Lagrange notes that Christ submitted to baptism in the same spirit that he submitted to circumcision and presentation in the Temple.[4] In this unostentatious manner Christ identifies himself with mankind in its humbled condition. Moreover, he identifies himself with that group which represents the purest religious strain of the old order. John the Baptist, in his moral teaching and in his messianic doctrine, was the authentic prophet sent by God for this period. Under his leadership at least a part of the Chosen People were drawn up to the ultimate disposition for the reception of the Messiah. Christ's submission to John's baptism indicated his acknowledgement of the truth of John's mission. He would infinitely transcend John, but this was the valid point of contact between the two successive dispensations.

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[2] H. Hobout, art. "Jean Baptiste," DTC, VIII, 1 (1947), 650-51.

[3] D. Buzy, *The Life of Saint John the Baptist* (London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 1933), pp. 110-13.

[4] M.-J. Lagrange, *Évangile selon saint Luc* (Paris: Gabalda, 1921), p. 114.

Was Christ's submission to baptism an indication that he himself had sinned, or that he considered himself a sinner? Orthodox faith naturally eliminates the possibility. Loisy answers this question: Christ accepted baptism "to indicate his will to live without defilement, without admitting to any sins which he had not committed; he manifests his readiness to prepare, in every way possible, for the coming of the Kingdom."[5]

At this point in Matthew's gospel there is added a short exchange between Jesus and John:

> And John was for hindering him, and said, "It is I who ought to be baptized by thee, and doest thou come to me? But Jesus answered and said to him, "Let it be so now, for so it becomes us to fulfill all justice." Then he permitted him. (Matthew 3:14-15)

There is an obvious difficulty in attempting to harmonize these words with those of the Baptist in John 1:31-33. In this latter passage, John himself admits that until the theophany he did not recognize Christ as the Messiah. Exegetes in the past have attempted to solve the problem by distinguishing various modes and degrees of the understanding John had of Christ. St. Augustine maintained that Jesus and John had always known one another, but that the theophany finally revealed to John the full nature of Christ's power and mission. On the other hand, St. John Chrysostom believed that they had not known one another previously, that the recognition in Matthew 3:14 was through a special revelation, and that the theophany completed and perfected

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[5] This statement of Loisy is cited by Lagrange, *Saint Matthieu*, p. 57. ". . . pour signifier sa volonté de vivre purement, sans avouer des péchés qu'il n'avait pas commis; il manifestait sa résolution de se préparer, selon son pouvoir, à l'avènement du royaume."

John's understanding. Later exegetes have guessed that John's initial recognition was a natural presentiment drawn from the obvious integrity and dignity of Christ. Father Buzy, among contemporary scholars, maintained that the theophany was John's official, "juridical" notification of Jesus' messiahship, which would not preclude recognition by other natural or supernatural means.[6]

We may accept, however, a recent opinion that considers Matthew 3:14-15 as an addition to the primitive account, appearing in the final, canonical version of Matthew. The dialogue was probably inserted to answer heretical charges that Christ had literally been a sinful human being. The problem had not presented itself at the time of the composition of Mark and Luke, who would certainly have included this personal testimony and explanation by Jesus if it had been traditional. This exchange is thus considered as an apologetic device, introduced on the basis of the theological understanding of the sacred writer.[7] The words do have a special significance within the theological scheme of St. Matthew. "To fulfill" is a recurring concept in this gospel; it characterizes Christ's relationship to the Old Covenant. Matthew's whole concern is to demonstrate Christ as the perfection of the old order, an order that was terminating in the mission of the Baptist. The fulfillment of "all justice" is the obedient adherence of Christ to the plan of God, the schedule of the history of salvation determined in the mind of God.

Mark and Luke thus indicate how natural Christ's humanity and humble spirit seemed to his early followers. This is evident in their casual references to the baptism. But by the time of the final composition of Matthew, the paradoxical situation was better appreciated; the submission of the Messiah to his Precursor was indeed extraordinary. "This was God's plan for a period of transition."[8]

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[6] The Patristic opinions are listed by Buzy, *Saint Matthieu, La Sainte Bible*, ed. Pirot-Clamer, IX, p. 34.

[7] A. Légault, "Le baptême de Jésus et la doctrine du Serviteur souffrant," *Sciences Ecclésiastiques*, XIII (1961), 150-51.

[8] Lagrange, *Saint Matthieu*, p. 57.

> And immediately on coming up from the water he saw the heavens opened . . . (Mark 1:10)

It is evident from their accounts that the sacred writers intended to present Christ's baptism as a "backdrop" for the theophany which followed.[9] Christ's baptism provided the occasion for a theophany, a manifestation of the divinity. By an examination of the elements of the theophany we may attempt to discover the revelation which was made, and the persons for whom it was intended.

As Christ came out of the water "the heavens opened." This first part of the theophany has been invested with varying grades of significance. In the least, it may be a simple anticipation of the passage of the dove. With a Semitic notion of the heavens, they would obviously have to open if anything were to pass through them.[10] However this may also be a literary allusion to an Old Testament vocation scene.[11] The prophet Ezechiel reported the opening of the heavens at the beginning of his prophetic career (Ezechiel 1:1). But it should be noted that the heavens opened to Ezechiel as a disclosure of the interior of heaven. At Christ's baptism the opening is obviously ordered to the descent of the dove. It has also been maintained that this phrase is an implicit allusion to Isaiah 64:1, "O that thou wouldst rend the heavens, and wouldst come down." Interpreted in the light of this passage and its context, the baptism theophany would indicate a new era of grace, the renewal of happy relations between God and man.[12]

> he saw . . . the Spirit, as a dove, descending and remaining upon him. (Mark 1:10)

Matthew and Mark mention that Christ saw this descent of the Spirit. Mark adds that the Spirit "remained upon him." Luke lays stress on the corporeal form assumed by the Holy Spirit. This is not a mere literary personification of God's power but is undoubtedly an explicit reference to the Holy Spirit in his individual, personal being. Mark refers to "the Spirit" (*to pneuma*), Matthew to "the Spirit of God" (*to pneuma tou theou*), but Luke is most explicit in referring to "the Holy Spirit" (*to pneuma to agion*). By insisting on the corporeal form of the apparition, St. Luke is certainly emphasizing the objective and external nature of the theophany, and perhaps there may be a definite reference to the individual persons of the Trinity.[13] The sacred writers certainly comprehended the presence and activity of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as they wrote their accounts of the baptism theophany. But this is not to assert that the event itself was intended to reveal the mystery of the Trinity. This could not have been comprehended by the onlookers at the Jordan, probably not even by John the Baptist. The presence of the Spirit, his visible presence, primarily indicates his real activity at this moment of Christ's life. But this anticipates the conclusion of this paper.

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[9] This is especially true, as Father Lagrange notes, in Luke's gospel, but the relative importance is also evident in the other three gospels.

[10] D. Buzy, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-40.

[11] I. de la Potterie, "L'onction du Christ," *Nouvelle Revue Théologique,* LXXX (1958), 234.

[12] A. Feuillet, "Le Baptême de Jésus d'après l'Évangile selon saint Marc," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly,* XXI (1959), 469 ff.

Is there a particular significance to the appearance of the Spirit in the form of a dove? Benoit draws a direct parallel to Genesis 1:2 where the Spirit broods over the primal waters of creation. At the baptism then, the Holy Spirit, the power of God, broods over the waters of the new creation.[14] Another Old Testament instance of the bird figure occurs in Deuteronomy 32:11. In the Canticle of Moses the divine activity in the exodus is described "as the eagle enticing her young to fly; and hovering over them, he spread his wings . . ." Here too, in the exodus, a new creation is initated by the abiding and ever active power of God. We may also refer to the opinion that this descent of the Spirit is the answer to Christ's prayer which Luke mentions, characteristically. According to André Feuillet,[15] this prayer is that alluded to above, taken from Isaiah 64:1: "O that thou wouldst rend the heavens, and wouldst come down." Feuillet also attempts to see the dove as manifesting Jesus as the embodiment and representative of the new Israel, the new people of God.[16]

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[13] Lagrange, *Saint Luc*, p. 114.

[14] *La Sainte Bible de Jerusalem* (Paris: Cerf, 1956), Matthieu 3:16, p. 1293.

[15] Feuillet, *op. cit.*, p. 470.

> And there came a voice from the heavens, "Thou art my beloved Son, in thee I am well pleased." (Mark 1:11)

The text as given here from Mark is also that found in Luke. Jesus is addressed in the second person. Matthew reads: "this is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased." Considerable effort has been expended to explain this discrepancy. The use of the third person in Matthew's gospel is often explained as a direct address to the Baptist and the observers of the theophany (whose existence in turn, is heavily based on this use of the third person). Mark, it is explained, was more concerned with the person of Christ and his "messianic secret," and therefore used the second person. Some recent exegetes however, ascribe the use of the third person to a characteristic of Matthew's gospel in its final Greek form where Old Testament quotations are generally given verbatim.[17] These words at the baptism are taken from Isaiah 42:1, where the third person is used. Mark and Luke then, either report the oral tradition directly, or they adapt the Isaian reference to their understanding of the event.

This statement, whatever variant is accepted, is nevertheless an explicit identification of Jesus as the Servant of Yahweh foretold in the prophecy of Isaiah.[18] The first "Song of the Servant" begins thus:

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[16] See Robert Siebeneck, "The Dove as Epiphany," *Worship,* XXXV (1961), 97-101. This article is a summary of Feuillet, "Le symbolisme de la colombe dans les récits evangéliques du baptême," *Recherches de religieuse,* 1958. Siebeneck writes: ". . . this apparition points to the fruit of the Spirit's communication. He descended on Jesus in the form of a dove to show that in Jesus, the new Israel, the new people takes its start." The connection between the figure of the dove and the people who come to new life in the Messiah is based on imagery in Osee (11:11), Psalms (73:19 and 67:14), and Canticle of Canticles (2:14; 5:2; 6:9). The connection seems rather tenuous.

[17] Légault, *op. cit.,* p. 161.

[18] See *Bible de Jerusalem,* notes on Isaiah 42 and 42:1. These contain a full outline of the prophecy of the Servant of Yahweh.

> Here is my servant whom I uphold,
> my chosen one with whom I am pleased,
> Upon whom I have put my spirit;
> he shall bring forth justice to the nations.
> (Isaiah 42:1)

We must note the obvious change of the title from "servant" in Isaiah to "son" in the gospels. At the same time that the identity of the prophesied Servant is revealed, that title is changed to one which is more significant, and one which in time, will be susceptible of a yet more profound interpretation. "The substitution of 'son' for 'servant' (permitted by the double meaning of the Greek word *paîs*) underlines the messianic and properly filial character of his relationship with the Father."[19]

It does not seem that this statement at the time of the baptism was intended to reveal the divine sonship of Jesus anymore than the appearance of the dove was intended to reveal the personal individuality of the Holy Spirit, or the whole event was intended formally to reveal the Trinity. While all this was certainly latent in the action which occurred, the dispositions of any observers would certainly preclude the effective revelation of such mysteries in a single moment. "Son of God" was understood, at the time, to imply a relationship of particular intimacy founded on God's predilection. Later the Apostles would come to realize the full implication of this expression.[20] However, the sacred writers wrote their gospels in the light of this fuller understanding. So that St. Luke for example, between 70 and 80 A.D., could write his two verses on the baptism with the particular intention of stressing the divine sonship. Lagrange writes that

> the scant importance which he attaches to the baptism throws into relief the meaning of this declaration. It corresponds exactly to what we are given to understand by the words of the angel [at the An-

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[19] *Ibid.*, note on Matthew 3:17.
[20] *Ibid.*, note on Matthew 4:3.

> nunciation]. . . . After Jesus had been baptized, the Holy Spirit appears, just as he had come upon Mary at the moment of the supernatural conception, and the Father recognizes his Son.[21]

Another biblical theologian sees this declaration of sonship as "an all important precision from the doctrinal point of view, for it places us in a trinitarian context."[22]

It remains necessary to try to determine what the theophany could have revealed to any observers who might have witnessed it on that day of Our Lord's baptism. Who did witness the theophany? For whom was this miraculous disclosure of the divine operations intended? The theophany was an external, objective, observable phenomenon. This is the obvious assertion of the sacred writers. Matthew and Mark say that Jesus saw the Spirit descending from the opened heavens; Luke makes a point of the corporeal form of the apparition. Moreover, there is the explicit statement of John the Baptist in John 1:31-34 that he too saw the apparition.[23]

Was the theophany observed by a crowd of onlookers and the disciples of John? There is nothing in the texts to affirm positively that it was. In the past, Catholic scholars, anxious to maintain the objectivity of the event and to refute the Rationalists, clung to the possibility of actual witnesses. But this possibility rests only on the lack of positive denial. If people were present (and this would have been the normal circumstance), the most we could suppose is that seeing they did not see, and hearing they did not comprehend.[24]

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[21] Lagrange, *Saint Luc,* p. 115. "Le peu d'importance qu'il attache au baptême met davantage en relief la valeur de cette déclaration. Elle correspond exactement à ce qu'on pouvait attendre de la parole de l'ange . . . Après que Jésus a été baptisé, l'Espirit-Saint apparaît, comme au moment de la conception surnaturelle il était venu sur Marie, et le Père reconnaît son Fils."

[22] de la Potterie, *op. cit.,* p. 237.

[23] Legault, in the article cited above, maintains that the theophany signifies a merely subjective experience of Jesus. The testimony of the Baptist in John 1 is explained as anti-Johannite polemic introduced by the Evangelist to emphasize the superiority of Christ over the Baptist. Thus, Legault ignores the explicit assertion of the text in order to maintain his hypothesis. He also passes over the obvious arguments from the synoptics.

There is much reason however to maintain that John the Baptist did observe and understand the phenomenon to some extent. We have his explicit acknowledgment in John's gospel. Moreover, his entire vocation was to witness to the Messiah and to designate him on his arrival. In this sense some indication of the Messiah's identity was almost demanded by the Precursor's vocation. His mission had been to dispose the people morally so that, when the Messiah did arrive, they would recognize him. It is unimaginable that John himself would not be disposed for this recognition. We may conclude that the theophany at Christ's baptism was primarily intended for John's sight and hearing.[25]

Did the theophany have any significance for Christ? The form of direct address in Mark and Luke indicates that it was meaningful for him. It is also explicit that he saw the heavens open and the dove descend. St. Augustine dismissed this question: why should the Father tell Christ what he already knew? But it seems equally untenable that Christ would have undergone such events merely to create an impression. To overemphasize the divine knowledge of Christ detracts from his humanity and regards much of his life as little more than a pretense. Christ could acquire knowledge because he possessed a true human nature, and operated humanly by means of it. Moreover, his emotions were susceptible of the encouragement which could be offered through external phenomena and circumstances.[26] This would seem to be true especially at the crucial moment when his public ministry began. Nevertheless, the knowledge to be had from the theophany would still only have been accidental to the perfect self-consciousness which he had always enjoyed.

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[24] J. Lebreton, art. "Jésus-Christ," *Dict. de la Bible: Supplément,* IV (1949), 989. See also Buzy, *op. cit.,* pp. 140-44.

[25] It is necessary to note that even the Baptist could have had a limited comprehension of the theophany. It depends on his intention in sending his disciples to Christ (Matth. 11:2-6). Cf. J. Dupont, "L'ambassade de Jean-Baptiste," *Nouvelle Revue Théologique,* LXXXIII (1961).

[26] *Sum. theol.,* III, q. 9, a. 4; q. 12, a. 2.

INTERPRETATION OF THE EVENT

General interpretations of the baptism-theophany tend to fall into the usual conservative and radical extremes. The conservative examination of the event sees in it a revelation of the Holy Trinity and/or the divine sonship of Christ. Often too, there is the immediate conclusion that this is the institution of the sacrament of Baptism. St. Augustine limited it to a prefiguration of the sacrament:

> Nec sane tunc unctus est Christus Spiritu sancto, quando super eum baptizatum velut columba descendit: tunc enim corpus suum, id est, Ecclesiam suam praefigurare dignatus est, in qua praecipue baptizati accipiunt Spiritum sanctum . . . Absurdissimum est enim, ut credamus eum cum jam triginta esset annorum . . . accepisse Spiritum sanctum: sed venisse illum ad baptisma, sicut sine ullo omnino peccato, ita non sine Spiritu sancto.[27]

This citation will suffice to characterize the Patristic interpretations of the baptism-theophany. Others will see in it the consecration of the waters for Christian baptism, or an example for his followers, or the seal of approval on John's mission. But the conservative opinion always refuses to admit any change in Christ at the time of this event.

On the other hand the radical interpretation sees in the baptism that point in Christ's life when he *became* the Messiah. Wellhausen's opinion is usually cited first: "the meaning of the baptism is that Jesus was changed into the Messiah; he entered the water a man like any other, and he came out the Son of God."[28] Loisy marked this as the occasion on which Christ became conscious of this messianic vocation. Always there is the assumption that what is described as an external, visible phenomenon of a supernatural character is an impossibility. Therefore it signifies a subjective experience. Christ is thus conceived as a visionary, whether inspired or deluded, of purely human origin.

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[27] *De trinitate,* XV, c. 26. PL 42, 1094.

[28] Wellhausen is cited by Lagrange, *Saint Marc,* p. 11. "Le sens du baptême est de changer Jésus en Messie; il entre dans l'eau homme comme un autre, il en sort Fils de Dieu."

Lagrange rejected the gratuitous assertions of the Rationalists who paid little attention to arguments from the infancy narratives on the nature of Christ or to his own words on his relationship with the Father. Yet Lagrange also admitted the inadequacy of the conservative opinion. In his commentary on St. Mark, he admits that the text obviously indicates a divine activity working a real change in Christ's life. His effort therefore was to indicate a middle course of interpretation. He pointed out that the descent of the Holy Spirit on Christ in a real, effective sense does not necessarily mean the infusion of sanctifying grace. It is not here intended to signify an entitative constitution of a Messiah. Examining the passage in the light of the scriptures, he wrote: "in reality the descent of the Spirit of God *in the Old Testament,* does not signify the infusion of sanctifying grace, but *a special impulse given for a certain task.*"[29] The entitative constitution of Christ as two natures in the single person is not changed in any way. The change is in Christ's activity. ". . . the account of Mark means therefore that Jesus' mission comes from God, that he will begin it under his impulse and be assured by his aid."[30] Thus, the baptism-theophany is interpreted as the inauguration of Christ's messianic career. This is an interpretation which clearly agrees with the context and text of the accounts of the gospels.

This interpretation of Lagrange seems to have been accepted by all Catholic exegetes in its general lines. However, further studies have found details and allusions which give a more profound and more specific character to the event.

Following Oscar Cullman, a number of scholars have pursued the notion that the theophany was the revelation of Christ's vocation to suffering.[31] The voice from heaven, by identifying Christ as the Servant of Yahweh, also identifies him as the Suffering Servant. The citation of Isaiah 42:1 thus reveals all the aspects of the Messiah which are indicated through all the Songs of the Servant. These culminate in the prophecies of propitiatory suffering in chapter 53. This interpretation, then, considers the baptism-theophany as a view toward Calvary, and it finds in Christ's anticipation of his suffering and death some support for making this connection.[32]

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[29] *Ibid.,* p. 12.

[30] *Ibid.*

The concept of the Suffering Servant has an undoubted relationship to the baptism-theophany and it contributes much to our understanding of the event. But we will now consider a recent theory which seems to state its significance most precisely and fully. I. de la Potterie, S.J., in his study "L'onction du Christ," maintains that

> if one wishes to keep within the perspective of the New Testament writers, it is better not to speak of a messianic consecration . . . In the theophany at the Jordan, Jesus is designated as *the prophet* who comes to announce the good news, as the Servant of Yahweh, even as the Son of God. But the anointing which he receives is presented as *a prophetic anointing.*[33]

Once we have considered this concept of prophetic anointing and presented the evidence for its application to the baptism-theophany, it will be possible to return to the notion of the Suffering Servant and its applicability.

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[31] Legault (*art. cit.*, p. 166) maintains that in the subjective experience of the baptism-theophany Christ received "if not the first revelation, at least the confirmation of his vocation as the Suffering Servant." F.-M. Braun, O.P. (*St. Jean, La Sainte Bible,* ed. Pirot-Clamer, X, p. 323), holds an objective theophany which is intended as a revelation for the Baptist. John 1:29-34 marks a transition in the Precursor's understanding of the Messiah: he had expected a forceful, powerful judge, but the theophany reveals to him the true notion of the suffering, sacrificial lamb.

[32] Mark 10:38; Luke 12:5.

[33] de la Potterie, *op. cit.,* p. 239: "Si on veut rester dans cette perspective des auteurs néotestamentaires, il vaut mieux ne pas encore parler de consécration messianique pour l'onction de Jésus au Jourdain. . . . A la théophanie du Jourdain, Jésus est designé comme le prophète qui va annoncer la bonne nouvelle, comme le Serviteur de Yahvé, comme le Fils même de Dieu. Mais l'onction qui'il reçoit est présentée comme une onction prophétique."

The biblical concept of "anointing" must first be briefly outlined. Anointing, in the Old Testament, signified a vehicle through which were passed supernatural gifts appropriate to a certain office. Only one designated by the divine choice received this ritual consecration, and he was set apart from profane activity for the service of God. His anointing was the symbol of his election and his possession of Yahweh's spirit. This ritual, which externally proclaimed the internal charism, was properly associated with the office of king. But it was metaphorically applied to the prophetic office also. There is no evidence that any prophet was ever ritually anointed, but they were considered so because they fulfilled the more essential requisites of choice by God and possession of his Spirit. "The Spirit of the Lord God is upon me," said Isaiah, "for the Lord has anointed me." (Isaiah 61:1). The Deliverer whom the Chosen People awaited was to be the anointed one, the Messiah. The traditional hope was for a kingly messiah, and this notion often tended to degenerate because of worldly and political preoccupations among the people and their leaders. There was a tradition of prophetic messianism, a post-exilic notion, found in the prophecies of Isaiah. It was never very popular.[34]

The key to this interpretation of Christ's baptism is found in Acts 10:36-38. This passage is taken from Peter's discourse to Cornelius, which is considered to be in itself a brief sketch of the early kerygma.

> [God] sent his word to the children of Israel, preaching peace through Jesus Christ [who is Lord of all]. You know what took place throughout Judea; for he began in Galilee after the baptism preached by John: how God anointed Jesus of Nazareth with the Holy Spirit and with power, and he went about doing good and healing all who were in the power of the devil; for God was with him.

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[34] E. Cothenet, art. "Onction," *Dict. de la Bible: Supplément*, VI (1960), 701-31. See also Claude Peifer, "Anointing in the Old Testament," *Worship*, XXXV (1961), 577-86, and "Jesus, the Anointed of Israel," *Worship*, XXXVI (1961), 26-35.

Here we have a New Testament comment on the inauguration of Jesus' mission in Old Testament terms. It may be compared to a description of the prophetic office in Isaiah 52:7:

> How beautiful upon the mountains are the feet of him that bringeth good tidings, and that preacheth peace: of him that showeth forth good, that preacheth salvation, that saith to Sion: Thy God shall reign.

Again, the prophetic office, and more specifically the prophetic anointing, are described in Isaiah 61:1, 2:

> The Spirit of the Lord is upon me because he has anointed me: to bring good news to the poor he has sent me, to proclaim to the captives release, and sight to the blind; to set at liberty the oppressed, to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord, and the day of recompense.

At the baptism-theophany the voice from heaven quotes (with the changes already noted) the text of Isaiah 42:1, "Here is my servant whom I uphold, my chosen one with whom I am pleased." This text continues: "upon whom I have put my spirit." These words are not reported in the gospels but there is the visible evidence of the descending Spirit. This is the gift of the spirit which is peculiar to the prophetic office: "and the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him: the spirit of wisdom, and of understanding, the spirit of counsel, and of fortitude, the spirit of knowledge, and of godliness." (Isaiah 11:2)[35]

After the baptism-theophany the presence and activity of the prophetic Spirit in Jesus is frequently referred to. "Now Jesus, full of the Holy Spirit, returned from the Jordan, and was led by the Spirit about the desert . . ." (Luke 4:1) Following the temptation account, in Luke 4:14 and the following verses, we have the clearest references to Jesus' prophetic mission. "And Jesus returned in the power of the Spirit in Galilee. . . ." It was there, in the synagogue while teaching, that he quoted the text of Isaiah 61 and announced to the people that "today this scripture has been fulfilled in your hearing." References to the character, function, and activities of the prophet are multiplied in these verses, indicating that the prophetic Messiah, foretold in Isaiah, and revealed in his baptism in the Jordan, had begun his work.[36]

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[35] See *Bible de Jerusalem,* notes on Isaiah 42:1 and 11:2.

Christ also identified himself as the prophetic Messiah in Matthew 11:2-6 and Luke 7:18-23. While John the Baptist was imprisoned he sent two of his disciples to Christ with the question "art thou he who is to come, or shall we look for another?" Echoing the words of Isaiah, Christ replied "Go and report to John what you have heard and seen: the blind see, the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead rise, the poor have the gospel preached to them. . ." Whatever John's understanding or intention was at the time, Christ merely made more explicit what had been revealed at his baptism-theophany.

Luke's understanding of the prophetic character of Christ's baptism is further revealed when we compare his account of it with his account of the descent of the Holy Spirit on the apostles at Pentecost in Acts 2:1-4. The parallelism is evident, indicating the analogy between the descent of the Spirit upon Christ and his descent upon the apostles. The specific character and purpose of this Pentecostal gift of the Spirit is declared by Peter in his discourse at the time in his appeal to the prophecy of Joel: ". . . in those days I will pour forth of my Spirit, and they shall prophesy . . ." (Joel 3:1-5). De la Potterie concludes that "Jesus' baptism inaugurates his mission to preach the good news, just as the baptism of the disciples in the Spirit inaugurates the witness which they will have to declare to the ends of the earth."[37]

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[36] This understanding of Christ as prophet is particularly noticeable in Luke, in both the Gospel and the Acts. The scriptural and patristic portrait of Christ as prophet is developed by Jean Danielou, "Le Christ Prophète," *La Vie Spirituelle*, LXXVIII (1948), 154-170.

[37] de la Potterie, *op. cit.*, p. 238: ". . . le baptême Jésus inaugure sa mission de prêcher l'évangile, comme le baptême des disciples dans l'Esprit inaugure le témoignage qu'ils auront à rendre jusquau'aux extrémités du monde."

Having established that the prophetic character of Christ's vocation was the subject of the baptism theophany, we may now return to the notion of suffering which is implicit in it. Since Christ was identified as the Servant of Yahweh, his vocation to suffering could be discovered by a complete understanding of the character and mission of the Servant as it is set forth in Isaiah. In the fifty-third chapter of the prophecy this aspect is clearly indicated. That this was, in time, understood by the apostles is clear from the text of Acts 4:27. In a context concerned with the passion and death of Christ we find the words "thy holy servant Jesus, whom thou hast anointed . . ." On this basis, Cullmann and those who follow him maintain that the vocation to suffering is the primary revelation of the baptism theophany. In reply to this position, de la Potterie criticizes Cullmann's over-concern with Christ's self-consciousness and his personal understanding of his vocation. It would seem rather that the revelation made at the baptism was not primarily intended for Christ, but for John (and perhaps indirectly, for those disciples of John who would shortly attach themselves to Christ). But there is no evidence that anybody besides Christ anticipated the climax in suffering which his career would have. His own apostles certainly did not. They did recognize his prophetic character, but only after he suffered and died did they come to understand fully that this was essentially involved in the mission of the Servant of Yahweh. The text of Acts 4:27 is the result of post-Resurrection reflection and realization.[38] Christ had understood from the beginning and he spoke of it mysteriously to his yet uncomprehending followers: "can you drink of the cup of which I drink, or be baptized with the baptism with which I am to be baptized?" (Mark 10:38).[39] The baptism theophany revealed immediately that Christ was a prophet, but only Christ himself realized that his baptism was a consecration for his death. It is unreasonable to maintain that this realization did not come to him until the baptism, for this would imply that he submitted to it without a knowledge of what would be required of him.

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[38] *Ibid.*, pp. 239-46.

[39] See also Matth. 20:28, 26:28, Mark 10:45.

CONCLUSION

In the beginning of this paper we clearly distinguished between the baptism of Jesus and the theophany which it occasioned. In concluding it, it seems more helpful to make a three-fold distinction: the baptism, the prophetic anointing, and the theophany.

In submitting to the baptism of water, Jesus identified himself with mankind in its humble state. Though there is no sin in him, this submission does not appear as a pretense; it is evidence of the true humanity of Christ and his solidarity with this sinful race. Moreover, he identifies himself with the sinful humanity which, according to the plan of the Heavenly Father, can only return to grace through suffering and sacrifice. In submitting to the baptism of John, Jesus connects his mission of fulfillment to the one true tradition of messianic anticipation in the old order. John was sent by God to prepare the hearts of men for the Messiah by preaching to them a religion of repentance and virtue. In associating himself with John, Jesus bypassed the corrupt traditions which awaited with anguish and impatience a mere political leader. The baptism is a background; it describes the situation in which God will intervene.

The second element of this event was the anointing of Christ for his prophetic mission; this was the descent of the Spirit as an invisible, spiritual impulse toward the public ministry. This is not an entitative consecration. It does not alter the nature of Christ or make him anything that he had not previously been. This is the initial activation of the gift of the Spirit which he already possessed by nature. We have attempted to substantiate this interpretation by showing that it was the understanding of the apostles and evangelists themselves as they wrote and preached it in terms of Old Testament fulfillment.

Thirdly, the anointing by the Holy Spirit was accompanied by a theophany. This was an objectively observable phenomenon which revealed the invisible and spiritual action of the anointing. The visible dove, the audible voice, the recognizable citation of Isaiah's prophecy, were primarily intended for the Precursor. Christ too, because of his human nature, could appreciate and take consolation in these sensible signs of the divine love and power in which he participated and which would accomplish, through his teaching and his suffering and death, the redemption of his brethren.

VINCENT WEBER, O.P.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRAYER TO CHRIST

As you have faith
in God, have faith in me.
The Gospel of St. John

It is depressing at times to read and study theology and the history of dogma as a series of 'challenges and responses,' of thrust by heresy and counter-thrust by orthodoxy. Things never seem to get done until some heretic sets the pot boiling. But with all its drawbacks, such a method seems indispensable. It is often only in the blinding flash of polemical lightening that we glimpse briefly the outlines of an earlier faith and piety.

There is a unity in Christology, and one problem leads on to another, one facet illumines many others. The problem of the development of prayer to Christ is almost a *summula* of Christology. If Christology is but a scientific answer to the question: "What think you of Christ?," then the study of the growth of prayer to Christ reveals itself as a sort of touchstone of orthodoxy.

That this should be so is not surprising. The question of the adoration of Christ is bound to raise problems, for it involves our very concept of Christ. Is he God-Man, or he is a divinized creature, or divinity masquerading as a man? The question of how we pray to Christ—and whether we pray to him—elicits responses as varied as the teachings on his humanity, his divinity and their union. To those who deny his humanity, prayer through the mediatorship of Christ is unnecessary; to those who deny his divinity, prayer to Christ is blasphemy.

I

When and how did prayer to Christ develop? One source of a possible answer might be exegetical. Sacred Scripture proclaims expressly the necessity of adoring Jesus Christ. At the pool of Bethsaida, Jesus told the Jews: "the Father has left all judgment to the Son, so that all may reverence the Son just as they reverence the Father; to deny reverence to the Son is to deny reverence to the Father also" (John 5:23-4). This communication from the Father to the Son demands that all men give the Son equal honor. The context leaves no doubt: equal honor—nay, identical honor—is to be accorded to Christ as to God. The enemies of Jesus, on this occasion drew the same conclusion, hating him for "treating himself as equal with God" (John 5:18).

St. Paul stoutly affirmed this unity of adoration of the Father and the Son. To the Philippians he wrote that "everything in heaven and on earth and under the earth must bend the knee before the name of Jesus, and every tongue must confess Jesus Christ as the Lord, dwelling in the glory of the Father" (Phil. 2:10-11). Expressing the theme of judgment, St. Paul told the Romans that "we shall all one day stand before the judgment seat of Jesus Christ . . . and so each one of us will have to give an account of himself before God" (Rom. 14:10-12). This is not an exclusive Pauline concept; the unity of adoration is expressed by St. Peter (2 Peter 3:18) and by St. John (Apoc. 5:13). Indeed, in St. Paul and St. John there is a close relationship: the Father and the Son constitute the same kingdom (Ephes. 5:5 and Apoc. 12:10); they have a single throne (Heb. 1:13

and Apoc. 22:1-3). In the New Jerusalem which St. John visioned, Father and Son are its illumination: "for the glory of God shone there, and the Lamb gave it light" (Apoc. 21:23); to them are offered the first-fruits of those "ransomed for God and the Lamb" (Apoc. 14:3).

Cult and adoration are expressed especially by acts of faith, hope and charity. These are acts that are commanded in honor of Christ as well as of the Father. "As you have faith in God, have faith in me," said Jesus (John 14:1); this faith is the principle of the remission of sins, of justification and of salvation. To those who do not believe in the name of Jesus, the awful sentence of judgment and condemnation has already been spoken (John 3:18; 6:47; 11:25; Acts 10:43; Gal. 2:16; 1 Peter 1:8-9; 1 Jn. 3:23). The cult of Christ also is an expression of our hope (1 Tim. 1:1) for in his name is salvation (Acts 4:12) and all who ask in his name receive (Mt. 18:19-20; 28:20; Luke 21:15; John 14:13, 14; 15:5; 16:33). But Jesus is even more than the guarantor of our salvation, the security of our hope; he is its object as well (1 Jn. 3:2, 3; Mt., 5:8; 18:10; 1 Cor. 13:12; Phil. 1:23; Tit. 2:13; Apoc. 22:17, 20). He is above all the object of our love (Mt. 10:37; Luke 14:26).

But now we are confronted with a paradox. For we have now, it seems, proved too much. The game is given away when we realize that these texts and their traditional exegesis, while they prove that we owe adoration to Christ, are primarily proofs of his divinity. Here our theological excogitations have caught us up short, for the development of prayer to Christ has eluded us in this process. We have a theological background, a sound Scriptural basis; but if this were all, then there would be no need even to pose the problem. The problem however is real, for we must ask what the primitive Church did. And here we come face to face with an embarrasing fact: seemingly the primitive Church did not pray to Christ!

Father Josef Nielen, in his book on *The Earliest Christian Liturgy*, recognized this problem.[1] But in his endeavor to solve it, he seems to go beyond the evidence at hand. He begins with a basic fact: the importance of Christ throughout the New Testament. The Christians realized that their salvation and eternal glory lay only through union with Christ. Hence the formula 'in Christ' designates a life of the most intimate union with the Savior. God can be called 'Father' by Christians because of their union with Christ who is Mediator. But the Christology of the New Testament does not only portray Christ as giving salvation through his mediation. There are texts, as we have seen, which imply the equality of the glorified Christ and God. Even the term 'Lord' implies this, for Jewish Hellenism was accustomed at this time to call Yahweh 'Lord.' Hence the Christian use of 'Lord' to refer to Christ takes on an added significance (Acts 7:59; 1 Cor. 16:22; Apoc. 22:20).

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[1] Nielen, Josep, *The Earliest Christian Liturgy*, trans. P. Cummins (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1941).

Even more common than 'Lord' was the use of such terms as 'Child of God' or 'Servant of God' (Acts 3:13; 3:26; 4:27, 30; 8:32 ff). At this very early stage in the Church we find the idea that the name of Jesus conveys powers of salvation in favor of the Christian community. Hence again we feel, says Fr. Nielen, that the invocation of the name Jesus leads to liturgical veneration of him who bears the name.[2]

According to Fr. Nielen, prayer to God in the name of Jesus developed naturally into prayer *to* Jesus, as was guaranteed by Christ himself (John 14:13). St. Paul says that the Christians are "those who call on the name of Our Lord Jesus Christ" (Rom. 10:12 f). This underlines the fact that they are believers in Jesus and invokers, or adorers, of Jesus, for in Greek literature, 'to call upon' is used in the specific sense of praying to the gods. Indeed, the Septuagint translated the Hebrew verb 'to pray' with the Greek 'to call upon the name of the Lord.'[3]

The oldest private prayer *to* Christ is that of St. Stephen (Acts 7:59-60); the oldest public prayer to Christ Father Nielen finds in the first epistle to the Corinthians (16:21-24). There, St. Paul has preserved the Aramaic 'Maranatha' because the prayer would be known to him and to his readers from their familiarity with a primitive Christian liturgy.[4] This theory has plausibility; but no one knows anything more about a liturgy containing such a prayer.

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[2] *Ibid.*, p. 169.

[3] Lesètre, H., "Priere," *Dictionnaire de la Bible*, ed. F. Vigouroux (Paris: Letouzet et Ané, 1912), vol. V, col. 663.

There is also an indirect argument, says Father Nielen. There are many prayerful wishes found throughout the Pauline letters; these spontaneous expressions of thought unite God and Christ in a single invocation (1 Thes. 2: 9-13 for example). In the prayer that follows, Jesus is addressed alone as 'the Lord,' a term which the ancient world reserved for those it reckoned with divinity.[5]

With all these arguments, Father Nielen concludes that the early Christians prayed more often to God *through* Christ than *to* Christ directly. Yet, he insists, they did pray to Christ. The Jews, says Father Nielen, prayed to God without any mediator; the Christians used a Mediator (Christ) when they prayed. Such a practice marked them off from the Jews. Jewish converts would continue the practice of prayer addressed to God through Christ, but the Gentile converts, following the lead of St. Paul, began the practice of prayer *to* Christ, not being bound by Jewish scruples.[8] But the plausibility of the reasoning here is undermined by an examination of the historical facts.

Father Nielen's case is stronger than one based solely on texts; but it still leaves many weak points. We can confidently state that by some process of "inevitability of development,' prayer *through* Christ will develop into prayer *to* Christ. Yet this 'development' does not take place for centuries, and then it is due to outside factors operating on the Christian faith. Father Nielen's argument once again proves the divinity of Christ and the early Christian recognition of this divinity; but that is not the question at issue.

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[4] Nielen, *op. cit.*, p. 222-3.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 223.

[6] Baumstark, A., *Vom geschichtlichen Werden der Liturgie* (Freiburg, 1923), p. 90.

Father H. D. Simonin, treating of the Christology of the early Church, tries another tack.[7] In the Old Testament, he observes, we find that God alone is prayed to; yet in the New Testament, we find many invocations to 'the name of the Lord' (Acts 25:9; 9:15-16; 22:16; 1 Cor. 1:2; Phil. 2:9-11). Similarly, the first example of prayer to Christ is that of the martyr-deacon, St. Stephen. St. John, in his description of the heavenly liturgy, shows the saints singing hymns to God and the Lamb (Apoc. 5:9, 12-13). St. Paul sings hymns in honor of Christ (1 Tim. 3:16) and frequently recites the doxology of his day: "per Dominum nostrum Jesus Christum." It is true that every act of praise and every prayer directed by the Christians to God goes through Christ. But sometimes, as the texts adduced indicate, latreutic formulas are offered to Christ alone (1 Peter 4:11; 2 Peter 3:18; 2 Tim. 4:18).[8]

Obviously, the early Christians posed no precise theological questions concerning the adoration due to Christ, the Incarnate Word. It seems clear that they accepted without hesitation the formulations of the New Testament and of the Apostolic catechesis. It is a truism that liturgy is essentially conservative; the manner and mode of worship is usually the last thing to change in any culture. Thus, before we look at the testimony of the early Fathers, let us examine the liturgical record and see what light it can shed upon this question.

The liturgy can be regarded as the sum-total of the public prayers and acts of worship instituted by the Church. It is a rich and varied source for seeking to understand the doctrine of the Church. In this very early period of the Church, the liturgies are characterized by a wide range of local diversity. The liturgy retains the basic teachings of the New Testament and preserves and passes on the traditional formulas of Christian faith. But each church, or diocese, tended to develop its own 'improvisation' and we look in vain, in this period, for liturgical uniformity. Between the early third century and the middle of the fourth, there will be a crystallization; from the fourth century onwards, liturgical organization and development will evolve more and more within the patriarchical sees. We will thus witness the rise of Roman, Alexandrian, Antiochene and finally Constantinopolitan liturgies. The greater part of the subsequent elaboration of these liturgies lies beyond the scope of our time and present interest Yet something of the differences between these liturgies will become apparent and will have an important bearing upon the development of prayer to Christ.

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[7] Simonin, H. D., *De doctrina Christologica ecclesiae primaevae* (Rome: Institutum Pontificum Internationale "Angelicum," 1942).

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 4-5.

While the *Didache* gives us the formulation of certain Eucharistic prayers, the most complete ancient text of an *anaphora* is that of St. Hippolytus (✠235): the so-called *Egyptian Church-Order*, which is, in reality, a variety of the primitive Roman liturgy.[9] It conforms to a traditional Trinitarian scheme; the Eucharistic prayer is addressed to the Father, the terminus of prayer and praise and the first source of all benefits. Christ is the Mediator of our thanksgiving because he was the mediator of our redemption. This Eucharistic action is an *anamnesis* of his Death and Resurrection. This ancient liturgy retains the New Testament scheme of prayer to God through Christ.

The 'prayer' found in the *Letter* of St. Clement to the Corinthians is not a sacred formulary; it is rather a petition composed in the style of such solemn liturgical prayers. It affords us therefore a glimpse, at least, of the liturgy of Apostolic times (*Epis.*, 59-61). In this 'prayer,' God the Father is addressed as 'the Creator of all things'; it is *through* His well-beloved Son . . . *in* His name . . . *through*

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[9] The Egyptian recension of Hippolytus' *Apostolic Tradition* is given the name "The Egyptian Church Order." St. Hippolytus, who died c. 235, was involved in conflicts with the church authorities at Rome but was reconciled and died a martyr's death. This work, completed c. 220 or earlier, was written originally in Greek. It was forgotten in the West, but in the East, because it came from Rome and purported to be of apostolic tradition, it enjoyed great renown. It can be found printed in full in the Veronese Palimpsest, ed. E. Hauler, *Didascaliae apostolorum fragmenta Veronensia latina; accedunt canonum qui dicuntur apostolorum et Aegyptiorum reliquiae*, fasc. 1 (Leipzig, 1900), pp. 101-121.

Jesus Christ . . . *through* the High Priest and Ruler of our souls, that petition is offered to God.[10]

The Roman liturgy, which preserved more of the ancient spirit than other liturgies, always addressed the Collects, or prayers, to God the Father. The prayers of the *Didache*, fore-runners of the ancient Roman liturgy, seem to be but applications of the rule laid down by St. Paul: "giving thanks always in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ to God the Father." In the ancient Church, as we can see from liturgical practice and law, direct address to Christ in the prayers was not allowed. At the Council of Hippo, in 393, at a date when Arian troubles were still plaguing the Church and the East had already changed many of its formulas, an explicit decree provided that all prayers at the altar should be directed to God the Father.[11] This law was observed in the Roman Church until 1000, despite the dangers which Arianism posed. It was not until the native Roman liturgy gave way before a Gallicized form from the north, that any form of address to Christ appeared in the prayers of this premier Apostolic See. The vitality of the opposition to such change can be illustrated by the fact that as late as the 9th Century, the *Capitularium Collectio* of Paul the Deacon contained the decree: "all prayer is to be directed to the Father; let no one address a prayer except to the Father."[12]

Certain other parts of the Roman liturgy illustrate something of the liturgical witness that history can use. The *Kyrie* came into the liturgy of the West in the 5th century and its arrangement in triplets stems from Arian times. Its witness is, therefore, more in the spirit and tradition of the anti-Arian reaction.[13] The *Gloria* was not originally created for the liturgy, but is, rather, a remnant of the *psalmi idiotici* of private persons. We shall therefore discuss it when we come to private prayer. Its use in the liturgy does not even begin until the sixth century and its general adoption is very late and beyond our period.

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[10] "The Letter of St. Clement of Rome to the Corinthians," trans. F. X. Glimm, *The Apostolic Fathers* (New York: Christian Heritage, Inc., 1947), pp. 9-57.

[11] Mansi, J. D., *Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio* (Florence, 1759), vol. II, col. 922: "Statuta Concilii Hipponiensis."

[12] Benedict the Deacon, *Capitularium Collectio,* III, 14, PL 97, 850.

The early liturgies saw in God the Persons, and in the Persons the roles devolving upon each in the history of salvation. The scheme develops in this wise: every good comes *from* the Father, *through* the Son, by means of the presence *in* us of the Holy Spirit—and thus *by* the Holy Spirit and *through* Christ, everything returns *to* the Father. The formulation is thus "a Patre, per Filium, in Spiritu Sancto, ad Patrem." The Son, in this context, is obviously and primarily the Son Incarnate, Jesus Christ; thus the scheme is both Trinitarian and Christological in perspective.[14]

Before we show what influence Arianism had on the liturgy, we should say a few words about the development of prayer to Christ in private spirituality and devotion. The personality of Christ was the preponderant factor in early Christian spirituality. In private prayer the Christian was more at liberty to use formulas that expressed his devotion and piety. But our witness to private prayer is quite slender. It is stated that in the first century, Christians did not pray to the Trinity or to the Holy Spirit; prayers were addressed only to the Father *or* the Son. In the 2nd Century, prayer to the Trinity developed among Christians.[15] Our witness for the next century is once again St. Hippolytus. In his *Treatise on Apostolic Tradition,* he advises the Christians to be faithful in the performance of their daily prayers, for if they are, "you will not be able to be tempted or to perish, having Christ always before your mind" (68:15).[16] The implication here is that such private prayer is directed not only through Christ but also to Him.

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[13] Jungmann, J. *The Mass of the Roman Rite. Its Origins and Development,* trans. F. Brunner (New York: Benziger Bros., 1950) vol. I, p. 341.

[14] Vagaggini, C. *Theological Dimensions of the Liturgy* (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1959), p. 110.

[15] Plaut, B., *What Is the Trinity?* (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1959), p. 94.

The *Gloria,* which we have seen was originally a private hymn, consists of three parts: a) the song of the angels on Christmas night; b) praise of God; c) invocation of Christ. This third Christological section flows naturally and logically from the previous and is obviously not a later interpolation. It is an apostrophe to Christ, listing the names, or titles, of our Savior—all of them ancient—with 'Lord,' in all its Pauline implications heading the list. The hymn begins with praise to God; it ends with praise of Christ, thus spanning within its measured phrases a whole salvation-historical centered theology.[17]

Now, let us see what witness we can garner from the Fathers. Simply stated, we can conclude from a survey of the Fathers that Christ is conceived of as *the* Mediator. Again and again—in the conclusions of prayers, in doxologies, and in exegesis and polemics—the great truth is stressed: salvation is through Jesus Christ.

St. Clement, writing near the year 100 A.D., addresses his letter to the Corinthians "who have been called and made holy by the will of God through Our Lord Jesus Christ." He tells them that Jesus Christ is their way: "through Him let us strain our eyes towards the heights of heaven; through Him the eyes of our souls have been opened. . . ." (36:2). Clement appeals for peace and concord and tells the Corinthians that he shall "beg with earnest prayer and supplicaiton that the Creator of all may keep unharmed the number . . . of his elect . . . through His beloved child, Jesus Christ" (59:2).

Such expressions we can find multiplied in all of the early Fathers. Examples are to be found in the so-called "Second Letter of St.

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[16] *The Treatise on Apostolic Tradition of St. Hippolytus of Rome,* trans. Gregory Dix (London, 1937).

[17] Jungmann, *op. cit.,* I, p. 354.

Clement," in the Letters of St. Ignatius of Antioch and in the beautiful prayer of St. Polycarp: "I glorify Thee [the Father] through the eternal and heavenly High Priest, Jesus Christ, thy beloved Son, through whom be to Thee with Him and the Holy Spirit glory now and for all ages to come. Amen" (*Martyrdom of Polycarp*, 14:2).[18]

There are faint indications of prayer *to* Christ, though nothing of an explicit nature. St. Ignatius, writing to the Ephesians, says that "if through your prayers, Jesus Christ should make me worthy. . . ." (n. 20), a phrase that is certainly susceptible of being interpreted as prayer to Christ. In the *Shepherd of Hermas*, confident prayer is advised for we must "turn to the Lord and ask Him without wavering" (9:1). Considering the entire context, this use of 'Lord' may well be intended in the Pauline sense and refer to Christ.

II

Among the later Fathers there is one important witness against prayer to Christ; I am referring to Origen, of course. In his treatise on *Prayer*, Origen writes: "If we understand what prayer really is, we shall know that we may never pray to anything generated—not even to Christ—but only to God and the Father of all, to whom even our Savior prayed . . . and teaches us to pray. . . . One should pray to the Father alone. . . . (15:1, 4)[19] This extreme view is unique, and though we find the formula of prayer *through* Christ to be well-nigh universal, it is certain that there was some sort of private, non-liturgical, non-official prayer to Christ. In a negative way, the passage quoted from Origen is an indication that there was such prayer to Christ, and that such a practice offended the neo-Platonic conceptions of the Alexandrian sage.[20]

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[18] "The 'Second Letter' of St. Clement," trans. F. X. Glimm, *The Apostolic Fathers* (New York: Christian Heritage, 1947), pp. 765-79. Also in the same volume are "The Letters of St. Ignatius of Antioch," pp. 87-143, trans. G. G. Walsh, and "The Martyrdom of St. Polycarp," trans. F. X. Glimm, pp. 151-163; and "The Shepherd of Hermas," trans. Joseph Marique, pp. 235-352.

[19] Origen, *On Prayer*, trans. J. O'Meara in "Ancient Christian Writers Series" (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1954), pp. 57-8.

The explication of prayer to Christ will come about through the struggle with Arianism. Yet Arianism was not the first heresy to trouble the Church. One of the first, and in many ways the most insidious heresy was Gnosticism. The Gnostics explained the humanity of Christ as a mere semblance. For them the divinity was the sole, proper object of worship. They thus denied to Jesus Christ any mediatorial function, any priesthood, any true redemptive role. But because they were so individualist and intellectualist, the Church was able to overcome their heretical doctrine.[21]

Arius, however, who took up and extended the doctrine of Paul of Samosata, caused tremendous reverberations. Though condemned at the local synod of Alexandria in 318 and at the ecumenical Council of Nicaea in 325, the whole of the fourth century was filled with disputes over his teachings. The decision about Arian doctrine was bound to be important in the question of prayer. Was the Son to be honored and glorified like the Father? What position was Christ to occupy in the prayers of the Church? Did the ancient emphasis on *per Filium* and the direct address to God the Father alone reflect a Subordinationist or Arian cast of thought? Just because the liturgical traditions of the past seemed to favor an Arian point of view, these questions were of cardinal importance.

In general, the orthodox reply was a shift of emphasis. The primitive formula, "through Christ" had meant not only that Christ had redeemed us by the historical fact of his death and resurrection, but that he continued to be our Mediator with the Father. He divested himself not of his humanity, but as man entered the glory of the Father and there, the firstborn of new mankind, he "lives always to make intercession for us" (Heb. 7:25). This was what the mode of primitive liturgies expressed.

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[20] Adam, K., *The Christ of Faith. The Christology of the Church,* trans. Joyce Crick (New York: Pantheon, 1957), p. 240.

[21] Adam, K., *Christ Our Brother,* trans. J. McCann (New York: Macmillan, 1931), pp. 46-7.

Now the Arian challenge forces a new response. Nothing of the mediatorship of Christ is denied, nor is his humanity denied; but the liturgies answer the denial of Arius by multiplying the texts which affirm the divinity of Christ. Alongside, or even instead of, the *economical* perspective, which throws the spotlight on the Persons in their relations with the history of salvation, we now find an *ontological* perspective in which attention is directed principally to the equality of the Persons and the unity of their nature.[22]

The Roman liturgy, you will recall, resisted any change in its formulas. But in the East, where the fight against Arianism was at its zenith, the liturgies reflected the stress of battle. Here it would be best to say a few words about the Eastern liturgies, for they are formed in this period and reflect its tensions.

St. Basil is an example of what was happening. In place of the accepted doxology which offered praise "to the Father, through the Son, in the Holy Spirit," Basil favored a new form: "to the Father, with the Son, at one with the Holy Spirit"—a form that directed attention no longer upon Christ's humanity, by which He is our intermediary with God, but upon His divinity, in which He is one with the Father and the Holy Spirit. This trend becomes a fundamental trait of Eastern worship.[23]

The triumph of orthodoxy over Arianism did not, however, mean the end of heresy. In the following century there came Nestorianism, Monophysitism and Monothelitism and many others. Each provoked a counter-reaction by the defenders of orthodox Christian faith.

In the *Twelve Anathemas* of St. Cyril against Nestorius, we find that the eighth one concerns worship due to Christ: (Denz. 120)

> If anyone shall dare to say that the assumed man ought to be worshipped together with God the Word, and glorified together with

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[22] Vagaggini, *op. cit.*, p. 116.
[23] Jungmann, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 38-9.

> him, and recognized together with him as God, and yet as two different things, the one with the other, and shall not rather with one adoration worship the Emmanuel and pay to him one glorification . . . let him be anathema.

Nestorius, in his answer, twisted Cyril's meaning, launching a counter-anathema against "anyone who says that the form of a servant should, for its own sake, be reverenced . . . and not rather on account of its connection with the holy and in itself universally-ruling nature of the Only begotten. . . ."[24]

Theodore of Mopsuestia, trying to save the distinction of natures, proposed also a distinction of persons in Christ, of whom only the divine merited adoration. The II Council of Constantinople in 551 severely condemned this and prohibited anyone from teaching that a relative cult should be given to the humanity of Christ as if it were given in the manner of cult to an image and not for its own proper dignity but for some extrinsic relationship with the Word, the Son of God.[25]

The Monophysites, who troubled the Church in the fifth century, placed so much stress on the personal unity in the Godhead, that they ended by asserting a natural union or the equivalent. Proud and intransigent, these heretics claimed to be defending the Church against the still formidable Nestorians; they viewed with the greatest suspicion the acts of the Council of Ephesus which seemed to conflict with their Alexandrian theology. It would not be the only time that men would rend the Church to preserve their theology. After the condemnation of Monophysitism at Chalcedon, there were mass-desertions, especially in Egypt. There the ancient liturgy was re-cast into a Monophysite mold which viewed Christ only in his divinity. In the Coptic rite, an offspring of Alexandria, the *anaphora* directs all prayers to Christ.[26] It should be noted that, as in so many other things, the East was divided in liturgy between the contending poles of Antioch and Alexandria. In the course of time, the victory went to Antioch, for its liturgy, by a process of diversification and amalgamation with the Jerusalem 'liturgy of St. James,' gave the Eastern Church the 'Great Byzantine Rite,' the model of Eastern liturgies. In Alexandria, the ancient 'liturgy of St. Mark' developed into the Monophysitic Coptic rite.

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[24] Percival, H. R. (ed), *The Seven Ecumenical Councils of the Undivided Church. Their Canons and Dogmatic Decrees* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co., n.d.), Vol. XIV, 2nd Series, p. 214.

[25] Denziger-Bannwart, *Enchiridion Symbolorum.* 30th ed. (Freiburg i. Br., 1955), 175, 180, 183, 221. Cf. also Chollet, A. "Culte," *Dictionnaire de théologie Catholique* (Paris: Letouzey et Anè, 1938), III, col. 2415-17.

Before we conclude this survey, a word should be said about the Mozarabic and Gallican liturgies in the West. Dom Cabrol, an eminent liturgist writing at the beginning of this century, adduced them as witnesses for the early development of prayer to Christ.[27] But both rites, possessing a common origin, are post-Arian. That they reflect an emphasis on prayer to Christ is manifest. It is because they are products of the anti-Arian reaction—and perhaps stem from an Eastern source—that they do so.

Thus we see that prayer to Christ, liturgically, entered the Church following the rash denials of Arius. The foundations for this new emphasis were laid by the great writers of the fourth and fifth centuries. St. Hilary of Poitiers, 'the Athanasius of the West,' in his work, *De Trinitate,* set the tone for all these writings. In a noble and elevated prayer which concludes the first book of his treatise, St. Hilary writes:

> Let me treat of Thee, O God eternal, Father of the eternal and only-begotten God, the one Lord Jesus Christ. . . . We must not fail to confess him as true God. . . . Grant us therefore precision of language, soundness of argument, grace of style, loyalty to truth. Enable us to utter the things that we believe, that so we may confess Thee, one God, Our Father, and one Lord, Jesus Christ. (I, 38).[28]

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[26] Jungmann, *op. cit.*, I, p. 42.

[27] Cabrol, F. "Culte crétien," *Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi Catholique*, ed. A. d'Ales (Paris: Beauchesne, 1925), I, col. 237.

[28] St. Hilary, "On the Trinity," trans. E. W. Watson and L. Pullan, *A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, vol. IX (1st series), p. 51.

It was indeed necessary now to seek for precision in language and soundness in argument. The primitive catechesis had spoken of Jesus Christ "Whom God raised from the dead," of the "man Jesus Christ," of "the faith that comes through Jesus." The early liturgies stressed the economical role of Christ, the mediatorship of Christ Incarnate who intercedes for us with the Father. The ravings of heresy ended that era and demanded this new precision, a new perspective. Nicaea and Chalcedon, Ephesus, and II Constantinople, Hilary and Cyril did not divinize a human mediator; they rather re-stated, with new emphasis and new perspective the eternal doctrine of the Church. They nevertheless closed the early period of Church history in which the stress had lain upon the humanity of Christ; they ushered in the new age which saw in Christ more the divinity than the man. The crude, but poignant drawings of Christ the Shepherd in the catacombs would now be replaced by the great mosaics of Christ in Glory and Christ the Ruler and Judge of all. The fourth and fifth centuries were the water-sheds in the development of the Church and of dogma. The explication of prayer to Christ is an example of this.

The last word, as usual, belongs to St. Augustine:

> God could not grant men a greater gift than to give them as their Head the Word thorugh whom He made all things, and to unite them to Him as His members in such a way that He would be Son of God and Son of Man, God together with the Father and Man together with men; and that, when we speak to God in prayer we would not separate the Son from God; and that when the body of the Son prays it would not separate its Head from itself; and that it would be the same Lord, Jesus Christ, Son of God, Savior of His body, who would pray for us and in us and be prayed to by us. He prays for us as our Priest; He prays in us as our Head; He is prayed to by us as our God. Let us recognize our voice in Him, therefore, and His voice in us. . . .[29]

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[29] St. Augustine, *Enar. in Ps. 85.1,* PL 37, 1081.

TIMOTHY J. McCARTHY, O.P.

THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF ARISTOLE'S PHYSICS I-II

After the Philosopher has determined in the first book the principles of natural things, he determines in the second book the principles of natural science.
Thomas Aquinas

Taken together, Books I and II of Aristotle's *Physics* combine to form a unified and integral introduction to the general science of nature. Yet, taken separately, each of these books addresses a distinct problem.

Book I has for its purpose the presentation of the *principles of mobile being*, whereas Book II is concerned with the *principles of natural science*. The purpose of this paper is to present the logical relationship between these two books. To achieve this end an analysis of the contents of the two books will precede the consideration of the relationship between them.

BOOK I

Book I of Aristotle's *Physics* can be conveniently divided into four parts. Chapter i contains Aristotle's statement of purpose and procedure. Chapters ii, iii, and iv are an historical survey of previous cosmological theory. Chapters v, vi, and vii put forth Aristotle's own theory. Finally, Chapters viii and ix are an account of why his predecessors had failed.

Purpose and Procedure (*c. i*)

> When the objects of an inquiry, in any department, have principles, causes, or elements, it is through acquaintance with these that knowledge, that it to say scientific knowledge is attained. For we do not think that we know a thing until we are acquainted with its primary causes or first principles, and have carried our analysis as far as its simplest elements. Plainly therefore in the science of Nature, as in other branches of knowledge, our first task will be to try to determine what relates to its principles.[1]

So begins Book I, Chapter i of Aristotle's *Physics.* Aristotle beheld a world in flux, a world whose every part gave patent testimony to the fact of change. Is there, he asked, any intelligibility to this changing world, or is it too fluid, too contingent to admit the necessity of science? He was searching for principles, for laws, for certain stable features of motion, which could be universalized, which could be said to hold true for all change.

How was he to proceed in such an investigation? "The natural way of doing this is to start from things which are more knowable and obvious to us and proceed towards those which are clearer and more knowable by nature."[2] His commitment to this method had several implications. It implied, first of all, that certain truths were, in fact, "obvious to us."[3] For the purposes of this investigation these obvious truths would be assumed. Thus, not only did Aristotle accept those axioms common to all knowledge, such as the principle of contradiction, but also many hypotheses proper to the physical world. From the very beginning he held as indisputable:

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[1] Aristotle, *Physics* (Oxford trans.), I, 1, 184a9-15.
[2] *Ibid.*, 184a16.
[3] *Ibid.*

first, that the material world exists; second, that it is numerically and specifically diverse; third, that it changes; fourth, that what already is cannot come to be; and fifth, that from nothing nothing comes.[4]

It followed, also, that if Aristotle was to begin with the more known, he would begin with the data presented him by his senses. From the evidence of everyday experience he would seek to understand the principles and causes of a changing world.

Finally, and significantly, inasmuch as the particular cannot be understood except in terms of the universal, Aristotle's determination to advance from the more known to the less known required him to construct a general theory applicable to all change before he could study the particular movements of this or that reality.[5] Just as a sociologist could not understand Frenchmen or Russians unless he first understood human nature, so Aristotle would not study particular changes until he knew the principles of change in general.

History (c. ii, iii, iv)

It is difficult, if not impossible, to exaggerate the role whch Aristotle assigned to history in any investigation of first principles. To the Greek mind, history was an inquiry, an indispensible pre-scientific study of earlier thought on some specific question. It was the wise man's way of availing himself of the insights, and avoiding the errors of the past. Indeed, the primary reason why Aristotle held that a rational animal is a social animal was because man, by himself and of himself, is utterly incapable of knowing all the truths he was made to know. As he says in the second Book of the *Metaphysics*:

> The investigation of the truth is in one way hard, in another easy. An indication of this is found in the fact that no one is able to attain the truth adequately, while, on the other hand, we do not

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[4] William H. Kane, O.P., et al., *Science in Synthesis* (River Forest: Dominican College of St. Thomas Aquinas, 1953), p. 198.

[5] St. Thomas, *In I Phys.*, lect. 1, nn. 3-7.

> collectively fail, but everyone says something true about the nature of things, and while individually we contribute little or nothing to the truth, by the union of all a considerable amount is amassed.[6]

Aristotle divides early cosmological theory into two schools: one leagued closely around Parmenides; the other, the physicists, embracing a broad, but similar spectrum of ideas. Parmenides began his study of nature with two hypotheses, namely, that from nothing nothing comes, and that what already is cannot come to be. So doggedly did he adhere to these two truths that he denied the very possibility of change. As he conceived it, if the new reality can neither come from nothing, nor from what already is, change is impossible. Thus, he denied the very fact he set out to understand. Being for him was one and motionless.[7] Against such a stand Aristotle possessed one weapon—the *reductio ad absurdum.* If being were one and motionless, then the world and all that is in it would be but one substance without matter.[8]

"The physicists, on the other hand," writes Aristotle, "have two general modes of explanation."[9] Some, like Plato with his Great and Small, held that there is one underlying subject form which everything is generated by condensation and rarefaction.[10] Others, like Anaximander with his Air, Empedocles with his Elements, and Anaxagoras with his heterogeneous particles, held for one or several underlying substances from which everything comes by means of segregation.[11] To the physicists Aritsotle responded:

> The one (the prior reality), they reasoned, must have already existed in the new reality, for since everything that comes into being must arise either from what is or what is not, and it is impossible for it to arise from what is not (on this point all the physicists agree), they thought that the truth of the alternative

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[6] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* (Oxford trans.), II, 1, 993 a 30-993 b 7.
[7] Aristotle, *Physics,* I, 2, 184 b 17.
[8] *Ibid.,* 185 a 20-35.
[9] *Ibid.,* I, 4, 187 a 11-12.
[10] *Ibid.,* 187 a 15-17.
[11] *Ibid.,* 187 a 20-27.

> necessarily followed, namely that things come into being out of actually existent things, i.e., out of things already present, but imperceptible to our senses because of the smallness of their bulk. So they say that everything has been mixed in everything, because they saw everything arising out of everything.[12]

While the physicists possessed a greater sense for reality than Parmenides, their answer to his dilemma reduced all change to the mere local reorganization of parts.[13]

Aristotle's Theory (c. v, vi, vii)

In Chapters v, vi, and vii Aristotle gives his own account of the matter. What happens when a thing changes, when an unformed mass of bronze becomes a brazen statue, when the wood of a tree becomes a wooden bed, when a living body becomes a corpse? Aristotle noted, as had his predecessors, a singularly remarkable fact—that poles of change are not arbitrary. Whatever changes, and whenever it changes, always changes into its opposite: the living becomes the dead, the formless becomes the formed, the warm becomes the cold. Clearly then, there was at least this much intelligibility in change—its terms were always contraries.[14] Yet, as the most perspicacious of his predecessors had also noted, the contrariety of the poles of change, of itself, is not adequate to explain motion. Life alone does not change into death, but *something* living becomes *something* dead. Hot does not become cold, but some warm liquid becomes cool. To explain change adequately it is necessary to posit a third principle, a substratum or subject which undergoes change.[15] Thus, as regards the number of the principles, and their character as contraries and a subject, Aristotle was within the tradition of the best ancient thought.

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[12] *Ibid.*, 187 a 33-187 b 2.

[13] J. A. Weisheipl, O.P., *The Development of Physical Theory in the Middle Ages* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1959), p. 36.

[14] Aristotle, *Physics*, I, 5, 188 b 25-26.

[15] Aristotle, *ibid.*, I, 6, 189 a 33-35.

Where Aristotle parted company with the ancients was in his conception of the subject, the substratum of change. The Pre-Socratics held that this substratum was some actual substance—water, air, fire and the like—whose local reorganization explained change. To Aristotle's mind, such a substance could explain an accidental change, where some actual subject truly did persist thorugh the change. But in more fundamental changes, changes where nothing actual remained, where the two contraries shared no common form whatsoever, an actual substratum was insufficient. To overcome this insufficiency Aristotle posited the necessary existence of a principle which, while real, was not actual, but a purely passive, purely potential, utterly formless being which was able to receive distinct fundamental forms.[16] "My definition of matter is this—the primary substratum of each thing, from which it comes to be without qualification, and which persists in the result."[17] As he wrote towards the end of Chapter vii:

> This underlying subject is an object of scientific knowledge by an analogy. For as the bronze is to the statue, the wood to the bed, or the matter and the formless before receiving the form, so is the underlying subject to substance.[18]

Aristotle, then, had three principles: subject, privation, and form. Unlike the ancients, his underlying subject was prime matter.

The Difficulty of the Ancients (*c. viii, ix*)

Pre-Socratic cosmological thought never fully escaped the dilemma posed by Parmenides.[19] From whence, asked Parmenides, comes the new reality? Since it cannot come from nothing, it must already exist, although it is "imperceptible to the senses."[20] Aristotle agreed that nothing can come from nothing in its absolute sense, but this was not the only sense of "nothing."

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[16] J. A. Weisheipl, O.P., *op. cit.*, p. 37.

[17] Aristotle, *Physics,* I, 9, 192 a 31-32.

[18] *Ibid.*, I, 7, 191 a 8-13.

[19] J. A. Weisheipl, O.P., *op. cit.*, p. 37.

[20] Aristotle, *Physics,* I, 4, 187 a 37.

> We ourselves are in agreement with them in holding that nothing can be said without qualification to come from what is not. But nevertheless we maintain that a thing may "come to be from what is not"—that is, in a qualified sense.[21]

As Aristotle conceived it, "non-being" had two qualified senses: privation was non-being, and so was potency. While it is true that nothing comes from nothing in its absolute sense, something can come from nothing in its qualified senses, that is, something can come to be *per accidens* from privation, and something can come to be *per se* from potency.[22] Thus, the chain which held the ancients on the horns of the Parmenidean dilemma was their univocal notion of non-being.[23]

BOOK II

Saint Thomas begins his *Commentary* on Book II of the *Physics* with the following statement:

> After the Philosopher determined in the first book the principles of natural things, he here determines the principles of natural science. Now in any science the things that must be first known are its subject and the medium by which it demonstrates. Thus the second book is divided into two parts: in the first he determines what natural science considers; in the second, by what causes it demonstrates. . . .[24]

Book II, therefore, can be divided conveniently into two sections: Chapters i and ii determine the subject of the science and Chapters iii through ix relate the causes by which this science can demonstrate.

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[21] *Ibid.*, I, 8, 191 b 13-18.

[22] St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, lect. 14, n. 8.

[23] St. Thomas, *In III Meta.*, lect. 2, n. 2433.

[24] St. Thomas, *In II Phys.* lect. 1, n. 285, trans. by R. A. Kocurek in *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature* (St. Paul, North Central Pub. Co., 1951), p. 99.

REALITY

The Subject (*c. i, ii*)

In determining the subject of natural science Aristotle directed the attention of his students to the profound difference between natural and artificial realities.

> Of things that exist, some exist by nature, some from other causes. "By nature" the animals and their parts exist, and the plants and the simple bodies (earth, air, fire, water)—for we say that these and the like exist by nature.
>
> All the things mentioned present a feature in which they differ from things which are not constituted by nature. Each of them has within itself a principle of motion and of stationariness (in respect of place, or of growth and decrease, or by way of alteration.) On the other hand, a bed and a coat and anything else of that sort, qua receiving these designations—that is, in so far as they are works of art—have no innate impulse to change.[25]

Unlike natural objects, artificial realities have no intrinsic source of change. When artifacts do change, they change not by reason of what they are by art, but by reason of what they are by nature. A house, for example, changes not because it is a house, but because it is made of ice, or grass, or mud, or wood, or stones, or metal, that is, because of what it happens to be made from, because of what it is accidentally. Natural realities, on the contrary change by reason of what they are essentially, "which seems to indicate," says Aristotle, "that nature is a principle and cause of motion and of rest in that in which it is primarily and per se and not accidentally."[26]

An object's nature includes both its proper matter and its primary form, both its passive capacity for receiving change and the active source of its characteristic operations.[27] Yet form is more properly nature than matter. "The form is nature rather than the matter; for a thing is most properly said to be what it is when it has attained to fulfillment than when it exists potentially."[28]

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[25] Aristotle, *Physics,* II, 1, 192 b 7-17.

[26] Aristotle, *Physics,* II, 1, 192 b 22-24.

[27] *Ibid.,* 193 a 31-37.

[28] *Ibid.,* 193 b 8-9.

Something is "by nature" which has a principle of this kind.[29] That such a principle does exist was, for Aristotle, beyond dispute.

> That nature is would be absurd to try to prove; for it is obvious that there are many things of this kind, and to prove what is obvious by what is not is the mark of a man who is unable to distinguish what is self evident from what is not.[30]

Thus, first by carefully distinguishing natural and artificial objects, and then by constructing a precise definition of nature, Aristotle precised the subject of this science, natural things, things which have a nature.[31] At this point, Aristotle found it expedient to distinguish natural science from mathematics. He did this by showing that natural science seeks to understand that very phenomenon which mathematics disregards, namely, motion.[32]

These first two chapters of Book II reveal a logical advance from the general to the particular. Book I was entirely concerned with formulating a general theory applicable to all change. In Book II the investigation is limited to things which change by nature. The aim, moreover, is not to understand nature in general, but to provide a method which will reveal the natures of particular species.

The Causes (c. iii-ix)

Having marked off the subject of the science, it remained for Aristotle to enumerate its causes (c. iii-vi) and to show how these causes might be used as middle terms (c. vii-ix).

> After the Philosopher shows what things natural science considers, he here begins to show from what causes it demonstrates. This is divided into two parts: in the first he determines the causes; in the second he shows from what causes the philosopher of nature demonstrates . . .[33]

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[29] *Ibid.*, 192 b 33.
[30] *Ibid.* 193 a 2-6.
[31] *Ibid.*, 192 b 32-34.
[32] *Ibid.*, II, 2, 193 b 32-35.
[33] St. Thomas, *In II Phys.*, lect. 5, n. 358.

To Aristotle's mind, natural things had four reasons for their being, four proper explanations for their characteristic behavior: the material, formal, efficient, and final causes.[34] Yet, he states:

> Chance also and spontaneity are commonly reckoned among the causes: for many things are said to be and to come to be as a result of chance. We must inquire therefore in what manner chance and spontaneity are present among the causes enumerated, and whether they are the same or different, and generally what chance and spontaneity are.[35]

Was there a fifth cause, chance, not included in the above-mentioned four? Aristotle answered this question by distinguishing those events which happen regularly from those which occur sporadically or unpredictably. Normal, constant motions are properly explained in terms of final causality, a natural term to which things tend for their well being. Chance events, while they appear to happen for no set purpose, are nevertheless partially intelligible in terms of the final causality of the agents involved. A chance event occurs when two agents, or more, acting for independent ends, converge, such as when a falling stone strikes a man.[36] Chance, therefore, is not a proper cause, but an incidental one, reducible to the independent actions of the converging agents. "It is clear then that chance is an incidental cause in the sphere of those activities for the sake of something, which involve purpose."[37]

Having solved the difficulty arising from the occurence of chance events, Aristotle now proceeds in Chapters vii, viii, and ix to outline how the natural philosopher can employ the four causes to demonstrate the detailed conclusions of his science. He declares:

> Now the causes being four, it is the business of the physicist to know about them all, and if he refers his problem back to all of them, he will assign the "why" in the way proper to his science—the matter, the form, the mover, and "that for the sake of which".[38]

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[34] Aristotle, *Physics,* II, 3, 194 b 23-195 a 2.

[35] *Ibid.,* II, 4, 195 b 31-35.

[36] *Ibid.,* II, 5, 196 b 10-33.

[37] *Ibid.,* 197 a 5-6.

[38] *Ibid.,* II, 7, 198 a 23-26.

For what may have been apologetic reasons, Aristotle takes great care to establish the possibility of demonstrating from the final cause. Why do swallows make nests and spiders make webs; why do plants grow leaves which shade their fruit and send down roots which drink in nourishment?[39] To answer that all this was the result of chance is contrary to reason. Just as it would be unreasonable to regard a delicately formed statute as the result of chance or blind necessity, so it would be equally unreasonable to regard the marvels of nature as such. "If therefore purpose is present in art, it is also present in nature."[40]

Indeed, the final cause supplies natural science with its most perfect demonstrations. Demonstrations whose middle terms are efficient and material causes enjoy some necessity, but not the strict rigor attainable by the final cause. "Often a natural agent can be impeded, or the matter may not be disposed to receive the action of the agent, so the effect does not follow with certainty . . . from the matter and the agent."[41] Thus, for instance, given a man and woman united in wedlock (efficient causes), the birth of a child will not always follow. Or, given an acorn (material cause), it will not always become an oak. But, on the other hand, *if* a man is to be born (final cause), we can be certain he will have a heart, or *if* he is to live (final cause), we can be certain he must receive nourishment.[42] With this comparison of the relative certitude attainable in the demonstrations of natural science Aristotle ends Book II.

BOOKS I AND II: THEIR LOGICAL RELATIONSHIP

In Book I Aristotle proposed a general theory to explain all change. In Book II he constructed a logical frame for the science of nature by which the student of nature could achieve an ordered and comprehensive understanding of natural realities. The three principles Aristotle set forth in Book I—subject, privation, and form—are principles *in essendo.* Taken together they provide an adequate explanation of the reality of change. The four causes set forth in Book II—matter, form, agent, and end—are principles *in cognoscendo,* principles by which the mind can gain understanding of natural things, the middle terms by which the natural scientist can demonstrate. In Book I, therefore, Aristotle confronted the problem of formulating a universal theory of change and solved it. In Book II he does not solve the problems of natural science. Rather, he defines and specifies the problems. He tells us what we will have to know if we are to understand realities which move and rest by nature.

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[39] *Ibid.*, II, 8, 199 a 22-33.
[40] *Ibid.*, 199b 29.
[41] W. H. Kane, O.P., et. al., *op. cit.*, p. 214.
[42] Aristotle, *Physics*, II, 9, 199 b 30-200 a 10.

The purpose of this paper is to determine the precise logical relationship of these two books; in short, to determine the relationship between the principles of mobile being (matter, form, and privation) and the principles of natural science (nature and the four causes). The problem is this: privation is a principle of mobile being, but it is not a principle of natural science; also, agent and end are principles of natural science, but they are not principles of mobile being. Why, therefore, is privation a principle of mobile being, but not a principle of natural science; and, why are agent and end principles of natural science, but not principles of mobile being?

First of all, matter, form and privation are the principles of mobile being. Matter and form, while complementary, are distinct positive principles, as is evidenced by the fact that the same matter can receive distinct forms. Wood, for example, can be made into a desk or a bed. Privation, unlike matter and form, is not a positive principle. It is but the matter considered as lacking some form; the bronze, considered as lacking the form of a statue; the wood, as lacking the form of a bed. It is, therefore, not something real. Rather, it is a lack of being, conceived of as a being, a lack of bedness in the wood, a lack of statueness conceived of as belonging to the bronze. "Privation is nothing other than the negation of a form in a subject and is outside the whole of being."[43] It is a being of reason of the first intention.

Thus, while privation is a true principle, a necessary feature of every change, it is not a cause of mobile being itself. A cause tells us what a thing is; privation tells us what a thing is not. The natural scientists cannot understand why a man laughs or a dog barks by knowing what a man or dog is not, but by knowing what they are,, their causes. When, therefore, Aristotle listed the principles of natural science, he included matter and form upon which mobile beings depend for their existence and intelligibility, and he excluded privation as contributing nothing to either.

Now, the second problem arises. From whence did Aristotle derive his efficient and final causes? Are they mere creations of the mind not found in external reality? Since they are nowhere mentioned as principles of mobile being, how can they be principles by which we understand mobile being? To solve this second and more subtle problem it might be well to recall what is meant by a virtual distinction.

Distinction, in general, is a lack of identity, "carentia identitatis."[44] But things are distinct in a multitude of ways. The most obvious case of distinction is separation. When two things exist independently of one another they are obviously distinct. A second kind of distinction exists where two realities, while incapable of separate existence, are nevertheless irreducibly diverse. An example of this is the distinction between matter and form. Another kind of distinction is the virtual distinction. This distinction exists when in one and the same reality there is such an abundance of perfection that the mind, in order better to comprehend and express it, distinguishes its various perfections.

Once again, the problem is this: from whence comes agent and end? It must be admitted that if our knowledge of mobile being is to be valid, it must ascribe nothing to reality which it does not truly possess. It must be admitted further that Aristotle posited only two principles by which mobile beings are, matter and form. Nevertheless, as has been seen, the mind has an ability to distinguish in one reality diverse perfections, to explicate various aspects of one and the same reality. This is precisely what happens here. Form, simply speaking, is the act, the perfection of matter. Yet it is not only that. When we observe change it becomes clear that form is also the source of motion or agent and the term of motion or end. For example, when the form of heat perfecting the matter of a radiator acts on one's hand and produces in that hand heat similar to itself, we have the same form, heat, manifested in all three of its aspects: first, as the act of matter; second, as the source of the motion of heating; third, as the term of that motion. Thus, a thing *is* by its form, *acts* by its form, and *tends* to its form. It remains true, therefore, that there is nothing in the physical universe but matter and form, but the mind in seeking to understand the natures of mobile realities discovers that form plays three roles: it is the perfection of matter, the source of motion, and the term of motion. Knowledge of the form as agent and as end sheds additional light on natural realities and makes possible further demonstrations.

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[43] St. Thomas, *In I Phys.*, lect. 15, n. 264.

[44] Joseph Gredt, O.S.B., *Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae,* 12th ed. rev. (Freiburg i. Br.: Herder, 1958), I, 99-100, n. 119.

Thus, we conclude that while mobile beings have but two principles *in essendo,* matter and form, they have four principles *in cognoscendo,* matter, form, agent and end. And this is due to the mind's ability to see in one reality diverse perfections.

Augustine T. Riplinger, O.P.

PRIME MATTER IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SAINT AUGUSTINE

Yet this almost-nothing, since it was not absolutely nothing, must have been from Him from whom all is that in any way is.
De Genesi ad litteram

Saint Augustine stands at the headwaters of one of the main streams of Western thought. It was his great office to transform the pagan Platonism of classical antiquity into the Christian Platonism of later ages.

In the philosophy of Plato, the notion of matter held a significant place. In the thought of Augustine, this Platonic notion took on a uniquely Christian character, and, in this guise, it exercised considerable influence in the philosophy and theology of the later Scholastics.[1] The problem for these later thinkers was to understand the true meaning of Augustine's notion, for his expression is often obscure. In debates such as the thirteenth century controversy over the potentiality of prime matter, both sides appealed to the texts of Augustine for authoritative support of their positions. Today, long after the heat of controversy has subsided, we have the opportunity to determine objectively, as far as possible, the true character of his understanding of prime matter. In order to achieve this, however, we must consider the words of Augustine in the light of his own milieu.

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[1] Pierre Duhem, *La systeme du monde*, II (Paris: Hermann, 1954), p. 431.

THE BACKGROUND OF AUGUSTINE'S THOUGHT

Before examining the writings themselves, we must first place them in the context of Augustine's ideological development. Born at Tagaste in Numidia in 354, Augustine received his earliest education at Madaura, a neighboring city which had been the home of the second century Platonist Apuleius.[2] However, it was not until his discovery of Cicero's *Hortensius* that Augustine, then in his eighteenth year, began to take a serious interest in philosophy. His appetite whetted by Cicero's exhortation, Augustine set about the search for wisdom in earnest, only to fall into the trap of the pseudo-intellectual Manichees.[3] Overthrowing the last remains of his Christian upbringing, he avidly embraced the tenets of this cult, but he soon found that its theories of matter and evil raised more difficulties than they solved.[4] Dissillusioned by this first experience with philosophy, Augustine was on the verge of complete skepticism,[5] when he chanced upon some works of a Platonic character.[6] These writings, together with the preaching of St.. Ambrose, the bishop of Milan, soon dispelled Augustine's intellectual difficulties. Now only his moral problem prevented him from returning to the religion of his childhood. Finally even this obstacle was swept aside in a series of remarkable psychological experiences, culminating in the famous garden incident. Thus, at Milan, in the spring of 389, Augustine, the future Doctor of the Church, received Baptism at the hands of St. Ambrose. Augustine was then thirty-five years of age.[7]

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[2] Vernon J. Bourke, *Augustine's Quest of Wisdom,* in Science and Culture Series, ed. Joseph Husslein (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1945), pp. 6-8.

[3] St. Augustine, *Confessions,* III, chapt. 4-6 (trans. F. J. Sheed, *The Confessions of St. Augustine;* New York: Sheed & Ward, 1943), pp. 45-47. Subsequent references are to this edition.

[4] *Ibid.,* V, chap. 3, pp. 84-85.

[5] *Ibid.,* chap. 10, pp. 96-97.

[6] *Ibid.,* VII, chap. 9, p. 142.

Upon his return to Africa in the following year, Augustine founded a monastery at his former home in Tagaste.[8] There, although not yet in sacred orders, he began the first of his expositions of creation and matter.[9] During this period, St. Augustine began three works which pertain to the present topic of investigation. They are the *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* (388/9), the *De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII* (388-395), and the *De vera religione* (391).[10]

Early in 391, the Greek bishop of Hippo prevailed upon Augustine to take priestly Orders and entrusted him with the office of preaching.[11] Urged by this new responsibiilty, Augustine redoubled his study of Sacred Scripture and by 393 progressed far enough in this study to attempt a literal commentary on Genesis. The task, however, proved too difficult for him, and he left the work unfinished. Despite his apparent attempt to suppress its publication,[12] this unfinished commentary has survived as the *De Genesi ad litteram liber imperfectus*. Two other pertinent works which were written later at the time of Augustine's priestly ministry are his *De fide et symbolo* and his *Sermo CCXIV*, both of which are explanations of the Creed.

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[7] Bourke, *op. cit.*, p. 82. See Possidius, *Vita Sancti Aurelii Augustini*, 2. PL 32, 35.

[8] Possidius, *op. cit.*, 3. PL 32, 36.

[9] Bourke, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

[10] Seraphinus M. Zarb, "Chronologia operum Sancti Augustini," *Angelicum*, XI (1934) 1, p. 89. All subsequent dating of Augustine's works will be taken from this article, pp. 88-91.

[11] Possidius, *op. cit.*, 4-5. PL 32, 35-38.

[12] St. Augustnie, *Retractationes*, I, c. 18. PL 32, 614.

With his episcopal consecration about the year 395, begins the period of Augustine's more mature work. Three anti-Manichaean polemics, all written within a few years of Augustine's consecration, deserve special notice in the present discussion; they are the *Contra epistolam Manichaei quam vocant Fundamenti* (396), the *Contra Faustum Manichaei* (397/8), and the *De natura boni contra Manichaeos* (399/405).[13] The *Confessions* and the *De Genesi ad litteram,* also of this period, contain the most complete and the best known of Augustine's statements on matter, but their contents should not be taken as the sole authority for Augustine's thought on the subject. Finally, in his old age, Augustine returned to the problem of matter in his *Contra adversarios legis et prophetarum* (421) and his *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum* (429/430). This last work, which takes the form of a dialogue betwen Julian the Pelagian and Augustine, provides an interesting example of the type of controversy which must have contributed much to the formulation and development of Augustine's thought.

Of all the philosophers, the objects of Augustine's highest regard were undoubtedly the Platonists, especially Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblicus and Apuleius.[14] In reality, it was neo-Platonism which Augustine preferred. The only one of Plato's own works that Augustine is certain to have known is Cicero's translation of the *Timaeus.*[15] It is highly uncertain whether or not Augustine had read the *Enneads* of Plotinus,[16] although these contain very extensive remarks about the nature of primary matter. But without a doubt Augustine was greatly influenced by the works of Porphyry,[17] who was the editor of Plotinus' work and his faithful disciple on the question of primary matter.[18]

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[13] Zarb, *loc. cit.,* gives the earlier date for the *De natura boni*; Bourke, *op. cit.,* p. 305, gives the later date.

[14] St. Augustine, *The City of God,* VIII, chap. 12, trans. C. G. Walsh and Grace Monahan, Fathers of the Church, XIV (New York: Fathers of the Church, 1952), p. 43.

[15] Guillermo Fraile, *Historia de la Filosophia,* II, Biblioteca de Autores Christianos, CXC (Madrid: B.A.C., 1960), p. 198.

[16] John J. O'Meara, trans., *St. Augustine: Against the Academics,* Ancient Christian Writers, XII (Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1951), note 102, pp. 160-161.

One final point should be noted with reference to Augustine's general philosophical outlook. As Etienne Gilson points out, Augustine does not share the "physicism" of Aquinas. Unlike St. Thomas, he does not begin his philosophy with the fact of physical change,[19] nor does he take a deep interest in natural questions as such. Despite the place accorded to physical topics in Augustine's writings, their consideration always remains, in the words of Henri Marrou, "rather elementary."[20] He is concerned with nature, not as something interesting in itself, but rather as a creation of the Divine Wisdom. As a result, his writings offer no truly systematic account of matter, but only a collection of more or less random observations suggested by texts of Sacred Scripture or points of controversy.[21] Furthermore, as Augustine himself admits, he often raises more difficulties than he solves.[22] Many of his answers are somewhat hesitant,[23] as though they do not completely satisfy him.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF MATTER

Two texts of Scripture provide the point of departure for Augustine's understanding of matter. The first is the opening sentence of Genesis: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth: but the earth was invisible and unformed, and darkness was upon the deep; and the

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[17] *Ibid.*, note 103, pp. 161-162. See also O'Meara, *Charter of Christendom: the Significance of the City of God*, The St. Augustine Lecture 1961, Villanova Univ. (New York: Macmillan, 1961), pp. 68-69.

[18] Duhem, *op. cit.*, p. 440.

[19] Etienne Gilson, "The Future of Augustinian Metaphysics," trans. Edward Bullough; *St. Augustine*, M. C. D'Arcy *et al.* (New York: Meridian, 1957), pp. 309-312.

[20] "Leur discussion met en oeuvre toute sorte de notions, precises a la verité, mais toujours assez elementaires. . . ." Henri-Irenee Marrou, *Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique* [Paris: de Boccard, 1958], pp. 454-455.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 234.

[22] *Retractationes*, II, p. 24, 1. PL 34, 640.

[23] Duhem, *op. cit.*, pp. 434-435.

Spirit of God moved over the water."[24] The second text, a passage from the book of Wisdom, supplied Augustine with the key to understanding the Genesis statement.[25] In Wisdom he read: "Who made the world from unformed matter."[26]

Although Augustine believed that there may be several literal meanings for a scriptural text,[27] he insists that if the *in principio* of the Genesis text is taken to mean a beginning of time, then the only acceptable interpretation of the succeeding *Deus fecit caelum et terram* is that God made the matter of heaven and earth. Only by this interpretation can the later creation of light, the firmament, the waters, etc. be saved.[28]

Augustine interprets several other scriptural phrases as signifying this unformed matter. Among these expressions are the following: *caelum et terra,*[29] *terra invisibilis et incomposita,*[30] *tenebrae super*

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[24] "In principio fecit Deus coelum et terram: terra autem erat invisibilis et incomposita, et tenebrae erant abyssum; et Spiritus Dei ferebatur super aquam" (Gen. 1:1-2). Note that Augustine's old Latin version differs somewhat from the modern Vulgate: "In principio creavit Deus coelum et terram. Terra autem erat inanis et vacua, et tenebrae erant super faciem abyssi: et spiritus Dei superferebatur super aquas."

[25] St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram liber imperfectus,* c. 3, 10. PL 34, 223-224. *De Genesi ad litteram,* I, c. 14, 28. PL 34, 256-257.

[26] "Qui fecisti mundum de informi materia" (Wisd. 11:18). This verse also differs from the Vulgate text: "Quae creavit orbem terrarum ex materia invisa."

[27] *De Gen. ad litt.,* I, c. 20. PL 34, 261-262. *Confessions,* XII, chap. 27, p. 311.

[28] *Confessions,* XII, chap. 29, p. 313. The question of the way in which matter is prior to form according to Augustine's thought will be treated later in this paper.

[29] St. Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos,* I, c. 7, 11. PL 34, 178. *De Gen. ad litt. imp.,* c. 3, 10. PL 34, 224. *Confessions,* XIII, chap. 29, p. 313.

N.B. It is a very complex problem to determine what Augustine means by *materia caeli.* Some authorities believe that Augustine considered it a spiritual matter, the root of corruption in spiritual creatures. For a discussion of this question see Gilson, *History,* p. 593, n. 24.

[30] *Confessions,* XII, chap. 4, p. 290. *De Gen. contra Man.,* I, c. 7, 12. PL 34, 179.

abyssum,[31] and *aqua.*[32] Moreover he equates this unformed matter of the Scriptures with the *chaos*[33] and the *hyle*[34] of the philosophers.

For Augustine, the first and most important fact about matter is that it is made by God.

> For when we read the text, "who made the world from unformed matter" (Wisd. 11:18), nevertheless, even this matter, whatever it is, we cannot say was not made by Him, from whom we believe and confess that all things are: . . .[35]

Because of his opposition to the Manichees, Augustine stresses the divine creation of matter with considerable force and frequency,[36] for the Manichees taught that matter was an uncreated evil principle co-eternal with God.[37]

The divine creation of matter implies three consequences according to Augustine. The first is that God did not produce matter out of any pre-existing stuff. If God had to make matter out of something else, He would not be all-powerful.[38] The second consequence is that God did not create matter out of Himself, for in that case matter would be equal to the Only-begotten Son of God.[39] Instead, matter is entirely from nothing, *ex nihilo.*[40] The third consequence is that matter cannot be co-eternal with God: it is essentially temporal.[41] *Ipsa veritas* teaches that the contrary opinion is opposed to the truth.[42]

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[31] *De Gen. contra Man.*, I, c. 7, 12. PL 34, 179. *De Gen. ad litt. imp.*, c. 4, 15. PL 34, 226.

[32] *De Gen. contra Man., I*, c. 7, 12. PL 34, 179. *De Gen. ad litt. imp.*, c. 4, 14. PL 34, 225. *De Gen. ad litt*, I, c 13, 27. PL 34, 256.

[33] *De Gen. contra Man., I*, c. 5, 9. PL 34, 178.

[34] St. Augustine, *De natura boni contra Manichaeos*, c. 18, PL 43, 556. *Contra Faustum Manichaei*, XX, c. 14. PL 42, 379-380.

[35] "Quenquam enim scriptum legerimus, Qui fecisti mundum de informi materia (Sap. XI, 18); tamen etiam ipsam materiam cujusmodicumque sit non possumus dicere non ab eo factam, ex quo omnia confitemur et credimus: . . ." (*De Gen. ad litt. imp.*, c. 3, 10. PL 34, 223-224.)

[36] *De Gen. contra Man.*, I, c. 6, 10. PL 34, 178. *Confessions*, XII, chap. 8, p. 293; chap. 15, p. 300; chap. 22, p. 307; chap. 29, pp. 313-315; XIII, chap. 33, p. 352. *Sermo CCXIV*, 2. PL 38, 1066-7. *De natura boni*, c. 18. PL 42, 556-557. *Contra adversarios legis et prophetarum*, I. c. 8, 11. PL 42, 609-610.

[37] *Contra Faustum*, XXI, cc. 1 & 4-5. PL 42, 387-389 & 390-392.

[38] *De Gen. contra Man.*, I, c. 6, 10. PL 34, 178.

[39] *Confessions*, XII, chap. 7, p. 292.

The various names by which Scripture designates matter suggest some of its other characteristics. *Terra invisibilis et incomposita* indicates that matter of itself is utterly devoid of form.[43] Despite the problems which this privation of form raises, Augustine had no doubt about the general fact.[44] In his *Confessions,* he states this total privation of form very succinctly.

> Was it not You, Lord, who taught me that before You gave form and outline to that formless matter, there was not anything, neither color nor shape nor body nor spirit? Yet there was not utterly nothing; there was a certain formlessness without anything to specify.[45]

Here, however, a difficulty arises. If matter is utterly devoid of form, how does one know it?[46] Augustine explains the problem and its solution at length in his *Confessions.*

> But I, Lord—if I am to say and write in confession to You all that You have taught me about this formless matter—I admit that when I used to hear its name without understanding, as others without understanding spoke it to me, I tried to conceive it under a great number and variety of forms, so that in fact I was not conceiving it at all, My mind was in a whirl of hideous and horrible forms which utterly denied the order of nature; yet they were forms all the same; and I conceived the formless not as totally lacking form but as possessing such a form that, if it were seen, my senses would

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[40] *De Gen. contra Man.,* I, c. 2, 4 & 6. PL 34, 175-178. *Confessions,* XII, chap. 7, p. 292; chap. 8, p. 293; XIII, chap. 33, p. 352. *Sermo CCXIV,* 2. PL 38, 1067.

[41] *Confessions,* XII, chap. 22, p. 307; chap. 12-13, pp. 296-297.

[42] *Contra Faustum,* XX, c. 14. PL 42, 380.

[43] *De Gen. contra Man.,* I, c. 7, 12. PL 36, 179.

[44] *Penitus informe* is Augustine's own phrase. *Confessions,* XII, chap. 13, p. 297. *De natura boni,* c. 18. PL 42, 556.

[45] *Confessions,* XII, chap. 3, p. 290.

[46] *Ibid.,* chap. 5, pp. 290-291. See also *Contra adv. leg. et proph.* I, c. 10, 13. PL 42, 610.

> recoil from its strangeness and grotesqueness and my human weakness be utterly confounded.
>
> But in fact the concept I had was formless not by absence of all forms, but by comparison with forms more beautiful. Right reason urged that if I wished to conceive the formless, I should strip away every smallest vestige of every sort of form. But I could not do it. I should have found it easier to think that whatever is totally without form cannot exist at all, than to conceive something between form and non-being, lacking form yet not nothing, formless and almost nothing.
>
> So my mind ceased to question my spiirt, which was full of images of bodily forms which it changed and rearranged as it willed. I fixed my mind upon the bodies themselves, and I looked deeper into the mutability by which they cease to be what they were and begin to be what they were not. And it occurred to me that this transition from one form into another might be by way of something formless, and not by way of absolutely non-being.[47]

Thus matter revealed itself to Augustine by the succession of the forms which appeared in it.[48] Elsewhere he says that "anything subject to change suggests to our mind a certain formless element, by which it receives form or by which it is changed and transformed."[49]

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[47] *Confessions,* XII, chap. 6, pp. 291-292. N.B. As Vernon Bourke (*St. Augustine's Confessions,* The Fathers of the Church: the Writings of Augustine, V [New York: Fathers of the Church, 1952], p. 371, note 17) points out, "Here, Augustine is approaching not only the concept of, but also the method of reasoning to, Aristotle's prime matter. . . . However Augustine never really knew the full Aristotelian theory; what he did know was probably learned through Plotinus . . ." Plotinus himself suggests the demonstration of matter from the fact of change in *Ennead* II, bk. IV, c. 6, (*Enneads of Plotinus,* trans. Stephen Mackenna [Boston: Branford, [n.d.]], I, p. 182). Yet it is not necessary to attribute the influence to Plotinus, for even Plato's *Timaeus* contains a suggestion of the argument (*Timaeus,* 50-51, in *Dialogues of Plato,* trans. B. Jowett [New York: Random House, 1937], II, pp. 30-37). Likewise, Chalcidius explains the analysis (*In Timaeum Platonis,* 315, *Fragmenta philosophorum graecorum,* ed. G. A. Mullachius, [Paris: Firmin Didot, 1867], II, p. 247).

[48] See also *Contra adversarios leg. et proph.,* I, c. 10, 13. PL 42, 610.

[49] *Confessions,* XII, chap. 19, p. 304.

Matter, then, is something without form of itself, but able to receive form.

This ability to receive form is another aspect of matter.[50] It is signified by the word *aqua,* since water is more easily acted upon than earth in regard to changes of form.[51] Although of itself matter is utterly without form, nevertheless it is "capable of receiving forms and subject to the work of the Creator: it is able to be changed into anything which it pleases the Creator to make."[52] In his definition of the Greek *hyle,* Augustine gives concise expression to this capacity for form.

> For the Greeks, when they speak of nature, define *hyle* as a certain matter of things which is in no way whatsoever formed, but which is capable of all corporeal forms, and which is known only in the mutability of bodies, for of itself it is able neither to be sensed nor to be understood.[53]

Augustine develops yet another characteristic of matter in his anti-Manichean polemics. He has no sympathy for the opinion shared both by his neo-Platonic masters and by the Manichees that matter is the principle of evil.[54] In his *De natura boni contra Manichaeos,* he says:

> Nor on this account ought this *hyle,* which cannot be perceived through any sensible species but which can, with difficulty, be conceived through the privation of all form, be called evil. For it has a

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[50] *Ibid.,* XII, *passim,* pp. 289-317. *De Gen. ad litt.,* I, c; 14, 28. PL 34, 256. *Contra adv. leg. et proph.,* I, c. 8, 11. PL 42, 609. *De natura boni,* c. 18, PL 42, 556-557.

[51] *De Gen. ad litt. imp.,* c. 4, 13. PL 34, 225.

[52] "Illa enim quae dicitur informis rerum materies, formarum capax et subjecta operi Creatoris, in omnia est convertibilis, quae placuerit facere Conditori." (*Sermo CCXIV,* 2. PL 38, 1067.)

[53] "Hylen namque Graeci, cum de natura disserunt, materiam quamdam rerum definiunt, nullo prorsus modo formatam, sed omnium corporalium formarum capa- [sic] quae quidem in corporum mutabilitate utcumque cognoscitur, nam per se ipsam nec sentiri nec intelligi potest." (*Contra Faustum,* XX, c. 14. PL 42, 379-380.)

[54] Emil Brehier, *The Philosophy of Plotinus,* trans. J. Thomas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 174-175.

> capacity for form, since if it were not able to receive form imposed by the maker it would certainly not be called matter. But if form is something good, whence things are called well-formed which excell in it, just as things which excell in beauty are called beautiful, then, without doubt, even the capacity for form is something good.[55]

The last important characteristic of matter is that it is in some way prior to form. To understand this priority, we must first observe the way in which Augustine conceived the relation of matter and time. Time, for him, is that by which we measure the motion of bodies.[56] But this motion is the "transition from one form to another"[57]; hence it is form that gives rise to time.[58] Therefore, if matter is entirely devoid of form, it is not subject either to change or to time. The matter which God created "was so formless that it could not change from one form to another, whether of motion or rest, and so time has no hold upon it."[59]

But if matter is not subject to time, how then can God be said to have created it at the beginning of time? Augustine's solution to this dilemma is that the creation and the formation of matter took place in one simultaneous act of creation.[60] He is emphatic on this point, taking pains to point it out even to his catechumens.[61] His *Contra adversarios legis et prophetarum* offers a typical expression of his argument.

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[55] "Nec ista ergo hyle malum dicenda est, quae non per aliquam speciem sentiri, sed per omnimodam speciei privationem cogitari vix potest. Habet enim et ipsa capacitatem formarum; nam si capere impositam ab artifice formam non posset, nec materies utique deceretur, Porro si bonum aliquod est forma; unde qui ea praevalent, formosi appellantur, sicut a specie speciosi, procul dubio bonum aliquod est etiam capacitas formae." (*De natura boni*, c. 18. PL, 556-557.)

[56] *Confessions*, XI, chap. 23-24, pp. 278-280.

[57] *Ibid.*, XII, chap. 6, p. 291.

[58] *Ibid.*, chap. 29, p. 314.

[59] *Ibid.*, chap. 12, p. 296. See also the chapters immediately preceding and following.

[60] Whether the creation of matter and the formation of it are to be considered as two distinct acts on God's part, as A. Gardeil has suggested, or whether they constitute one Divine act is of no great importance in this discussion, since both sides maintain the simultaneity of the two effects in time. See Etienne Gilson, *Introduction a l'etude de Saint Augustin*, Etudes de philosophie medievale, XI (Paris: J. Vrin, 1931), p. 258, n. 3.

> Nor should it be thought that God first made formless matter, and then after some lapse of time formed what He had previously made unformed. But, just as when words are formed by one speaking they do not first come forth unformed and afterwards receive form, but rather are produced already formed, so it should be understood that God made the world from matter certainly without form, but this matter itself He created simultaneously with the world. However, not without reason is that from which anything is made spoken of first, and afterwards that which is made from it, because even though both can be made together, both cannot be spoken of together.[62]

In his *Confessions,* Augustine carefully distinguishes the various senses of priority: priority in eternity, in time, in choice, and in origin. Matter is prior to form only by a priority of origin or nature. It is not prior in time, precisely because form is the source of time. It is not prior in eternity, because this sense of priority belongs only to God, and it is not prior in choice, for it is form that gives matter its worth.[63]

These are the facts that Augustine knew about matter. They can be summarized as follows. Matter was created by God *ex nihilo.* Although not of itself subject to time, it was created simultaneously with form and hence was created at the beginning of time. Only by a priority of nature does matter precede form. Of itself, matter is utterly without form, but it has the ability to receive form. From this ability it follows that matter is something good. Finally, although not of itself subject to change, matter becomes changeable by reason of the forms which it receives, and thus, by the continual succession of forms in it, matter becomes known to men.

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[61] *Sermo CCXIV,* 2. PL 38, 1067.

[62] "Nec putandus est Deus informem prius fecisse materiam, et intervallo aliquo interposito temporis formasse quod informe prius fecerat: sed sicut a loquente fiunt verba sonantia, ubi non prius vox informis post accipit formam, sed formata profertur; ita intelligendus est Deus de materia quidem informi fecisse mundum, sed simul eam concreasse cum mundo. Non tamen inutiliter prius narratur unde aliquid fit, et postea quod inde fit; quia etsi potest utrumque simul fieri non simul potest utrumque narrari. (*Contra adv. leg. et proph.,* I, c. 9, 12. PL 42, 610).

[63] *Confessions,* XII, chap. 29, pp. 313-314.

THE REALITY OF MATTER

One perplexing question remained for Augustine: what is the underlying reality of matter as revealed by these characteristics? A passage from the *Confessions* offers an excellent statement of the problem.

> For the mutability of mutable things is simply their capacity for all the forms into which mutable things can be changed. But what is this? Is it soul? Is it body? Is it any species of soul or body? If it were allowable to say that it is a nothing which is in some way something, or that it is and yet is not, that is what I should say.[64]

To these questions Plotinus had already given an answer. Plotinus affirms what Augustine doubts: for Plotinus, matter was indeed Augustine's "a nothing which is in some way something," something which "is and yet is not." The close parallel between Augustine's questions and Plotinus' affirmations almost suggests that Augustine was deliberately questioning the neo-Platonist's teaching. The following is the statement of Plotinus.

> Investigation will show us that matter has not reality and is not capable of being affected. Matter must be bodiless—for body is a later production, a compound made by matter in conjunction with some other entity. . . . Matter is not soul; it is not intellect, is not life, is no Idea-Principle, no reason-Principle; it is no limit or bound, for it is mere indetermination; it is not a power, for what does it produce? It lives on the farther side of all these categories and so has no title to the name of being. It will be more plausibly called a non-being, and this in the sense not of movement (away from being) or of station (in not-being) but of veritable not-being.[65]

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[64] *Ibid.*, chap. 6, p. 292.

[65] Plotinus, *Enneads*, III, bk. 6, chap. 7, *ed. cit.*, pp. 77-78.

Elsewhere Plotinus explains what he means by this "veritable not-being."

> By this non-being, of course, we are not to understand something that simply does not exist, but only something of an utterly different order from authentic-being: . . . the non-being we are thinking of is rather, an image of being or perhaps something still further removed than even an image.[66]

For the neo-Platonists the reality of matter was simply that it is the privation of all reality.[67] "Its existence is no more than an announcement of a future, as it were a thrust forward to what is to come into existence."[68] Matter, then, is the primal evil, the total absence of all form and goodness, the root of all things which contain evil.[69]

However, Augustine's use of the subjective mood in his final statement ("If it were allowable to say that it is a nothing which is in some way something, or that it is and yet is not, that is what I should say.") suggests that this neo-Platonic explanation failed to satisfy him. In particular, he was faced with the difficulty of reconciling the neo-Platonist assertion that matter is the root of evil with the Christian conviction that matter, as a creature of God, must be somehing good. Augustine's solution to this dilemma was slow to develop.

Augustine's first work on the subject, his *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* only hints at an explanation for the reality of matter. But these hints suggest a characteristically Plotinian notion. The potentiality of matter seems to be a mere announcement that God will make heaven and earth from matter. Like the darkness which envelops it, matter appears as the privation of all reality.[70]

In the *De vera religione* and the *De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII*, the identification of matter and Plotinian non-being is more explicit.

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[66] *Ibid.*, I, bk. 8, chap. 3, *ed. cit.*, p. 94.

[67] *Ibid.*, II, bk. 4, chap. 16, *ed cit.*, p. 195.

[68] *Ibid.*, bk. 5, chap. 5, *ed. cit.*, p. 201.

[69] *Ibid.*, I, bk. 8, chap. 4-12, *ed. cit.*, pp. 95-107.

[70] *De Gen. contra Man.* I, c. 7. PL 34, 178-179.

> However, what is not a body is either soul or something better than soul. For there is nothing lower than all bodies, because even if someone will suggest the matter from which a body is made, this matter, since it lacks all form, is rightly called nothing.[71]

Although it is nothing, non-being in the Plotinian sense, matter is still something good. It does not have form in the proper sense, but it does have form inchoatively, potentially, "for even what is not yet formed, is, nevertheless, in some way inchoate in order that it be able to be formed."[72]

In the *De Genesi ad litteram liber imperfectus*, Augustine adds nothing new to these earlier explanations. It is true that he speaks of matter as *quaedam confusa*, but it is evident from the context that he simply means that matter is devoid of form.[73]

A new expression, however, makes its appearance in the *Confessions* and the *De Genesi ad litteram*. Here he denies explicitly that matter is *nihil;* rather it is *prope nihil*, almost nothing. "Yet this almost-nothing, since it was not absolutely nothing, must have been from Him from whom all is that in any way is."[74]

In his last works, Augustine insists with special force upon the distinction between matter on the one hand and non-being and evil on the other.[75] His unfinished dialogue against the Pelagian Julian of Eclanum perhaps explains this insistence. Julian apparently accused

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[71] "Omne quod est, aut eodem modo semper est aut non. . . . Quod autem corpus non est, et tamen aliquid est, aut anima est, aut ea melius aliquid. Deterius enim omne corpore nihil est: quia et si materiam quis dixerit, unde ipsum corpus fit; recte, quoniam caret omni specie, nihil dicitur." (*De div. quaest. LXXXIII*, q. 54. PL 40, 38. See also *Ibid.*, q. 4; PL 40.12; and *De vera religione*, c. 18; PL 34, 134.)

[72] "Nam et quod nondum formatur est, tamen aliquo modo ut formari possit, inchoatum est." (*De vera religione*, c. 18. PL 34, 137.)

[73] *De Gen. ad litt. imp.*, c. 4. PL 34, 224. See *De Gen. contra Man.*, I, c. 5, 9. PL 34, 178.

[74] *Confessions*, XII, chap. 15, p. 300. See also chap. 8, p. 293; chap. 19, p. 304; and *De Gen. ad litt.*, I, c. 15, 29. PL 34, 257.

[75] *Contra adv. leg. et proph.*, I, c. 8, 11. PL 42, 609. *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum*, V, c. 44. PL 45, 1480.

Augustine of reverting to the Manichean error about the origin of evil. As proof he cited Augustine's teaching that being made from nothing is the root of corruptibility.[76] Augustine answers that the expression "made from nothing" is entirely negative; it is equivalent to saying "made from no other thing." *Nihil,* for Augustine, has no positive signification; it merely indicates the absence of any positive reality.[77]

The whole development of Augustine's thought seems to tend in the direction of clarifying the distinction between matter and privation. Whereas the neo-Platonists were intent upon asserting the privative aspect of matter, i.e., that it is entirely without form or being, without goodness, Augustine, especially in his later works, is most intent upon asserting the positive character of matter, i.e., that it is created by God and is good.

At the heart of Augustine's concept of matter is his notion of mutability, for as previously noted, it is this mutability of created things which reveals the existence of matter. Augustine uses the word "mutability" in two senses: one refers to the tendency of creatures to return to nothingness, and in this sense "mutability" is the same as "corruption"[78]; the other sense refers to the succession of forms in matter.[79] Only the latter sense does he attribute to matter precisely as matter[80]; the former sense he attributes to all created things as the result of their having been made from nothing.[81] In other words, matter is the principle by which creatures change their forms, but it is not the root of the tendency of creatures to return to non-being. The tendency to return to non-being flows from the fact that creatures have been made from nothing, and it belongs as much to form as it does to matter. This distinction is a natural consequence of Augustine's continual insistence on the fact that matter is something good created by God and not mere non-being.

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[76] *Opus imp. contra Julianum,* V, c. 31 ff. PL 45, 1469 ff.

[77] *Ibid.,* c. 31. PL 45, 1470.

[78] *Contra epist. Man. quam vocant Fundamenti,* c. 38, 44. PL 42, 203.

[79] *Confessions,* XII, chap. 6, p. 291; chap. 8, p. 293; chap. 19, p. 304. *De Gen. ad litt.,* I, c. 14, 28; VIII, c 20, 29; PL 34, 274-275; 389. *De natura boni,* c. 8. PL 42, 554.

[80] *Confessions,* XII, chap. 6, p. 291. *De Gen. ad litt.,* I, c. 14, 28; VIII, c. 20, 29. PL 34, 274-275; 388. See Anton Pegis, "The Mind of Augustine," *Medieval Studies,* VI (1944), pp. 33-34.

[81] *Contra epist. Man. quam vocant Fundamenti,* c. 38, 44. PL 42, 203. *De natura boni,* c. 10. PL 42, 554-555. *Contra adv. legis et proph.,* I, c. 6, 8. PL 42, 607.

Augustine's distinction between matter and privation and his explanation of the way matter becomes known through the mutability of bodies has suggested to some Thomistic scholars the full notion of the pure potentiality of prime matter.

Certainly the oft-quoted passage of the twelfth book of the *Confessions*, in which Augustine describes how he came to conceive matter, is open to a Thomistic interpretation. Nevertheless, it is difficult to reconcile such an interpretation with many of the other statements which Augustine makes concerning matter. We have already noted the care with which Augustine distinguishes matter from non-being. But there is no indication in his work that he distinguished with equal care actual from potential being. Rather the opposite seems to be the case. The following passage strongly suggests that Augustine, like his Platonic predecessors, failed to recognize the fundamental Aristotelian insight that potential being, though a real being, provides a kind of mean between the two extremes of actual being and mere non-being.

> But if anyone does not believe that corruption comes from nothing, let him place before himself existence and non-existence—the one, as it were, on one side, and the other on the other . . . then let him set something, say the body of an animal, between them, and let him ask himself whether, while the body is being formed and produced, while its size is increasing, while it gains nourishment, health, strength, beauty, stability, it is tending, as regards its duration and permanence, to this side or that, to existence or non-existence. He will see without difficulty, that even in the rudimentary form there is an existence, and that the more the body is established and built up in form, and figure and strength, the more does it come to exist, and to tend to the side of existence. Then again let the body begin

> to be corrupted . . . and let him ask now where the body is tending in this corruption, whether to existence or non-existence: he will not surely be so blind or stupid . . . as not to see that, in proportion as anything is corrupted, in that proportion it appoaches decrease. But whatever tends to decrease tends to non-existence. Since, then, we must believe that God exists immutably and incorruptibly, while what is called nothing is clearly altogether non-existent; and since, after setting before yourself existence and non-existence, you observed that the more a visible object increases the more it tends towards existence, while the more it is corrupted the more it tends to non-existence, why are you at a loss to tell regarding any nature that visible form is natural and corruption against nature?[82]

Here we are faced wtih the fundamental reason why Augustine's notion of the potentiality of matter could not be the full Aristotelian one of a purely potential being. Augustine had failed to recognize one of the first postulates of the Aristotelian conception, namely, that the corruption of one thing is the generation of another. Aristotle had conceived the process of corruption as the return of a form to a potential, though none the less real, state of being. Augustine, on the contrary, saw it as the return of a creature to a state of non-being in the absolute sense. Thus Augustine made his distinction between mutability and corruption. Mutability, the succession of forms in matter, is indeed very similar to the Aristotelian notion of generation and corruption. To the extent that mutability is explained by the potentiality of matter, one can speak of Augustine's notion of pure potentiality. But Augustine's chief concern is to explain corruption as distinguished from mutability, and this he explains not by the potentiality of matter, but rather by the fact of being made from nothing.

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[82] *Contra epist. Man. quam vocant Fundamenti,* c. 40, 46. PL 42, 204-205. Translated by R. Stothert in *St. Augustine: the Writings Against the Manichaeans and Against the Donatists,* vol. IV of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers (Buffalo, N.Y.: The Christian Literature Company, 1887) pp. 149-150.

Faced with the Platonic dichotomy between actual being and pure non-being, Augustine was forced to place matter on the side of actual being. Such is the conclusion of both Pierre Duhem[83] and Etienne Gilson.[84] Gilson admirably sums up the Augustinian position where he says:

> The statements of Augustine concerning matter are open to two interpretations: 1) matter was made "creatable," that is transformable into form; 2) matter was created as a pure mutability determinable by forms. In both cases, there was in Augustinian matter an incipient seeking toward form, the very "positive privation" which the Augustinians were to uphold against the mere absence of form attributed to matter by Aristotle.[85]

This notion of "an incipient seeking toward form," a kind of anticipated actuality accords well with another Augustinian notion, namely his concept of formation as a kind of participation or illumination rather than true efficient causality.[86]

CONCLUSION

Almost all the evidence converges on the opinion that Augustine's notion of prime matter never really attained the Aristotelian concept of pure potentiality; instead it remained bound by the essential notions of Platonism. Yet if Augustine remained essentially Platonist in his philosophy, he did succeed, in one important aspect, in rising above the common neo-Platonist version of that philosophy. Where as the neo-Platonists preferred to place matter on the side of non-being, non-existence, Augustine insisted, at least in his mature period, on placing matter on the side of real being, actually existent. Although deprived of all form, matter still possesses a kind of *inchoatio formae*, a thrust foreward to existence.

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[83] Duhem, *op. cit.*, p. 431.

[84] Gilson, *History*, pp. 362-363.

[85] *Ibid.*, p. 363.

[86] For an explanation of Augustine's notion of formation see Martin D'Arcy, "The Philosophy of St. Augustine," *St. Augustine*, M. D'Arcy *et al.* (New York: Meridian, 1957), pp. 187-188. Gilson, *Introduction*, pp. 257-259. Pegis, *loc. cit.*, p. 33, note 143.

This was the heritage which Augustine passed on to the schoolmen of the Middle Ages. As Augustine had purified the matter of Plotinus from its identification with non-being and evil, so Aquinas would purify the matter of Augustine of its last traces of actuality.[87] The frequency with which later Thomists have cited Augustine's authority for the pure potentiality of prime matter is proof of how easily the transformation was accomplished.

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[87] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Super libros Sententiarum,* II, d. 12, q. 1, a. 4, ed. P. Mandonnet (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929), II, pp. 312-315.

CELESTIN D. WEISSER, O.P.

THE CULT OF SAINT BOETHIUS, MARTYR

It is quite clear
that the cult rendered to Severinus
is sufficiently established
by authentic evidence.
Sacred Congregation of Rites

Writing in 1928, in his *Founders of the Middle Ages*,[1] Edward Kennard Rand regretted his inability to find any recent document, "authoritative or unauthoritative," on the saints of the Church, which included the name of Boethius.[2] He found this lamentable for two reasons. First, though he had discovered St. Severinus Boethius mentioned in the Bollandists' *Acta Sanctorum*,[3] he was unable to locate any such reference in their more recent *Bibliotheca hagiographica*

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[1] Edward K. Rand, *Founders of the Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1928). Reprinted in 1957 by Dover Publications, New York.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 179.

[3] *Acta Sanctorum, Maii*, VI (1688), 702-10; also in the later edition of ActaSS, VI (1866), 694.

latina antiquae et medii aetatis.[4] Second, and more significant, is the fact that the life of Boethius seems indeed to merit this recognition on the part of the Church. Rand concluded:

> I wish that someone influential with the Holy See would present a petition in favor of St Severinus or St Boethius, for, if I have stated the facts about him, the logic of the case seems inexorable.[5]

The facts, briefly, are these. Boethius was born at Rome around the year 475, of the distinguished family of the Anicii, Christian since the time of Constantine. While still a young man, Boethius was sent to Athens for his education, and there he first came into contact with neo-Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Stoicism,[6] occupying his leisure in writing and reading verse. In 510, Theodoric, Arian king of the Ostrogoths and sole ruler of Italy since 493, raised Boethius to the rank of consul. Twelve years later he was named *magister officiorum,* and his two sons were elevated to the dignity of consuls.

And then the wheel of fortune turned. Boethius was convicted of high treason by a servile Senate in 524 and confined to a dungeon in Pavia. The reason for his downfall was ostensibly political. Boethius was accused of carrying on secret communications with the Byzantine court, and perhaps also suspected of practicing astrology.[7] The real issue is told by Rand:

> The explanation of this *volte-face* on the part of Theodoric, I believe, is that the circle of Boethius, in particular, and the Senate, in general, formed the core of the Catholic conservatives who were bitterly opposed to [Theodoric's] Arianism.[8]

After a year of imprisonment, Boethius was executed at Calvenzano between Milan and Pavia. Shortly afterwards, his father-in-law, Symmachus, Catholic grandson of that other celebrated Symmachus who defended paganism against the edict of Theodosius, and the Roman Pontiff, John I, met a similar fate at the hands of the Arian king.

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[4] Brussels (1898-1901). This is particularly strange in view of the decree of 1883, printed below. See E. K. Rand, *op. cit.,* p. 324, fn.80.

[5] E. K. Rand, *op. cit.,* p. 180.

[6] See R. Bonnaud, "L'education scientifique de Boèce," *Speculum,* IV (1929), p. 200.

[7] *Ibid.,* p. 201.

[8] E. K. Rand, *op. cit.,* pp. 178-9.

So ended the political career of Boethius. So too died "the last of the Romans, the first of the Scholastics," an epithet he merits for his many extraordinary writings, in which he preserved the best of the classical Roman tradition and laid the foundation for Western Scholasticism. His works fall into four groups: logical works, including translations, commentaries, and some original writings based on the logical treatises of Aristotle; quadrivial, on music, arithmetic, and geometry; the literary *Consolation of Philosophy*, written during his confinement at Pavia; and, lastly, the five theological tractates:[9]

1. *Quomodo Trinitas unus Deus ac non tres dii* (How it is that the Trinity is one God and not three gods).
2. *Utrum Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus de divinitate substantialiter praedicentur* (Whether Father, Son, and Holy Spirit may be substantially predicated of Divinity).
3. *Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint bonae sint cum non sint substantialia bona* (How substantives can be good in virtue of their existence without being absolute goods).
4. *De fide catholica* (On the Catholic faith).
5. *Liber contra Eutychen et Nestorium* (A treatise against Eutyches and Nestorius).

The very titles of these treatises are sufficient indication that they are not mere reflections by a pious dilettante, but genuine, serious, and not insignificant theological tractates.

Boethius, then, was a layman conspicuous in public life, and a theologian. He was also a martyr. Moreover, he is considered a saint by the Church, as R. Bonnaud was able to point out to Rand in 1929.[10] His cult took definite shape in the eighth century, when a magnificent tomb was erected in his honor by Luitprand, king of the Lombards, and it was officially confirmed by Pope Leo XIII in 1883. This action of the Pope was a fitting prelude, as it were, to his future labors for the restoration of Christian philosophy throughout Christendom. Because Boethius happily combined such elements—layman, philosopher, theologian, saint—he seems worthy of greater consideration as a suitable patron for those modern laymen who more and more appreciate the importance of a sound theological basis for the development of true spirituality. It is with this hope that the decree confirming his cult is presented in translation on the following pages.[11]

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[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 149-157.

[10] R. Bonnaud, *art. cit.*, p. 199.

DECREE

CONFIRMING THE CULT AT PAVIA RENDERED FROM TIME IMMEMORIAL TO THE SERVANT OF GOD, *SEVERINUS BOETHIUS*, CALLED PHILOSOPHER MARTYR AND SAINT

Anicius Manlius Torquatus Severinus Boethius, born of the illustrious Roman family of the Anicii, was indeed celebrated for his vast learning, but was even more outstanding because of his zeal for Christian piety. Abounding in wealth, he eagerly aided the poor and wretched by his generosity and kindness. He diligently cultivated philosophical and mathematical studies, even applying himself to theology, and in all these disciplines he published outstanding writings. Because he evidenced so many striking signs of a virtuous character, he was first of all admitted to the Senate by Theodoric, King of the Goths, who at that time ruled the affairs of Italy, then he was raised to the supreme rank of consul. After his promotion to these honors, Severinus Boethius energetically directed all his attention to securing the welfare of the Church, though he did not neglect the burden of government which he administered. For which reason Theodoric, in admiration of so excellent a man, did not cease to bestow on him tokens of his personal good will and esteem.

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[11] I wish to express my gratitude to Benedict T. Viviano, O.P., for his assistance in the translation which follows.

But when Theodoric realized that the Catholic faith was again flourishing, under the aegis of Emperor Justin I, to the detriment of Arianism, he, who until then had treated Catholics with toleration, decided that his rule could not remain secure unless he further impeded the Catholic religion. Consequently, that tenacious adherent of the Arian heresy became enraged and, sacrificing justice to his own security, resolved to suppress the Catholic faith by deceitful stratagems. Therefore, he determined to do away with three of the leading Catholics, Pope John I, the patrician Symmachus, and the consul Severinus Boethius, for he thought that once these men were removed from the center of affairs, the enthusiasm of their co-religionists would soon wane. By command of the King, Pope John was arrested and brought to Ravenna, where he died in a squalid prison, worn out by hunger and other hardships. The fate of Symmachus was decapitation. Finally, Severinus Boethius was brought to Pavia (Ticinum), imprisoned in the tower, and then put to the sword. The shrewd King, however, afraid that the Catholics might pay homage to Severinus Boethius as a martyr, ordered that his body be secretly buried.

Soon afterword, when Theodoric had died, the people of Pavia undertook the transference of the body of Severinus Boethius to the Basilica dedicated to St. Peter, Prince of the Apostles, under the title of Ceil d'Oro, and there buried it in a worthy tomb. Thereafter Catholics began venerating these holy remains as those of a martyr. Thus it is quite clear that the cult rendered to Severinus from the time of his death is sufficiently established by authentic evidence.

Understandably, these facts encouraged the people of Pavia as well as many others, especially scholars, to petition the Apostolic See for the confirmation of this cult on account of its own merit and its genuine antiquity. The present bishop of Pavia, desiring to comply with these wishes, had by his ordinary power as bishop allowed processional banners to be made, and he did not hesitate to pronounce an affirmative judgment on this time-honored cult. He then submitted the case to the supreme Apostolic See for approval, according to normal procedure.

After the requirements laid down by the Constitution of Pope Urban VIII of holy memory had been duly fulfilled, His Eminence Lucido Cardinal Parocchi, postulator of the cause, proposed the following question to the ordinary session of the Sacred Congregation of Rites, meeting at the Vatican on the undersigned date: *Whether the judgment brought forth by the Most Reverend Bishop of Pavia is to be confirmed?*

When everything had been heard, including the report presented by the Promotor of the Faith, the Reverend Father Agostino Caprara, the Most Eminent and Very Reverend Fathers charged with safeguarding sacred rites judged the petition: *Affirmatively, namely the judgment is to be confirmed.* [Dated] 15 December 1883.

A faithful account of the proceedings was later made to our Most Holy Father, Pope Leo XIII, by the undersigned Secretary, and His Holiness ratified and confirmed the rescript of the Sacred Congregation for that same day, month, and year [15 Dec. 1883].

CARDINAL BARTOLINI, Prefect of the Sacred Congregation of Rites.
Lorenzo Salvati, Secretary S.C.R.

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JOHN'S BAPTISM OF THE JEWS

I am the voice of one crying in the desert,
'Make straight the way of the Lord.'
The Gospel of St. John

In the history of salvation, God has worked in strange ways when He has chosen men to help in His work. He called to Moses out of a burning bush and spoke to Joseph in a dream. Scripture tells us of a man who preached the Kingdom of God just before the Incarnate God became man. His manner of life was strange and remarkable in many ways and God used him and his preaching for the most important event of our salvation.

Who was this man who preached in the desert and why was he there? The Gospels tell us that he was a Precursor, one sent before the face of the Lord, one sent to prepare His way.[1] His reason for being in the desert was a Divine one and the words that he spoke and the baptismal act he performed were ordered by God. He gave little thought to clothing and food. The short garment of rough camel hair he wore, the wild honey he happened to find, and the locusts he caught on the ground were sufficient for his immediate needs. He was more interested in the immediate needs of the Jews who came out to see him, to hear him and to receive his baptism.

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[1] Luke 1:77. (All references to the New Testament are taken from the Confraternity Edition.)

What was this baptism? That is the burden of these pages, and briefly this is the order to be followed. There will be two main sections—a consideration of John's baptism from Scripture and then a theological analysis. We shall examine the pertinent texts of the Gospels regrading his baptism and see what they say and mean. In the theological section, we shall show the truth of the statement: John's baptism was not a Sacrament. First, let us look at Scripture.

I

The predominant word in the Synoptic Gospels, relating the activities of John the Baptist, is "Baptism," and its meaning and signification is of prime importance in understanding his office and work. The word is from the Greek *βαπτιξω*, and is the same as to immerse or to bathe. In Mark 1:4 and Luke 3:3 it is called a "baptism of penance" meaning a sign of the penance which John was preaching in the desert. According to most commentators, this was to signify a conversion of the heart, something interior, by which the recipient returned to or was reborn in God.[2]

It is strange to notice in the Gospels that none of the Jews questioned this act performed by John in the River Jordan. True, some questioned his presence and identity[3] and asked by what authority he was preaching and baptizing.[4] But there was no astonishment or admiration among them about the act itself. And for good reason: since baptism, washing, or immersion was in itself nothing new to most Jews, they simply accepted it. They questioned his preaching and wondered at his words about ". . . one who is to come . . ."[5] but if they were so moved to accept his words, there was no repulsion about receiving his baptism.

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[2] Simon-Dorado, *Praelectiones biblicae* (Torino: Marietti, 1951), I, 394.
[3] John 1:22.
[4] John 1:25.
[5] John 1:27.

Three reasons can be brought forth to explain this ready acceptance of his baptismal act. First, the Mosaic Law prescribed certain purifications to take away legal impurities, and the Jews faithful to the law rigorously observed these washings. In the Book of Leviticus we read that there are several washings prescribed for the complete cleansing of lepers[6] and there are washings prescribed for the man made unclean by an issue of seed.[7] The Book of Numbers states the various ways a man can be made unclean by touching a corpse and prescribes the washings to be undertaken in each case.[8]

Secondly, the Jews demanded of converted pagans a baptism of initiation into the Jewish religion. It symbolized the beginning of a new religious life. And thirdly, the Essenes, a group familiar to at least some of the Jews, were said to perform a rite of washing at least twice a day.[9]

Even though this act was known to the Jews, the baptism of John was still something new in rite and signification. It differed from the legal purifications because it was given by John himself: ". . . and they were baptized by him . . ."[10] Like the washings prescribed by the law, it used water externally, but unlike these washings his baptism had an internal signification, that of a moral and religious purification. In the baptism of Jewish proselytes, the one who administered the act was little more than a witness to the rite, while the candidate himself administered the water. A few maintain that it forgave the sins of the pagans, but most affirm that at best, even in the minds of the Jews, it signified only a ritual purification.[11] The washings practiced by the Essenes were administered at least twice and perhaps more times during the day, but the baptism of John, as such, was given only once.

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[6] Lev. 14:1-9. (References to the Old Testament are from the Douay Version.)

[7] Lev. 15:2 ff.

[8] Num. 19:11-22.

[9] Simon-Dorado, *op. cit.*, 395.

[10] Mark 1:5.

[11] Simon-Dorado, *loc. cit.*

Here we should note that it seems improbable that John was connected with the Essenes. Perhaps we can say that his baptism resembled the baptismal practices of the Essenes, but at the same time the differences between them are profound. We have nothing to prove that a new member of the Essenes was introduced into the brotherhood by a baptism of initiation. Usually after a year of probation and trial, he was simply permitted to perform the rtiual ablutions.[12] Besides the difference pointed out above, John's baptism allowed one to change his life morally and religiously, initiating a new life in God's kingdom.

The word "Baptism" then, as used in the Synoptics, refers to something interior, that change or conversion of the one who received it from John. Though familiar to the Jews and therefore acceptable to them, its signification was entirely different from anything they knew.

The words "for the forgiveness of sins" in Mark 1:4, do not refer to the sacramental forgiveness as we know it under the New Law, as will be shown in the theological treatment of John's baptism. His baptism did not confer pardon, but by listening to his preaching and doing the works of penance enjoined upon them, the recipients of it were disposed for a later forgiveness.

In Matthew 3:6, we read that the people "were baptized by him." Perhaps this refers to baptism by John himself, i.e., that the water was administered by his hands. Or it might mean that John took some other kind of unknown active participation.[13] If we take these words to mean exactly what they say, then it seems that water was poured over the heads of those receiving baptism while they were in the water. According to Matthew 3:16 ("And when Jesus had been baptized, he immediately came up from the water"), John's baptism was performed by immersion, although some type of infusion could have been used also.[14] However, Father Buzy points out that if total immersion was used, John would have had to stay close to shore and avoid the swift current of the Jordan. He holds that it is better ot conclude from these words of Matthew that the rite of John's Baptism was one of infusion.[15]

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[12] Rowley, H. H., "Le Baptême de Jean et La Secte de Qumran," *Revue Biblique,* LXVII, (1960), 133. Sutcliffe, E. F., "Baptism at Qumran?" *The Heythrop Journal,* I, (July, 1960), 180.

[13] Louis Pirot, *La Sainte Bible* (Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1946), 31.

In both Matthew and Mark we have the words "confessing their sins," referring to a confession that was voluntary and public on the part of John's neophytes. The confession of sins was not something unknown to the Jews, for we have references in the Old Testament to confession according to the Law. In the Book of Leviticus we read, "Let him confess all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their offenses and sins."[16] In the Book of Numbers we read the instructions of the Lord to Moses regarding any man or woman who breaks one of the commandments: "They shall confess their sin . . ."[17] But just as there was a difference in the Jewish idea of baptism, so there is a difference in their confession of sins: this ancient practice had the note of a collective or a national confession, while that urged by John the Baptist was an individual confession.[18] We should also note before leaving this text that the confession in John's rite was distinct from sacramental confession which developed from the words and life of Our Lord.

We come now to the texts that give us a better idea of the nature of John's baptism and distinguishes it from that of Our Lord. The three texts from Matthew, Mark, and Luke are in substantial agreement, but we can note the variations: "I indeed baptize you with water [the reading of Mark is "baptized"; and Matthew adds "for repentance"] . . . He [who is coming after me] will baptize you with the Holy Spirit and with fire." (Mark omits the words, "and with fire.")[19] The question of water, which John used in his baptism, and the Holy Spirit in Christ's Baptism points out the great difference in the two rites. The water in John's baptism washes the body. Of itself water can only cleanse, take away stains and bestow on the body a sort of purity; and moral innocence is naturally compared with bodily purity. Hence water is a natural symbol of a return to innocence of life.[20] Buzy quotes the words of John Chrysostom, "As if to say: believe not that my baptism suffices; for if my baptism were perfect another would not come after me to give another baptism."[21] John's baptism is imperfect and a shadow and figure of what is to come after him. The use of water signifies this imperfection because according to Gregory, ". . . unable to forgive sins, he washes the bodies of those baptized by him with water; but their souls he cannot wash with pardon."[22]

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[14] *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* (Paris, 1947) VIII, 1, col. 647.

[15] Buzy, D. D., Rev. Denis, *The Life of St. John the Baptist* (London: Burns Oates & Washbourne, 1933), 85.

[16] Lev. 16:21.

[17] Num. 5:7.

[18] Simon-Dorado, *op. cit.*, 396.

With these words, John is announcing to his listeners that he cleanses only the body, that his baptism is imperfect and is only a symbol of penance. But he immediately points to the eventual perfection of his rite by saying that the Baptism of Christ will be given with the Holy Spirit and fire. Among many variations offered, it seems better to interpret this as referring to the Sacrament of Baptism of Christ which takes away sins with fire and produces the infusion of the Holy Spirit directly into the soul.[23] John's baptism, using only water, was the sign of an interior change and somehow the agent of that conversion. Still it lacked any immediate and direct power of forgiving sins because water cleanses only the exterior body. However, it did act indirectly and mediately by stirring up in the soul feelings of contrition and faith, which, aided by grace, obtained forgiveness. Thus, we can say that the efficacy of John's baptism of water was indirect, mediate, and conditional, whereas that of the Holy Spirit is direct, immediate, and absolute, purifying the soul from all stain of sin and giving grace.

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[19] Matthew 3:11-12; Mark 1:7-8; Luke 3:15-18.

[20] Père M.-J. Lagrange, O.P., *The Gospel of Jesus Christ* (Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1958), 63.

[21] Buzy, *op. cit.*, 88.

[22] *Ibid.*, 64.

[23] Simon-Dorado, *op. cit.*, 399.

The words "and with fire" in Matthew and Luke help to explicate the true nature of John's baptism, but there is a problem as to their exact meaning and signification. The Latin rendering has "in spiritu Sancto," but since they are used in an instrumentive sense in Greek, the preposition in Latin seems superfluous. Conjoining this with the Latin ". . . et igni," therefore, implies at least two distinct causes of purification in Christ's Baptism as the fulfillment of the baptism of John.

Thus, it seems better to say that there is only one cause involved in the purifying action, corresponding to the action of water in John's baptism. The sense then, to maintain the parallel and the disjunctive character of these verses, is that of a fiery spirit or a sanctifying spirit that takes away sins in the Baptism of Christ.[24] We can paraphrase John's words thus: the Messiah will baptize you in the Holy Spirit, which is a devouring fire, a sanctifying fire, capable of consuming all impurities and of sanctifying purified souls. From the words of Mark 1:8, we should not conclude that water was not used in Christ's Baptism. Rather it introduces the purifying and sanctifying action of the Holy Spirit that was not present in John's baptism.

To distinguish further the two baptisms, we should determine what this fiery action of the Holy Spirit is. The Jews who came into the desert to see and hear John were not surprised at such a common element as water; and in John's words "I indeed baptize you with water," the meaning of the word is clear. Moreover, John clearly shows the imperfection of his baptism with the reference to fire, since, for the Jewish mind, the cleansing and purifying by fire would be the most efficacious means of baptism.[25] Yet it is almost the unanimous opinion that the fire referred to by John is not the fire of Pentecost nor the fire of the Last Judgment. The conclusion of Father Buzy is most clear: "The Messiah will baptize you in the consuming, sanctifying fire of the Holy Spirit which will burn up all impurities and sanctify the souls which he cleanses from sin."[26]

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[24] Pirot, *loc. cit.*

II

In the Church in our day, and for the past nineteen hundred years, Baptism has the character and nature of one of the Sacraments instituted by Christ. We know basically how it is conferred and the effects that it produces in the soul. In discussing the baptism of John from a theological point of view, we naturally compare it with what we know. The most elementary question we can ask, then, concerns the sacramental nature of John's baptism: Was it a Sacrament? The last section of this paper will try to answer that question by examining the rite of his baptism, by comparing it with the baptism of the Jews and Christ, by showing why John conferred his baptism and upon whom it was or should have been conferred.

The rite of John's baptism was from God. It was given to him by a special revelation of the Holy Spirit: "He who sent me to baptize with water said to me . . ."[27] The fact that he had a true mandate from God to baptize was so well known to the priests and elders, that they could find no reason to doubt it. In Matthew, we read that they were put into an impossible dilemma when Christ asked them by what authority John had baptized.[28]

On the other hand, part of his baptism was not from God in a strict sense. St. Thomas points out that there was nothing in John's baptism that could not be produced by man himself; thus, the effect of his baptism, the external washing of the body, was proper to man.[29] But the use of water in an external manner was characteristic of his baptism and distinguished it from that of Christ in which the Holy Spirit works interiorly.

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[25] *Loc. cit.*
[26] Buzy, *op. cit.*, 112.
[27] John 1:33.
[28] Matthew 21:25 ff.

Of itself, the baptism of John did not confer grace because the power of its effect, namely, the cleansing of the body, did not penetrate interiorly to the soul. Grace comes with the Holy Ghost who purifies and sanctifies, but from John's own words "I indeed have baptized you in water . . . He will baptize you with the Holy Spirit," we see that this kind of purifying action was not present in his baptism. A later witness to this absence is given us in the Acts of the Apostles when Paul meets some believers who received John's baptism.[30] Their answer to his question was: "We have not even heard of the Holy Spirit."[31] But since his baptism was a preparation for a future coming of Christ, it did not confer grace.

However it did dispose and prepare for the reception of grace in three ways.[32] The Jews were more easily disposed by the doctrine which John preached to put their faith and trust in Christ when He appeared. Secondly, his baptism disposed for grace by familiarizing men with the rite of Christ's baptism; through acts of true mortification and sacrifice, the Jews who received John's baptism were better prepared to enjoy the effects of Christ's baptism.

Two other forms of baptism or washing were prevalent before and after John's baptism: the various legal purifications of the Jews and the Baptism of Christ that came after John. A comparison of John's baptism with each of these will shed more light on the nature of his baptismal act.

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[29] *Sum. theol.*, III, q. 38, a. 2.
[30] Acts 19:1-7.
[31] John 1:17.
[32] *Sum. theol.*, III, q. 38, a. 3.

First, in comparison to the Jewish forms of baptism and purification, John's baptism was distinct and superior. We should note that the two had a certain likeness in that both were conceptions of a religious washing, designed to remove impurities that would hinder access to holy places and religious functions. But the two baptisms differed in an essential point: the Jewish form of Baptism, whether of the priests in their Temple functions or of private individuals in their numerous purifications, was concerned only with bodily purity, never purity of soul.[33] The ritual purifications of the Jews played an important part in the Law. Their chief function was to give the Israelites legal purity for certain religious acts. John's baptism, on the other hand, was exclusively a baptism of repentance, of spiritual and moral renewal, of remission of sins; so much so that John showed no concern regarding legal or bodily purity and impurity. Christ spoke against the emphasis of the pharisees on the external rites, while He always spoke most highly of John's baptism and even entered the waters of the Jordan himself. He always gave the precursor the highest approval and testimony, but condemned pharisaical externalism.[34]

Secondly, we should compare the baptism of John to the Baptism of Christ. Such a comparison shows that it was distinct from the Baptism of the Savior and at the same time definitely inferior to it. Father Buzy uses the words of John Chrysostom to show that the baptism of John was given in water for penance: ". . . incapable of directly purifying the soul, it prepared the way for the remission of sins," by exciting in the hearts sentiments of compunction.[35] But the Baptism of Jesus is made in virtue of the Holy Spirit who penetrates the soul interiorly to purify and transform it.

Early heretics and even some theologians of the Middle Ages argued for the identity of the two rites, but the Council of Trent explicitly decreed the contrary, declaring the superiority of Christ's Baptism.[36] The evidence from Scripture for this superiority is taken from the fact that the first Christians were baptized in the Name of Jesus[37] or in the Name of the Lord.[38] Further, the difference in wording and language of the two rites is proof that the two baptisms were not considered identical by the primitive community. The rite of John, although of Divine origin, was only a corporeal ablution which bore the name of the man who executed it. But speaking of Christian Baptism, St. Paul says, "For all you who have been baptized into Christ have put on Christ."[39]

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[33] Buzy, *op. cit.*, 88.

[34] DTC, VIII, 1, col. 648.

[35] Buzy, *op. cit.*, 85.

St. Thomas' reasoning for this distinction and superiority is similar to that above when he discussed the effect of John's baptism. The baptismal act of John was known in his day by his proper name, the baptism of John the Baptist, and has come down to us in this form. Nothing happened, no event occurred or effect was produced in his baptism that John himself could not have produced. On the other hand, Baptism in the New Law does not carry with it the name of the baptizer because the minister does not produce the principal effect of the Sacrament, the interior cleansing of the soul. Thus, John's baptism, by its very name as well as from the definition of the Church and Sacred Scripture occupies a place inferior to the Baptism of Christ.[40]

Continuing this comparison we see that John's baptism had a very particular end, "That He may be made known to Israel, for this reason have I come baptizing with water."[41] From the very beginning of his ministry he insisted that his was a temporary mission, one of preparing the way for the Messiah by preceding him in preaching and baptizing. But when the manifestation of Christ in Israel began, he would decrease and retire.[42] In other words, when Christ or his disciples began baptizing, John's office as the Messianic precursor was finished, although, as we shall see, there was good reason for him to continue baptizing for a time.

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[36] Denz. 857: Si quis dixerit, baptismum Joannis habuisse eandem vim cum baptismo Christi: A.S.

[37] Acts 2:38.

[38] Acts 10:48; 19:5.

[39] Gal. 3:27.

[40] *Sum. theol.*, III, q. 38, a. 2 ad 1.

[41] John 1:31.

One last difference can be pointed out between these two baptisms concerning the persons who use them. The manner of baptizing and the effect produced correspond directly to the character of those who use them: John is a man and baptized with and in water; Christ is Man-God and baptized in water and the Holy Spirit. John's baptism produced dispositions for the remission of sin and the infusion of grace in proportion to the attitude of the neophytes who received it. But the Baptism of Christ under the Christian Law produces the remission of sins directly and immediately so that Christian Baptism is the proximate cause of grace.[43]

Considering these great differences between John's baptism and that of Christ, was there really any reason for John to baptize? Would not the office of Precursor have been fulfilled just as well by his preaching? John's baptism seems superfluous, for the Jews had many different baptismal washings. And if John was to be truly a Prophet according to the words of the Benedictus, "And thou, child, shall be called the prophet of the Most High . . . ,"[44] all he had to do was persuade the people to be faithful to the existing religious rites. There was no need for him to introduce something new and therefore no need for his baptism.

St. Thomas answers these objections by giving four reasons why John should have baptized.[45] First, because Christ Himself should have been baptized by John so that baptism would receive the blessing of God and divine approval. Secondly, John's office was the manifestation of Christ, and by baptizing he announced the coming of the Messiah to those who came out to see and hear him. Thirdly, by his act of baptism he anticipated Christ's act and better disposed and accustomed men to the Baptism of the Savior. St. Thomas cites Gregory as saying that by performing this act he preserved the subordination of the Precursor to the Messiah, baptizing before Him just as he had been born before Him.[46] Lastly, men would more worthily receive the Baptism of Christ, if they had been first persuaded to do penance and practice mortification by receiving the baptism of John.

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[42] John 3:30.
[43] DTC, VIII, 1, col. 650.
[44] Luke 1:76.
[45] *Sum. theol.,* III, q. 38, a. 1.

We come now to the last set of questions concerning the baptism of John. Here we will consider three points: the proper recipients of his baptism, its continuation after the coming of Christ, and a question concerning the rebaptism of John's neophytes in the Baptism of Our Lord. These are the last three problems raised by St. Thomas in the question on John's baptism and we shall follow his order and reasoning.[47]

We know that many of the Jews went out into the desert, listened to the preaching of John and received his baptism: "All the country of Judea went out to him, and all the inhabitants of Jerusalem; and they were baptized by him in the river Jordan, confessing their sins."[48] But the problem arises as to why other Jews should have received baptism since John was the Precursor of Christ and directed everything to Him, culminating his mission in the baptism of the Messiah?

There are two reasons advanced why other men should have been baptized by John. St. Thomas quotes Augustine as saying that the Baptism of John would have been considered superior to Christ's, if only Christ would have received it.[49] Looking at the two baptisms from the aspect of the recipient, that baptism which the God-Man received would certainly be better than that which only mortal Jewish men received. Thus by baptizing not only Christ but many other Jews, John preserved the order of his baptism as subordinated to the Baptism of Christ. Another reason why John should have baptized other men was to prepare them better for the later reception of Christ's Baptism.

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[46] *Ibid.* The words of Gregory: ". . . praecursionis suae ordinem servans, qui nasciturum Dominum nascendo praevenerat, baptizando quoque baptizaturum proveniret."

[47] *Sum. theol.*, III, q. 38, aa. 4, 5, 6.

[48] Mark 1:5.

With the coming of Christ, there was really no reason for John to cease baptizing. In fact he should have continued just the same as before because the truth of the Messiah was not yet fully manifest. It had only begun with Christ's baptism in the Jordan, and it would be some time before its perfection was reached. At the same time, John continued to win members for Christ's new Kingdom and to send them to the Master. Indeed, if he had stopped baptizing, many of the Jews would have thought he had acted out of anger or jealousy. This apparent rivalry would have disillusioned John's neophytes and certainly proved an impediment to the work of the Savior.

Those who received John's baptism and went on to follow Christ, should certainly, according to St. Thomas, have been rebaptized in the Baptism of Christ. On this point St. Thomas takes exception to the opinion of Peter Lombard about the question of rebaptism. Neither grace nor the Holy Spirit was given in John's baptism because it was a baptism only of water. The faith and hope that his neophytes professed were not sufficient to supply for the lack of the Spirit's sanctifying action within the soul, not even if they had professed an explicit belief in the Trinity of Persons in the Godhead.

From the nature of the Sacrament itself, St. Thomas gives another reason for rebaptism. According to the words of Christ, "Amen, amen,

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[49] *Sum. theol.*, III, q. 38, a. 4. The words of Augustine: "Si solus Christus baptismo Joannis baptizatus esset, non defuissent qui dicerent baptismum Joannis, quo Christus est baptizatus, digniorem esse baptismo Christi, quo alii baptizantur."

I say to thee, unless a man be born again of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God,"[50] both water and the Holy Spirit are necessary parts of Baptism. So that if one of them is omitted the whole rite should be repeated, not just the deficiency.

In summary and by way of conclusion we can now give a definite answer to our original question: the baptism of John the Baptist was not a Sacrament. Recapitulating the above arguments, we can propose four basic reasons for this conclusion.

First, John's baptism had a different origin from that of Christ's. It certainly was not instituted by the Savior, the author of all the Sacraments. Although both these rites are of divine inspiration, John's mission and mandate were given by a special revelation of the Holy Spirit.

Secondly, the exterior act of baptisms differed, both in the act itself and in the effect produced. The Baptism of Christ was given in His name, the name of the Lord, or the Holy Trinity. We do not know what formula John used in his baptism and indeed Scripture does not even tell us whether a formula was used at all.[51] The effect of the exterior act in John's baptism did not penetrate interiorly to cleanse the soul, while through the Baptism of Christ, the Holy Spirit purifies and sanctifies the soul of the recipient.

Thirdly, the two baptisms had a different signification. The baptism of John in no way conferred grace and did not signify the presence of grace or sanctification within the soul. It looked to the future and prepared for a grace that would come with Christ's Baptism. Christ's Baptism, however, signifies the presence of grace within the soul when the act is performed.

Finally, the two baptisms differed in their causative power. The baptism of John was only an indirect instrument for the remission of sin. Its effect was conditional and mediate and it worked *ex opere*

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[50] John 3:5.

[51] DTC, VIII, 1, col. 649.

operantis. The Baptism of Christ, however, and all Christian Baptism after Him, remits sins directly, produces its effect absolutely and immediately, and works *ex opere operato.*

Thus, for these four reasons, the baptism of John the Baptist lacked the true nature and function of a Sacrament. It was important in his ministry as the Precursor of the Messiah and it disposed and prepared men to receive Him when He came. St. Thomas calls it a *quoddam sacramentale;*[52] it lacked the power and effect of Christian Baptism, but with it the world was ready to receive its Incarnate God.

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[52] *Sum. theol.*, III, q. 38, a. 1, ad 1.

WALTER CAVERLY, O.P.

THE POLITICAL THEORY OF JOHN OF SALISBURY

Indeed, to kill a tyrant is
not merely lawful, but right and
just. Tyranny is not merely
a public crime, but a crime
more than public.
The Policraticus

BACKGROUND

Throughout the Middle Ages but especially in the twelfth century the theory of politics lagged far behind its practice by statesmen. Except in the realm of Church and state there was little relation between theory and practice. No attempt was made to derive a theory from the facts of current observation. Men practiced feudalism, while studying the Fathers.

"The chief obstacle accounting for this slack period in the history of political theory was the constroversy between church and state over lay investiture."[1] It had long been the recognized practice of the feudal overlord of a bishop or abbot to invest him with the insignia of his fief and office, just as he would any other vassal. Then in 1075 Pope Gregory VII, who as the monk Hildebrand was the most active agent of reform at Rome, published the first papal decree effectively forbidding lay investiture. This prohibition struck at the heart of secular control over the church and precipitated an open conflict with the emperor, Henry IV. These hostilities were to last until the death of Frederick II in 1250.[2] For all practical intents and purposes, however, the case of lay investiture was over by John of Salisbury's time.

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[1] Charles Homer Haskins, *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1928), p. 359.

The crux of the difficulty lay in the fact that the loyalty of the bishops was of vital importance both to the pope as head of the church and to the emperor as ruler of the state:

> The insignia of an ecclesiastical office had both a spiritual and temporal significance. The pope now claimed that no layman had the right to bestow them. There was more than a mere question of symbols involved. The right to confer the investiture carried with it the right to refuse, and so to cancel the election of an unsatisfactory candidate. Other minor rulers might compromise; the emperor could not afford to. More than any other ruler in Europe, the emperor depended on the support of his ecclesiastical vassals. To give up the right to choose them would have crippled his power beyond hope of repair, leaving him at the mercy of rebellious lay nobles.[3]

Thus the practical question of control of the church brought to the fore the broader and more serious problem of supremacy, which had long been present in the history of the Holy Roman Empire. It needed only a strong pope and a determined emperor to bring it out into the open. This idea of supremacy was to exhaust the force of literature during the twelfth century.[4] A more systematic discussion of political theory had to await the translation of Aristotle's *Politics* in 1260, and the writing of the *Summa theologiae* of Saint Thomas Aquinas.

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[2] Wallace K. Ferguson and Geoffrey Bruun, *A Survey of European Civilization*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), p. 229.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 218.

[4] Haskins, *loc. cit.*

However, in the twelfth century there was a promise of rich and abundant life shown in the reformed and strengthened papacy, in the universities where the scholastic movement had just begun, in the Norman states with their peaceful and ordered institutions where the members were held together by common faith and by the commerce of learning and scholarship. This is the milieu of John of Salisbury.

LIFE AND STUDIES

John (Joannes Parvus) was born at Salisbury in or about 1120. Of his childhood John tells us little or nothing at all. His early manhood and adult life is quite a different story. The passages from the *Metalogicon* and the *Policraticus*,[5] his two major works, relate the progress of his learning and life from the time he went to Paris to study until his elevation as bishop of Chartres in 1176. In fact they are "those autobiographical passages rare in medieval literature which tell us even more of the life of the time than they do of their immediate subject."[6] John was the typical scholar of the period in which the schools were in their first vigorous activity. There was no fixed curriculum of studies, and scholars went from school to school at their pleasure. John's studies extended over a period of twelve years, from 1136 to 1148, although part of that time he taught privately and attended public lectures of eminent masters.

At Paris, as he tells us, John first studied logic under Abelard at Mount Saint Geneviève:

> When, still but a youth, I first journeyed to Gaul for the sake of study, in the year following the death of the illustrious King of the English, Henry, "the Lion of Justice," I betook myself to the Peripatetic of Pallet, who was then teaching at Mount Ste. Genevieve. The latter was a famed and learned master, admired by

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[5] John of Salisbury, *Opera Omnia*, PL 199.

[6] Reginald Lane Poole, *Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought and Learning*, 2nd ed. (New York: Dover, 1960), p. 177.

> all. At his feet I learned the elementary principles of this art, drinking in, with consuming avidity, and to the full extent of my limited talents, every word that fell from his lips.[7]

Abelard's return to public teaching had re-awakened the hostility of other teachers and high officials, and he was forced to leave his school. John then studied under Alberic of Rheims and Robert of Melun, orthodox realistic dialecticians.[8]

Not satisfied with dialectic alone, John turned to the master who was distinguished for his particular eminence as a grammarian, William of Conches.[9] John does not mention the place where William taught, but the minute description he gives of the school suggests that it was Chartres.[10] At Chartres, John laid the foundation of his classical learning from 1138 to 1141. After grammar John studied the quadrivium under Richard l'Eveque, who, John explains:

> was a man deficient almost in nothing. His breast is larger than his mouth, and his knowledge exceeds his eloquence. He is honest rather than vain, virtuous rather than ostentatious. He is familiar with every branch of knowledge. With Richard, I reviewed all that I had studied under the others, as well as learned certain additional points concerning the Quadrivium, to which I had been previously introduced by Hardewin the German.[11]

At the end of five years of student life, John was already into his career as a teacher. But to his earnest mind this only necessitated further training. He returned to Paris once again for theology under Gilbert of la Porrée:

> My pinched finances, the entreaties of my associates, and the advice of friends induced me to assume the office of teacher. At the end of three years I returned and sought out Master Gilbert, whose disciple I became in dialectical and theological subjects. But all too soon Gilbert was transferred.[12]

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[7] John of Salisbury, *The Metalogicon,* trans. by Daniel D. McGarry (Berkeley: Univ. of California, 1955), p. 95.

[8] Poole, *op. cit.,* pp. 178-9.

[9] *Metalogicon, ed. cit.,* p. 97.

[10] Poole, *op. cit.,* p. 181.

[11] *Metalogicon, loc. cit.*

[12] *Ibid.,* p. 99.

Gilbert of la Porrée was made bishop of Poitiers in 1142. His successor, as John's teacher, was Robert Pullen who later became cardinal and chancellor of the church. John finished his years of study with Simon of Poissy.[13] John ends the record of his studies telling us of his return to the Mount where he began twelve years before. The order and variety of these studies present a strong contrast to the fashion of the next century with its strict distinction of faculties and succession of sudies.[14]

The lasting influence of these masters, especially William of Conches and Gilbert of la Porrée, is shown throughout John's public life. He wrote the *Metalogicon* for the purpose of defending these men and vindicating the claims of grammar. John's esteem for the classics shows the deep and lasting impress of the school of Chartres.

Upon the completion of his theological studies John spent some time with his friend Peter, abbot of the Cistercian monastery of Moustier la Celle, who ordained John to the priesthood. Peter was also the recipient of many of John's letters,[15] and was later to be John's successor in the see of Chartres.

In 1148 John witnessed the Council of Rheims in which Saint Bernard of Clairvaux failed to silence Gilbert of la Porrée "on the charge of heresy."[16] At this council John became friendly with Bernard, who recommended him to the favor of Archbishop Theobald of Canterbury. Three years later John returned to England and took the position of secretary to Theobald. "For the next fifteen years John was employed in the administration of the primate's court and in negotiations with the Roman Curia."[17] In his new position John became the intimate friend of the English pope, Adrian IV, and he was in frequent communication with Thomas à Becket, then chancellor of Henry II of England.

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[13] *Ibid.*

[14] Hastings Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, ed. F. M. Powicke and A. B. Emden (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), vol. I, p. 67.

[15] PL 199: Preface, 21.

[16] Poole, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

[17] *Ibid.*

It was during this time that the conflicting claims of secular and ecclesiastical jurisdiction in England clamored for solution. John of Salisbury had held that the independence and supremacy of the church was essentially bound up with the existence of Christianity. Holding this opinion, John fell into the king's displeasure and was forced to give up his position as secretary to the archbishop. His income was withdrawn and he had to struggle with poverty and debt besides facing danger to his life. During this period of enforced idleness John wrote his two important works, the *Metalogicon* and the *Policraticus*. Both were written during the time of the king's absence at the siege of Toulouse in 1157.[18]

Archbishop Theobald died in 1161, and he was succeeded in the see of Canterbury by Thomas à Becket. The favor extended to John by Theobald was continued by the new archbishop. In time both Thomas and John were exiled by the king because of their firm desire for the rights of the church. The king's return to England in January, 1163, determined John's withdrawal to France. Thomas followed him into exile a year later.[19]

This quarrel with the king dragged on for six years. During this time of exile, John was the truest and wisest champion of the archbishop:

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[18] *Ibid.*, p. 188.

[19] King Henry II wanted to extend jurisdiction of royal courts wherever possible. This brought about his one serious conflict with the Church, for he tried to encroach on ecclesiastical jurisdiction and canon law. He claimed that clerics who had committed crimes should be tried in the regular royal courts. He also objected strongly against appealing to Rome in such cases. When Thomas à Becket became archbishop of Canterbury, the king thought he would have a pliant tool. He was, however, to be disappointed, for Thomas became the most violent opponent of royal encroachment embodied in the *Constitutions of Clarendon*, a statement made by the king in 1164 listing the restrictions to be placed on ecclesiastical courts and papal interference in England. Rather than give in to Henry's designs, Thomas fled to France. See Ferguson and Bruun, *op. cit.*, pp. 236-7.

> He did not spare his warnings and when necessary John would denounce Becket's actions not as impolitic but simply as unchristian when the archbishop sought wanton and intemperate means to promote his cause. Still John's hearty adhesion to the hierarchical principle with which Becket was identified made him stand firmly behind his chief.[20]

Both returned to Canterbury in 1170. On December 29th of that year, Thomas à Becket was murdered before the altar of his cathedral by four knights, emmissaries of the king. Becket was considered a martyr and people immediately began to make pilgrimmages to his tomb. The king was forced to do public penance and to withdraw his *Constitution of Clarendon*.[21] In the revulsion of general feeling that followed Becket's murder, to which John had been a witness, John was re-established in the court at Canterbury. Finally in 1176, his loyalty to the church's cause was rewarded by his elevation to the bishopric of Chartres, the city of his humanistic studies. John's episcopate was a brief one, however, for he died in 1180 at the age of sixty.

POLITICAL THEORY

The *Policraticus*, John of Salisbury's most influential work, contains the essence of his political thought. Much of the experience of his life and letters written as secretary to the archbishop of Canterbury went into its compilation. "The first attempt to look apart from surrounding conditions and to produce a coherent system which could aspire to the character of a philosophy of politics,"[22] the *Policraticus* is the most comprehensive political treatise of the Middle Ages before the rediscovery of Aristotle's *Politics*.

The curious name, *Policraticus*, is best translated *The Statesman's Book*. It shows the typical desire of the twelfth century scholar, who knew little Greek, to find a greek-sounding name for his work.[23] It is also called *On the Vanities of the Courtiers and the Footsteps of the Philosophers.*[24]

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[20] Poole, *op. cit.*, pp. 188-9.

[21] Ferguson and Bruun, *loc. cit.*

[22] E. F. Jacob, "John of Salisbury and the Policraticus," *Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Medieval Thinkers*, ed. F. J. C. Hernshaw (New York: Holt, 1923), p. 58.

The book is dedicated to Thomas à Becket for two reasons. First, the dedication to one as prominent as Becket would lessen the satire aimed at the people at court.[25] Second, it would be a complement to reinforce the request for the king's pardon, for John was in the midst of his trouble with Henry II.[26] John had had time to think about the levity and stupidity which disfigured healthy political society. It was the work of his political theory to clear away these obstacles.

The doctrine that the prince is the servant of the priesthood, the parts to be played by each member of the organized body politic, and the difference between the legitimate ruler and the tyrant are the principal contributions of the *Policraticus* to medieval political theory.

Church and State

The only form of government John recognized was monarchy. He greatly extolled the person and the rights of the prince while insisting on his duties:

> The prince stands on a pinnacle exalted and made splendid with great and high privileges. He is the public power and a likeness of divine majesty on earth. At the same time he is responsible for the state; he is the servant of the people; he is the agent of the priesthood.[27]

John definitely favored the extreme view of papal plentitude of power. He reached the conclusion that the prince is the agent of the priesthood by a novel exposition of the familiar doctrine of the two swords:

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[23] Poole, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

[24] *De nugis curialium et vestigiis philosophorum*, PL 199, 386.

[25] John of Salisbury, *Policraticus,* IV, c. 1, PL 199, 387.

[26] *Epistola CXIII*, PL 199, 98.

[27] John A. Abbo, *Political Thought: Men and Ideas* (Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1960), p. 108.

> This sword, then, [coercive power in temporal matters] the prince receives from the hand of the Church, although she herself has no sword of blood at all. Nevertheless she has this sword, but she uses it by the hand of the prince, upon whom she confers the power of bodily coercion, retaining to herself authority over spiritual things in the person of the pontiffs. The prince is, then, as it were, a minister of the priestly power, and one who exercises that side of the sacred offices which seems unworthy of the hands of the priesthood. For every office existing under, and concerned with the execution of, the sacred laws is really a religious office, but that is inferior which consists in punishing crimes, and which therefore seems to be typified in the person of the hangman.[28]

This statement is considered by some authors to be the first explicit claim of a direct power in temporal things existing in the pope.[29] In John's day it was the fashion to use the analogy of the sword when referring to law of any kind. It had a symbolic sense like the crown, or the throne and the sceptre. Its use was found in the great argument concerning investiture between the church and the emperor, Henry IV, in the eleventh century. But the terms "spiritual sword" and "temporal sword" had been gaining more definite meaning in the twelfth century, so that they were frequently used in the contest between church and state.

John's statement of the two swords occurs in a general discussion of the difference between the prince and the tyrant. The context is an examination of the prince's relation to the law of God and the church. Using illustrations to substantiate his statement of papal authority, John cites the humility of Constantine at the Council of Nicaea. Constantine declared that "it was not lawful for a man who was subject to the judgment of the priest to examine the causes of those who were to be judged by God alone."[30] John also refers to the excommunication and suspension of Theodosius from the regalia and insignia of emperor by St. Ambrose.

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[28] John Dickinson, *The Statesman's Book of John of Salisbury* (New York: Knopf, 1927), p. 9. This translation of the *Policraticus* will be used throughout this paper.

[29] Charles Howard McIlwain, *The Growth of Political Thought in the West* (New York: Macmillan, 1932), p. 229.

From this and other passages in the *Policraticus,* especially from his treatment of the tyrant, it must be concluded that John definitely states that all authority, ecclesiasical or secular, belongs to the spiritual power. The church receives her power from the hand of God directly, while the prince receives his power from the hand of the church. To say that John was the first to claim the direct power of the pope in temporal things seems unwarranted. Yet his does seem to be a more distinct formulation of this claim than any earlier statement of it surviving in modern times.[31]

John's second argument for the primacy of the priesthood is by reason of the pre-eminence of the church's end and function. The church has higher aims and tasks than the state. Religious as the prince's office is, it is inferior. His office consists in punishing crimes, as we have seen in the quotation above. In the organic body to which John analogically compared the christian commonwealth, the priests, as God's minister, hold the place of the soul. The prince is the head of that same body. He is subject "only to God and to those who exercise His office and represent Him on earth."[32] John, therefore, concluded that even as the head of the human body is governed by the soul, so the prince is governed by the priesthood.

The organic theory of the state

An organic theory and construction of human society was familiar to medieval thought. "Under the influence of biblical allegories and models used by Greek and Roman writers, the comparison of mankind and even smaller groups to an animated body was universally adopted."[33] John of Salisbury was the first to attempt an organization whereby some member of the natural body would correspond to each portion of the state. He relied upon an unknown letter to Trajan (*Institutio Traiani*) incorrectly attributed to Plutarch.[34] John remarked that he had taken only the general idea from this epistle. The basis of the theory, whether it is his or not, is truly an organic theory of the world state. It is his chief contribution to political thought.

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[30] Dickinson, *op. cit.* pp. 9-10.
[31] McIlwain, *op. cit.*, p. 230.
[32] Dickinson, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

Organization is the dominant theme in the fifth and sixth books of the *Policraticus*. The commonwealth or state, John says, "is a certain body which is endowed with life by the benefit of divine favor, which acts at the prompting of the highest equity, and is ruled by what may be called the moderating power of reason."[35] A well ordered constitution consists in the right functions of the members of the commonwealth and in right condition, strength, and composition of each functionary body. "There must be mutual support among the member and a close touch between them and their head."[36] This is necessary for the preservation and unity of the body which is the state.

The metaphor of the body is thus developed. The head and all the members are guided by the soul. The soul's special task is to love and reverence God. This love is shown in two acts of worship, contemplation and the rite of the church.[37] Although contemplation is the highest form of adoration, God gave senses to man and through them He must be worshiped.[38] In this way God is served by the whole body. The practical service to God is the task of a certain class of men who are intermediaries betwen God and man. They are the clergy—the *soul* of the body politic.[39]

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[33] Otto Gierke, *Political Theories of the Middle Ages*, trans. by F. W. Maitland (Boston: Beacon, 1958), p. 22.

[34] Dickinson, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

[35] *Ibid.*

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 258.

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 69.

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 72.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 64.

As divine law transcends human law, so those who minister in divine things are superior to those who minister in earthly things. The clergy must be shown the highest respect. Their persons together with their places and instruments of worship are sacrosanct and any form of sacrilege against them must incur excommunications. The first lesson John was trying to inculcate in the head of the state was reverence of God:

> In the highest place, then, there are four things which must be inculcated in the rulers of a commonwealth: reverence for God, self-training, the need for learning on the part of officials and rulers, and for winning the affection of subjects and giving them protection.[40]

If the soul is the clergy, then, the *head* is the prince. The prince's subjection to God and the clergy is emphasized in his election where divine, clerical, and popular elements concur. The prince, John says:

> is placed by the divine governance at the apex of the commonwealth, and preferred above all others, sometimes through the secret ministry of God's providence, sometimes by the decision of His priests, and again it is the votes of the whole people which concur to place the ruler in authority.[41]

John uses the election of Joshua to the leadership of Israel as an example of the people having voice in the election.

In a sense the prince is not answerable to the commonwealth, for there is no positive law which can try him. However, in this matter of law, John concludes that the prince is not absolved from the law.[42] By the conception of divine law or equity, John arrived at the position which lawyers later reached "by supposing the prince to be bound by the terms of a contract made to the people."[43] To the lawyer the prince is under contract with his vassals to protect their interests. To John, the prince is subject to divine law, in light of which all earthly law must be interpreted.

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[40] *Ibid.*, p. 67.
[41] *Ibid.*, p. 83.
[42] *Ibid.*, p. 33.
[43] Jacob, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

The *heart* is the senate, so called from its age (*senectus*). John adds, however, that he has in view the age of the mind and not the age of the body.[44] The senate allots to each his duties and obligations and makes the whole body work. Senators, because of their office, should guard against bribery. For this purpose the prince should see that they are not destitute. The same applies to other public officials, whom John calls *quaestores* and *commentarienses*, financial officials. These are the *stomach* and *internal organs* of the body. They are so called, because John says, "it is impossible to seek justice and money at one and the same time; either a man will cease to the one and despise the other, or else he will be perverted by the worse and lose the better."[45]

This senate, to John's mind, should be a council of great nobles by virtue of their tenure and dignity. He cites the Areopagus and the Roman senate as examples of this. He refers to the senators as councilors, the permanent secretariat of the prince. They are compared to the *sides* (*latera*) of the body. It is here that the greatest damage is done to the body. Therefore, John warns that all corruption must be avoided if the body is to perdure. "He who touches the pitch will be defiled by it."[46]

Next in order comes the simile of the *eyes*, *ears* and *tongue*, which is applied to provincial governors. Their duties are primarily judicial:

> A governor is one who presides over the administration of justice among the people of a province. He therefore should have knowledge of the just and the unjust, and should have the means and the will to enforce justice . . . if tragic consequences are the result of his ignorance of lack of skill, they are deservedly charged to him.[47]

In this section of the fifth book, John treats of the qualifications and duties of judges. The judge must have a vast knowledge of law; he must have strength of mind, he must be incorruptible. His job is to administer the law faithfully and rightly, unaffected by friendship or need for haste. He must keep his temper and hide his emotions with an impassive face.[48]

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[44] Dickinson, *op. cit.*, p. 108.
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 112.
[46] *Ibid.*, p. 114.
[47] *Ibid.*, p. 123.

The *hand* of the state is either armed or unarmed. Armed it is the military force; unarmed it is the officials and administrators in subordinate posts. These are the tax-collectors "who are like locusts that eat up the green leaves."[49] In the armed hand the knights are given the chief place. They must be carefully chosen and trained. They must not be "glory seekers," for these would be militarily useless.[50] The fighting man must be a disciplined, serious-minded, hardy man. Because John devotes six chapters to the praise of discipline, it is clear that he thought this was the quality his countrymen lacked. "They were bound by their oath to serve the king, but it should oblige them also to protect the church. This rule must be enjoined upon and fulfilled by every soldier."[51] The knight had to keep inviolate the faith which he owes first to God and afterwards to the prince and to the commonwealth.

The final organs treated in the body are the *feet*. These are the agricultural classes and the craftsmen or skilled laborers who provide the food, clothing, and necessities of life. They support the body. There is no attempt made to define their function, but John says that they are an integral part of the whole and their interests must be protected if the body is to progress:

> For an afflicted people is a sign and proof of the goutiness, so to speak, of the prince. Then and then only will the health of the commonwealth be sound and flourishing when the higher members shield the lower, and the lower respond faithfully and fully in like measure to the just demands of their superiors, so

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[48] *Ibid.*, p. 144.
[49] *Ibid.*, p. 176.
[50] *Ibid.*, p. 184.
[51] *Ibid.*, p. 201.

> that each and all are as it were members one of another by a sort of reciprocity, and each regards his own interest as best served by that which he knows to be most advantageous for the others.[52]

John ends his anthropomorphic analogy of the state with another metaphor. He compares the functions of the state with the work of the bee hive:

> Thus the citizens are held to their different tasks, and so long as the duties of each individual are performed with an eye to the welfare of the whole, so long, that is, as justice is practiced, the sweetness of honey pervades the allotted sphere of all. But the happiness of no body politic will be lasting unless the head is preserved in safety and vigor and looks out for the whole body.[53]

Whatever is true of John's treatment of the state, the specific political institutions and ideas which he treated were neither new nor strange to the thought of western Europe in the twelfth century. His real originality lies in his comprehensiveness and systematization. Although his anthropomophism has been derided, he made the state human. He gave it life. To John the state was a person, fallible, but with an infinite potentiality for goodness. The state was a creature that breathed, willed, thought, and depended on all the delicate adjustments of the other parts of the body. He made it live indeed.[54]

Tyranny and Tyrannicide

There is one particular doctrine in which John's political system is distinguished from that of almost every other political writer of the Middle Ages. He guards his theory of kingship by a careful distinction so as to exclude tyrants from all its privileges. He extends an ethical provision as a check on misrule in a remarkable way. This provision is tyrannicide—a duty not only of deposing but also of slaying tyrants. In fact, John of Salisbury put the case for tyrannicide more clearly and stated it more emphatically than any writer before the sixteenth century.[55]

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[52] *Ibid.*, p. 244.

[53] *Ibid.*, p. 247.

[54] Jacob, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-3.

Tyrannicide had been implicit in political thought since the acceptance of Saint Isidore's dictum that "one is a king only so far and just so long as his acts are kingly."[56] But John saw the possibility of tyranny in every power whether in the state, the church, the family or any other human relationship.

Concerning tyranny in the state, John first makes a distinction between the prince and the tyrant:

> Between a tyrant and a prince there is this single or chief difference, that the latter obeys the law and rules the people by its dictates, accounting himself as but their servant. It is by virtue of the law that he makes good his claim to the foremost and chief place in the management of the affairs of the commonwealth and in the bearing of its burdens; and his elevation over others consists in this, that whereas private men are held responsible only for their private affairs, on the prince fall the burdens of the whole community. Wherefore deservedly there is conferred on him, and gathered together in his hands, the power of all his subjects, to the end that he may be sufficient unto himself in seeking and bringing about the advantages of each individually, and of all. . . . The will of the prince is never contrary to justice . . . The prince is the public authority and an image on earth of the divine majesty . . . and all his power is derived from God.[57]

The definition of the tyrant is found in the eighth book:

> The tyrant, as the philosophers have depicted him, is he who oppresses the people by violent domination, while the prince rules by the laws . . . The tyrant is never satisfied until he has made void the laws and has reduced the people to slavery . . . The tyrant is the image of wickedness and a likeness to Lucifer, and often it is meet that he should be slain.[58]

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[55] McIlwain, *op. cit.*, p. 322.

[56] St. Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiae*, IX, 3, PL 82, 342.

[57] Dickinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-4.

[58] *Ibid.*, pp. 335-6.

It is important to note that the essence of the distinction between the tyrant and the prince lies in their relation to law. John had been greatly affected by the revived study of Roman law. His references to Vacarius, the influence of Roman jurisprudence in England, and the effects of his own study are clearly illustrated in the fourth and the eighth books of the *Policraticus*.[59] John was greatly concerned to find a just meaning for phrases such as the "prince is absolved from the law" and "whatever pleases the prince has the force of law."[60] Such ideas had been used to defend the theory that the prince was not subject to the law, and in fact even his most capricious desires could override the law:

> Let the whitewashers of rulers now come forward, and let them whisper, or if this is too little, let them trumpet abroad that the prince is not subject to the law, and that whatsoever is his will and pleasure, not merely in establishing law according to the model of equity, but absolutely and free from all restrictions, has the force of law. Let them, if they so desire and dare, make of their king, whom they except from the obligations of the law, a very outlaw, and still I will maintain not merely in the teeth of their denials but in the teeth of all the world, that kings are bound by this law.[61]

Such theories seemed impossible to John. The will of the prince had the force of law only so far as it was in accordance with equity and law. The prince was free in relation to law only as he freely obeyed the law. The prince for whom all legal obligation ceased was an outlaw. The law, to which the prince was subject and which was his function to administer, was not the arbitrary will of the ruler himself, nor even the will of the community. Rather, it was the law formed and given by God, taught by wise men and established for the commonwealth. Any ruler acting contrary to this law was a tyrant.

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[59] R. W. Carlyle and A. J. Carlyle, *A History of Medieval Political Theory in the West* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1928), vol. III, p. 140.

[60] Dickinson, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

[61] *Ibid.*, p. 33.

The action of tyrannicide is the conclusion John drew from these principles of law. The practcial questions relating to the subjects and the ruler, turned tyrant, are first considered at the end of the third book. John maintained that the tyrant has no rights against the people, and therefore he could justly and rightfully be slain:

> Indeed, to kill a tyrant is not merely lawful, but right and just. For whosoever takes up the sword deserves to perish by the sword. And he is understood to take up the sword who usurps it by his own temerity and who does not receive the power of using it from God. Therefore the law rightly takes arms against him who disarms the laws, and the public power rages in fury against him who strives to bring to nought the public force. And while there are many acts which amount to *lese majeste,* none is a graver crime than that which is aimed against the body of justice herself. Tyranny is not merely a public crime, but, if there could be such a thing, a crime more than public. And if in the crime of treason all men are admitted to be prosecutors, how much more should this be true in the case of the crime of subverting the laws which should rule even over emperors? Truly no one will avenge a public enemy; but rather whoever does not seek to bring him to punishment commits an offence against himself and the whole body of the earthly commonwealth.[62]

John constantly maintained these principles throughout his work. As was said above, he stated that there can be tyrants in any human relationship. Concerning ecclesiastical tyrants, John says, "For if according to both human and divine law a temporal tyrant is to be destroyed, who can suppose that it is our duty to love and cherish a tyrant in the priesthood?"[63] He does not, however, advocate the slaying of the tyrant-priest:

> . . . in the case of a priest, even though he acts the tyrant, it is not lawful to employ the material sword against him because of the reverence due to sacred things, unless perchance after he has been unfrocked, he lifts a bloody hand against the church of God.[64]

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[62] *Ibid.,* pp. 73-4 (introduction).
[63] *Ibid.,* p. 349.
[64] *Ibid.,* pp. 356-7.

Private tyrants can easily be restrained by the public laws which are binding upon the lives of all. On the other hand, John shows from history that it is just to slay tyrants and set the people free for the service of God. His judgment is summed up in the chapters in which he illustrates the just end of the tyrant from Roman and Jewish history.[65]

Yet John was faced with a dilemma. He was somewhat hampered by the recollection of the Augustinian and Gregorian tradition, i.e., he remembered that in the patristic tradition the evil ruler could well be an instrument of God's punishment of an evil people.[66] In one passage John seems a little doubtful whether it was lawful for a man to kill one to whom he is bound by fidelity and oath. John also approved the conduct of David, who would not use violence against Saul. Those who in time of oppression pray to God for deliverance, John highly commended.[67]

But his concept of government did not recognize any positive agency whereby the body politic could judge the lawfulness of the ruler's actions. There was no legal, constitutional means for his correction or deposition. Yet the prince, once turned tyrant, could so oppress the community as to become unbearable.[68] To John, then, the only way out was to see in the tyrant's killer an agent of God. If the tyrant persisted in malice, he would be punished by God. "Wickedness is always punished by the Lord. But sometimes it is His own and at other times it is a human hand which He employs as a weapon wherewith to administer punishment to the impious."[69]

Tyrannicide, then, becomes an act of God performed through the instrumentality of an individual citizen. Thus the slaying of a tyrant was justified by John of Salisbury, not in terms of human law, but in terms of divine law and inescapable justice.

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[65] *Ibid.*, pp. 358-93.
[66] Carlyle, *op. cit.*, p. 142.
[67] Dickinson, *op. cit.*, p. 368.
[68] Abbo, *op. cit.*, p. 109.
[69] Dickinson, *op. cit.*, p. 375.

CONCLUSION

As has been said, John of Salisbury was not the first to entertain such ideas of the state, the subjection of the prince to the priesthood, or the notion of tyranny. However, his is the first clear and thorough exposition of them. In the development of his theory, John made explicit many aspects not definitely stated before, including that of tyrannicide. In this sense, John can be called the author of the doctrine of tyrannicide. It seems plain from many passages that John had fundamentally no clear conception of the difference between private individual action and public collective action to rid the community of a tyrant. It was the obvious danger latent in the irresponsibility of private tyrannicide which caught the attention of later thinkers and caused them to repudiate John's position. As Saint Thomas was to point out in the following century, this doctrine was dangerous. It was subversive of all civil order. It could easily lead to rash and irresponsible deeds on the part of the individuals acting on their private judgment. The removal of a tyrant by private men, Saint Thomas condemns on the grounds of expediency—the evils produced by the remedy are invariably worse than the disease itself.[70]

It is true that John had said that the prince should be deposed, once he became a tyrant. But in justice to John of Salisbury, tyrannicide was not the central part of his political theory.[71] The doctrine of the commonwealth was his most important consideration. This is shown in the emphasis which he placed on the unity of the body politic. John had devoted a large part of his work to the action of tyrannicide in order to support his theory. He was treating the question of sovereignty and this, even today, remains unsolved. Men have always answered this question in different ways.

Although John's principle of the right of resistance to illegal authority has not met with general approbation, the essential principle of the state which he set forth was the common view in the Middle Ages. There can be no legitimate government which does not represent the principle of justice as embodied in the law. The ruler who voilates this law has no claim to the obedience of his people. John did not advocate the complete separation of church and state. Instead, he substituted the theory that there are two co-ordinate powers in the one organic *respublica* or commonwealth, whether that commonwealth be the totality of existing communities or one particular part or community of the whole. In this respect, then, political thought took a great step forward after its static posture of earlier centuries.

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[70] St. Thomas Aquinas, *De regim. princ.*, I, c. 6, and *Sum. theol.*, II-II, q. 42, a. 2 ad 3.

[71] Jacob, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

BENEDICT T. VIVIANO, O.P.

DUNS SCOTUS AND THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

We must examine whether
any form also survives afterwards.
For in some cases there is nothing
to prevent this; for example,
the soul may be of this sort . . .
Aristotle

The main reason for the wide variety of views concerning human immortality within the Aristotelian tradition is undoubtedly the obscure character of Aristotle's own treatment of the subject. Nowhere does he take up the matter *ex professo*. As Scotus was quick to point out, different Aristotelian principles could be drawn upon to prove different sides of the question.[1] St. Thomas' interpretation is very different from that of Averroës and Siger of Brabant, even though both schools relied on the text of Aristotle. It is true that Aristotle's positive assertions of immortality are always parenthetical asides, tucked away in unlikely places.

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[1] "Dubium est quid Philosophus circa hoc sensit, varie enim loquitur in diversis locis et habuit diversa principia ex quorum aliquibus videtur sequi unum oppositum et ex aliis aliud. Unde probabile est quod in illa conclusione semper fuerit dubius, et nunc magis accederet ad unam partem, nunc ad aliam." *Opus Oxon.*, IV, dist. 43, q. 2, n. 17seq. Also n. 47seq. Cited in C. R. S. Harris, *Duns Scotus,* II (New York: Humanities Press, 1959), p. 301, from the Wadding edition (Paris: Vives, 1891-1895), as are all other quotes from the Scotistic corpus. None of Scotus' works relating to our subject have yet appeared in the critical Vatican edition.

First we have the valuable statement in *De generatione animalium* that "reason alone enters in, as an additional factor, from outside (*thyrathen*), and that it alone is divine, because physical activity has nothing whatever to do with the activity of reason."[2] This sentence has been used to indicate not only the spiritual nature of the human soul, but even the later doctrine of creationism.[3] *Lambda* of the *Metaphysics* states: "We must examine whether any form also survives afterwards. For in some cases there is nothing to prevent this; for example, the soul may be of this sort—not all soul but the reason."[4]

In the *De anima* we read that mind "seems to be an independent substance implanted within the soul and to be incapable of being destroyed."[5] In Book II we find several hints regarding immortality; for example, mind "seems to be a widely different kind of soul, differing as what is eternal from what is perishable; it alone is capable of existence in isolation from all other psychic powers."[6] Book III gives us several more suggestive texts, culminating in the following declaration: "When mind is set free from its present conditions it appears as just what it is and nothing more: this alone is immortal and eternal."[7] Although these words seem to be clear enough, especially when read in context, as a matter of historical fact, seldom has the ingenuity of Aristotelians been more perversely employed than in their interpretation of the texts just quoted.[8] It remained for St.

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[2] II, chap. 3, 736^{b}28 (Loeb trans.).

[3] C. C. J. Webb, *Studies in the History of Natural Theology* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1915), p. 264.

[4] *Met.* XII, chap. 3, 1070^{a}24-28 (Oxford trans.).

[5] I, chap. 4, 408^{b}17-20 (Oxford trans.).

[6] II, chap. 2, 413^{b}24-17. Cf. also chap. 1, 413^{b}4-7.

[7] III, chap. 5, 430^{a}22. Also chap. 4, 429^{b}4-5, 429^{b}23, chap. 5, 430^{a}17.

[8] For an illuminating discussion of the principal theories, cf. W. D. Ross, *Aristotle*, 5th ed. rev. (London: Methuen, 1949), pp. 132 and 151 ff., and Webb, *op. cit.*, pp. 264-273, and 315.

Thomas to draw out the reasons behind the bald assertions and to construct from them a tightly knit argument for the immortality of the individual human soul. This St. Thomas did in numerous works.[9] The most concise and best known proof, namely from the immateriality of the soul's operation and being, is to be found in the *Summa theologiae*.[10]

THE VIEW OF DUNS SCOTUS

The opposition between the philosophical teachings of Duns Scotus and those of St. Thomas is well known. Indeed, this opposition has become proverbial among philosophers and theologians.[11] Our purpose here is not to list all the points of difference or to explain their cause; rather it is to single out one important point of difference. However, one general point should be noted in order to evaluate more correctly Scotus' attitude toward St. Thomas' proofs for the immortality of the soul. Duns Scotus wrote at a time[12] when St. Thomas' orthodoxy was not yet definitively established.[13] Although all recognized that Thomas' teachings were too significant to ignore, many, especially the more conservative neo-Augustinians, felt that certain novel teachings of Thomas had been rightly condemned in 1277. Hence it is not surprising that the 'Subtle Doctor,' nurtured in the neo-Augustinian tradition, felt he had a duty to criticize the Aristotelian doctrines of Brother Thomas. In fact we find that a good deal of his writing consists of a keen-minded and subtle analysis of Thomistic views. Generally Scotus concludes in disagreement with the 'Common Doctor.'[14] But, as Gilson has pointed out,[15] this critical disagreement is due not so much to an excessive, subtle captiousness as it is to a fundamentally different starting point.

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[9] *In II Sent.*, dist. 19, a. 1, IV, dist. 50, q. 1, a. 1; *Cont. gent.*, II, 79-81; *Quodl* X, q. 3, a. 2; *De an.*, a. 14; *Compend theol.*, c. 84.

[10] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 75, a. 2, ed. Leonina, *Opera omnia*, IV (Rome: Poly. Vat., 1888).

[11] Norberto del Prado, "Scot et Saint Thomas," *Revue thomiste*, XVIII (1910), 228.

[12] Roughly between 1291, the year of his ordination, and 1308, the year of his death. See Frederick Copleston, *History of Philosophy*, II (Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1950), p. 476.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 432 ff. Also Harris, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 141-199.

After the condemnation of 1277, a new philosophical climate was evident in all areas of thought. The bold use of Aristotelian principles by St. Thomas to investigate the truths of faith, the daring attempts to prove by philosophy some truths which had previously been held by faith alone, were for a time held suspect. "In theology, there appears a marked tendency to withdraw from the competency of the metaphysician all the problems whose ultimate answer hinges on the infinity of the divine being."[16] "Nothing of what depends on the free decisions of this absolutely free God is philosophically deducible."[17] In these two statements of Gilson we have the key to Scotus' mentality in approaching the problem of the immortality of the human soul. For Scotus, philosophy cannot demonstrate the immortality of the human soul as necessary and certain, although it can advance probable reasons which are more likely than their opposite.[18] As Scotus expresses it, "Potest dici, quod licet ad illam secundam propositionem probandum sint rationes probabiles, non tamen demonstrativae immo nec necessariae."[19]

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[14] Efrem Bettoni, *Duns Scotus*, trans. B. Bonansea (Washington: Catholic University Press, 1961), pp. 17-20.

[15] Étienne Gilson, "Avicenne et le point de départ de Duns Scot," AHDLMA, II (1927), 148.

[16] Étienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York: Random House, 1955), p. 464. See also Guillermo Fraile, *Historia de la filosofia*, II (Madrid: BAC, 1960), p. 1081.

[17] Gilson, *History*, p. 464.

[18] "Ita in proposito dico quod bene verum est quod si alicubi inveniatur a philosophis dictum quod anima sit incorruptibilis, haec quidem conclusio probabilior est quam opposita." *Rep. Par.* IV, dist. 43, q. 2, n. 17. Cited in Étienne Gilson, *Jean Duns Scot: introduction à ses positions fondamentales* (Paris: Vrin, 1952), p. 487, n. 2.

[19] *Opus Oxon.*, IV, dist. 43, q. 2, n. 16. Cited in Harris, *op. cit.*, II, p. 301. See also *Quodl.* IX, n. 15-17. Cf. F. Imle, "Die Unsterblichkeit der Seele bei den Franziskanertheologen des 13 Jahrhunderts," *Franziskanishe Studien*, XXIV (1937), 284-294. Also D. Sharp, *Franciscan Philosophy at Oxford in the 13th Century* (Oxford: University Press, 1930), *passim*.

Scotus' first criticism of St. Thomas' arguments goes right to the heart of the matter, and it is by far the most important of those which we wish to examine. St. Thomas had insisted that the *esse* by which the human composite of body and soul exists must be the identical *esse* by which the human soul is a subsistent form. It is precisely this identity of the *esse* of the soul and the *esse* of the composite that Duns Scotus criticizes.[20] Scotus thinks that the whole argument of St. Thomas begs the question, since it presupposes what is uncertain, namely that the soul is a subsistent form or that it has *esse per se* even outside the body.[21] For Scotus, the soul, of course, is a reality, and its own *esse* is distinct from the *esse* of the body. But, he insists, insofar as the soul is the 'form' of the body, its *esse* cannot be independent, but must be ordered to the *esse* of the whole composite, which is the result of the union of the *esse animae* with the *esse corporis*.[22] Scotus then distinguishes two senses of the phrase *esse per se*: (a) the actuality by which a thing exists outside of its causes; (b) the ultimate and definite actuality by which a thing exists in its natural concreteness, "quod convenit composito in genere substantiae."[23] Granting that the soul has *esse per se* in the first sense, i.e., it really exists, Scotus insists that the composite alone has *esse per se* in the second sense. The human soul is readily admitted to be unique "because it is not immersed in matter, nor is it totally absorbed by it," since "it possesses operations and energies that are proper to itself, independently of the body."[24] Hence, the human soul is in some sense incorruptible so that it *could be immortal,* but it does not necessarily follow that it *is* immortal. This incorruptibility of the soul is said to be *per accidens.* The fundamental reason for this is that the soul is 'by nature' ordered to the *esse* of the whole composite, and the possible suspension of this natural order cannot be demonstrated by reason alone. Such a suspension of natural law would be miraculous; it would require divine intervention in the course of nature.[25] Consequently it cannot be demonstrated that this natural order of soul to body *must be* suspended.

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[20] Gilson, *Jean Duns Scot,* p. 486, n. 2.

[21] Parthenius Minges, *Ioannis Duns Scoti doctrina philosophica et theologica,* I (Quarracchi: Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1930), p. 123. Cf. Harris, *op. cit.,* II, p. 301.

[22] *Quodl.* IX, n. 15. See also Bettoni, *op. cit.,* pp. 88-90, for a clear exposition of the whole argument. My debt to him here is considerable.

[23] Hieronymus de Montefortino, *Ioannis Duns Scoti summa theologica,* III (Rome: Sallustiana, 1901), q. 75, a. 6 ad 1.

[24] *Quodl.* IX, n. 8, cited in Bettoni.

If one insists that the independent activity of mind argues to its immaterial subsistence, Scotus replies that it is the whole man that thinks through the soul. Thinking is primarily an activity of the supposite, and for him the *esse animae* is not the *esse totius*. As Gilson observes, "Everything turns on the motion of being."[26] Thus Scotus does not think it possible to demonstrate the *per se* incorruptibility of the human soul by pure reason.

Scotus then points to a flaw in the proof for the incorruptibility of the soul. He grants that the soul is a simple, immaterial form, which cannot be corrupted by a separation of parts, but he notes that it can be destroyed and annihilated by God. The soul may be indestructible by intrinsic causes and even by inferior extrinsic causes, but not by a superior extrinsic cause.[27] Therefore it cannot be demonstrated that the soul *is* indestructible. There is even another way in which it could be destroyed: "take the case of the *esse* of an angel: if it is posited according to some that it is something other than essense, it is absolutely inseparable from itself, but it is destructible by the advent of an opposite to its *esse*."[28] Therefore, it is not possible to prove conclusively that the soul is immortal.

Next Scotus examines the argument from natural desire. Considerable attention is given to this favorite argument of the Augustinian school.[29] He begins by trying to define this vague, elusive natural desire of all men to be immortal. Either this desire is natural in the strict sense or else it is an elicited act proceeding from reflection. If the former, then it would be inevitable, but one would first have to prove the *possibility* in nature of the thing desired. If the latter, namely an elicited act of reason consistent with nature, then one would first have to prove the existence of a strictly natural desire. In other words, the validity of an elicited desire depends on the existence of a natural desire, and this presupposes the natural possibility of immortality, which cannot be demonstrated. It is true that man naturally flees from death, but so does every animal, since we see them flee from mortal danger.[30] If one objects that the object of an elicited desired, once apprehended, must be the object of a truly natural desire, Scotus replies that one might just as well argue that since a vicious man desires the object of his vice, once apprehended, he must have a natural desire for vice, whereas in reality nature does not incline one naturally to evil. Further, one cannot argue that the object of an elicited desire according to right reason must also be the object of a natural desire, since the whole question is to discover whether the desire for immortality is or is not according to right reason. The thing to be proved cannot be assumed without begging the question.[31]

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[25] *Opus Oxon.*, IV, dist. 43, q. 2, n. 23. Also *Rep. Par.*, dist. 43, q. 2, n. 18.

[26] *Jean Duns Scot*, p. 489.

[27] J. K. Ryan, *The Docrtine of John Duns Scotus on the Nature and Value of the Rational Arguments for Immortality*, M.A. thesis (Washington: Catholic University Press, 1931), p. 28 ff.

[28] "Accipiendo enim esse Angeli si illud ponatur secundum aliquos aliud ab essentia, profecto non est separabile a seipso, et tamen est destructibile per successionem oppositi ad ipsum esse." *Opus Oxon.*, IV, dist. 43, q. 2, n. 23. De Montefortino, *op. cit.*, q. 75, a. 6 ad 2.

Scotus then criticizes two lesser proofs of immortality, neither of which have anything to do with St. Thomas. The first is based on the desire of all men for eternal beatitude in God. But this *suasio* presupposes that pure reason can demonstrate that the true end of man consists in the beatific vision. But this cannot be demonstrated by reason. Only one who claimed God to be the proper object of the human intellect could suggest such a 'demonstration,' but since being *qua* being is the true object, the argument does not follow. In other words, one can admit that man desires complete happiness. But this desire is merely for happiness in general, and not for any particular kind; still less is it a desire for supernatural beatitude. Without the aid of revelation we cannot know in what our particular happiness consists.[32] Hence the sickness, misfortunes and calamities which fill this life are indeed impediments to complete happiness, but man would never know that he was destined for anything else, unless God revealed it to him.[33]

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[29] Bettoni, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

[30] *Opus Oxon.*, IV, dist. 43, q. 2, n. 29.

[31] *Ibid.*, nn. 30, 31.

The last argument for immortality criticized by Scotus is the Platonic argument from retributive justice. The multitude of unrighted wrongs in this world cries out for divine retribution in the next life. If there is a just God, so the argument runs, He will punish the wicked and reward the righteous in the next life. But, says Scotus, such *a posteriori* arguments prove less than the *a priori* ones from the nature of the human soul. For it is not certain from reason alone that there is a single governor of men who acts according to the laws of retributive and punitive justice. Unaided by faith, men would have to conclude that virtue is its own reward and that vice is its own punishment. The arguments proposed by the Fathers, Augustine and Gregory, along these lines are no more than *persuasiones probabiles*.[34]

The impression left by all these arguments *against* immortality is that Duns Scotus was resolutely opposed to any such thing as a proof for a life after death. That such an impression would be seriously misleading, we must, in all fairness to the Subtle Doctor, be careful to point out. The more cautious authors, primarily Franciscans, have been at some pains to emphasize that Scotus upheld at least the *moral* demonstrability of immortality and denied only its strictly metaphysical knowableness.[35] These moral persuasions should suffice for every man of good will,[36] even though they would not be demonstrative or necessary to a man, even a philosopher, in a state of pure nature. Minges explains at some length that we are shocked by this attitude because we have been raised to believe in immortality from our cradle-days and as a result are unusually well disposed to receive any arguments for the doctrine. The fact is that many ancient philosophers denied the deathless character of the soul, and this is a good sign of what the human mind is capable of attaining on its own.[37] De Montefortino cites one of the earlier Scotist commentators, A. Hickey (Magister Hickquaeus), who interprets Scotus in the following sense: this hesitation in regard to the certain character of the proofs is not intended to foster atheism but simply to establish the truth. The arguments are demonstrative "respectu intellectus bene dispositi, non autem respectu protervi," but they lack a certain evident quality which is needed to satisfy the philosopher and to give him complete certainty.[38] Writing for seminarians, the famous Scotist Frassen does not waver in setting down the proofs as demonstrative.[39]

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[32] Minges, *op. cit.*, I, p. 124.

[33] De Montefortino, *op. cit.*, III, q. 75, a. 6 ad 6.

[34] Minges, *op. cit.*, I, p. 123. Also De Montefortino, *op. cit.*, III q. 75, a. 6, ad 7.

THOMISTIC REBUTTAL

In proposing solutions to the various difficulties raised by Scotus regarding the demonstrative character of the proofs for immortality, we will concentrate exclusively on those proofs found in St. Thomas' own writings. For although we do not believe that any of Scotus' criticisms are absolutely irrefrutable, still it remains true that the minor arguments for immortality are only useful hints that contain some truth, but of themselves are not overwhelmingly convincing.

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[35] Minges,*op. cit.*, I, p. 129.

[36] *Ibid.*, p.124.

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 125.

[38] *Op. cit.*, III, p. 473, n. 1.

[39] Claudius Frassen, *Scotus Academicus*, Vol. V (Rome: Sallustiana, 1901), pp. 129-133.

To aid us in our task we will draw upon the resources of the classical Thomistic commentators, and especially Cajetan.

The first difficulty concerns the statement that the human soul is incorruptible *per accidens* because it has *esse per se*. There are three senses in which *esse per se* can be taken: (a) as it is distinguished from the *inesse* of an accident, a sense which would obtain even in the form of fire; (b) as it is the mode in which a composite or supposite exists; (c) as it bespeaks not only the first sense, but also a natural independence of the *esse* from the body. The first sense proves nothing, the second is false when applied to the soul, and the third, according to Scotus, is known by faith alone. Cajetan replies that St. Thomas is referring to the third sense and then proceeds to refine the demonstration taken from the soul's manner of operating,[40] to show that reason can arrive at this third sense.

We say that the soul has *esse per se* because it has per se operations. This latter phrase can mean two things: either it means 'without a bodily organ,' and then it would not follow that the soul is subsistent, or it means 'completely by itself,' and then it would be subsistent, but the fact is that the soul does not work completely by itself. Every operation of the soul belongs to the whole man as he is one whole thing, a *quod*.

To clarify the issue we must distinguish four ways in which the soul may be said to operate per se, i.e., without the body:

1. Without a bodily object, e.g., thinking without a phantasm.
2. Without a bodily organ, so that there is no part of the body by which the soul exercises this operation, unlike seeing or hearing.
3. Without a bodily co-receiver, i.e., only the soul receives this operation, and the composite made up of the soul and the body is not the proximate recipient of this activity.

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[40] Cajetan, Thomas de Vio, *Commentaria in Summa theologicam S. Thomae Aquinatis*, in ed. Leonina, IV (Rome: Poly. Vat., 1888), I, q. 75, a. 6, n. 4.

4. Without a bodily supposite, as if the soul could have an intellectual act which did not belong to the whole man.

Passing over the first way, let us consider the second and third, for from one point of view they amount to the same thing, but from another they are different. They are the same because we believe that every operation has its own proper organ, and so in both ways the operation is received in a composite of body and soul as in its proximate receiver. They differ in this, that the second implies the third but not vice versa. For it, an operation is organic, as is seen in the case of a seed, and indeed of anything that belongs first to the whole without working through any of its parts. Such an operation is corporeal, but not organic, because an organ means a definite part of an animated body.

Although this difference between the whole and its part is true in some cases, it does not apply in things of a set nature or in things which are quantified or qualified. The whole human body and each of its parts is of a set nature and has quantity and quality. Whence we must draw the same conclusion about the whole and its parts in this case. Now whenever bodily contact is opposed (*repugnat*) to a thing by reason of its determined nature in a body, or by reason of its quantified or qualified character, it is also true that contact either with an organ or with a whole body is opposed to it. But contact with a body characterized by a set bodily nature and quantity and quality is opposed to the human soul when that soul is functioning as an intellect. Therefore the presence of a bodily co-receiver is completely ruled out for the very same reason that a bodily organ is out of the question. St. Thomas rules out both kinds of contact.[41] Since the soul works per se in both the second and third ways, it follows that it is subsistent. If you deny that it works in this way, you deny that it is subsistent (something Scotus does not want to do).

The fourth way of operating per se involves subsistence too, but its denial does not imply a denial of subsistence.

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[41] *Sum. theol.*, I, q. 75, a. 2.

Having made the necessary distinctions, we may return to Scotus' difficulties. He must either mean that the soul does not operate per se in the third manner or in the fourth. Each alternative has its perils.

Scotus holds in the *Opus Oxoniense*[42] that there is in us an operation which transcends all sensible operations. He also admits in the *Quodlibet*[43] that granted an operation so immaterial that it occurs only in the soul, and not in a composite of body and soul as its proximate receiver, it truly follows that the soul is separable from the body. From these concessions it follows that intellectual activity occurs only in the soul, and not in a composite as its proximate co-receiver; such activity would otherwise be quantified and affected by sensible qualities and would really be nothing other than sense knowledge. Moreover, it follows that the soul is immortal, though Scotus professes not to see this.

Now it is clear that if Scotus means by his objection that the soul is a way of understanding for the whole composite, so that the body is the proximate co-receiver, and for this reason the soul is not subsistent, his syllogism is valid but he contradicts what he assumed in the *Opus Oxoniense*, since such an activity would be a sensible operation. But if he means that the soul is a way of knowing for the whole composite, so that it is the whole supposite which acts, and for this reason the soul is not subsistent, again his reasoning is sound, but he contradicts what he said in the *Quodlibet*. In either case he is at variance with himself.

What is more important than detecting inconsistencies in Scotus' statements is establishing the truth of the matter. It is clear that St. Thomas means that the soul operates per se in the second and third ways, that is, free of a bodily organ and without a bodily co-receiver. Both of these ways are possible and in fact do occur. Hence the soul is independent of the body in every way that counts, and so it is necessarily immortal.[44]

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[42] *Opus Oxon.*, IV, dist. 43, q. 2.

[43] *Quodl.* IX.

Let us now examine Scotus' second objection, viz., that the soul is not incorruptible per se. Cajetan quickly dispatches this difficulty and the reason is not far to seek. For here Scotus refers to annihilation, but we are speaking of corruption. Indeed the tables may be turned on Scotus and the statement changed into an argument for immortality: since a subsistent form either exists or is annihilated, it cannot be corrupted. Of course, no one denies that God *could* annihilate the soul; the question is, *will* He? From a study of the divine government it is certain that He would not, but we cannot go into this here.[45]

As to the last of St. Thomas' proofs for immortality, that from natural desire, there are many answers that could be given. First we could argue that St. Thomas only meant this as a good indication (*signum*) of the naturalness of life after death, but not as a rigorous demonstration; thus we concede the validity of Scotus' attack. Or we could say that since Scotus notes that the argument assumes the possibility of immortality beforehand, he must concede that if our first proof establishes this (and in fact he too admits that we have proven the possibility of immortality), then the argument holds true. But Cajetan does not rest content with these timid replies. Instead he charges directly into a logical analysis of the main term, detects a specious fallacy, and in his customary manner, penetrates beneath St. Thomas' words to solve the problem.

The phrase that troubles Cajetan is the major of the syllogism used by St. Thomas: 'omne habens intellectum naturaliter desiderat *esse semper*.' For *esse semper* can be taken in two ways, positively, as in God, or negatively, as *esse in universali, esse* in general. If he means the term positively, then it refers either to one's own *esse*, or that of another, or *esse in communi*. None of these senses imply a natural desire of such a destiny, once apprehended. For from the fact that we grasp the idea of eternal *esse* speculatively, nothing follows. Indeed, the truth is that such a thought would be false in regard to the whole composite. With respect to the soul, it is not immediately obvious to us that it is eternal. This must be proved. From the fact that we realize that something else exists forever, e.g., God, it does not follow that we wish to exist forever, except in the sense that we can wish all perfections, even impossible ones, e.g., to fly.

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[44] The whole argument will be found in Cajetan, *op. cit.*, I, q: 75, a. 2, nn. 13-17. Cf. John of St. Thomas, *Cursus philosophicus*, ed. Reiser, III, q. 9, a. 2, p. 294.

[45] Cajetan, *op. cit.*, I, q. 75, a. 6, n. 4.

If he means the term negatively, *esse semper* becomes *esse in universali*, and then the proposition is true, for we always grasp the idea of existence. But this proves nothing except that we naturally desire existence in general and not just here and now. From this, however, we cannot conclude that we desire to exist forever. Hence, there is a fallacy here, that of amphibology. The ambiguity may be stated thus: we always desire to exist, but do we desire to exist always? For the proof to hold true it must be the latter phrase that is meant, and *esse* must be taken in a positive sense.

Two principles we need to bear in mind are that desires follow cognitions, and that a thing desired is a good apprehended by a knowing power. So if the knowing power can only perceive a limited good actually present, then the appetite can only desire such a limited thing. But, if the knowing power can perceive an absolute good, then the appetite can desire an absolute good. And thus the will desires universals, since the intellect knows them. From this fact it follows that since the will by nature desires *esse*, it must desire it as a universal, abstracting from place and time, that is, it desires *esse sempiternum*.

Our wills desire *esse* by means of an elicited act, because each thing by nature desires *esse* according to its level and ability. But intellectual creatures must desire things with elicited acts if they are to desire intelligently.

The conclusion is based on the principle that every natural potency has a fixed set of limits as to its existence.[46] Thus it is impossible for something to have a natural desire to exist or act vaguely; rather, it must be determined that it shall act or exist for a certain time, or always, or never. From this it follows that, given a natural desire for existence unlimited as to time, it must be a desire to exist forever. To make this clearer, let us consider the opposite. If there were a natural desire for vague existence, the natural potency of this nature would also be vague. Thus the existence of such a nature would not have fixed limits. This violates our principle and is unreasonable, since nature simply does not work in such a slipshod fashion. Every nature is either corruptible or not; if not, then it has a fixed capacity to exist forever; if corruptible, then its principles have a fixed capacity to preserve it in being for a certain amount of time and no longer.

And so we can begin to see the marvellous subtlety of St. Thomas, which Scotus did not penetrate. For arguing from a elicited natural desire, it is not necessary to prove that the apprehension of this desirable *esse semper* is reasonable; because if the thing desired is simply *esse absolute,* it is *per se nota.* Therefore it follows that our souls desire *esse semper* positively. And here the depth of St. Thomas is revealed, for from an intellectual grasping and desiring of *esse semper* negatively, and the *semper* being taken as a *sine qua non* condition, he concludes to a desiring of *esse semper* positively and as a part or condition of the thing desired, wtihout slipping into a fallacy.[47]

CONCLUSION

These distinctions should help us to see that the objections of Scotus are not unanswerable. We may now raise the question whether his view that human immortality is metaphysically uncertain is contrary to the defined doctrine of the Church. The problem arises in connection with the rather firm statement of the Fifth Lateran Council (1512-17):

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[46] *De caelo,* I, chap. 12, 281^{a}29 (Oxford trans.).

[47] Cajetan, *op. cit.,* I, q. 75, a. 6, nn. 9-14.

> We regretfully mention that recently the sower of cockle, the ancient enemy of the human race, has dared to oversow the Lord's field and to give increase to some dangerous errors, which have always been disapproved by the faithful. These errors concern the nature of the rational soul especially—for instance, that the soul is mortal or that there is only one soul for all men. Some audacious philosophers have held that this was the truth, at least according to philosophy. Therefore, we desire to use suitable remedies against this error. And with the approval of this sacred council, we condemn and reject all those who claim that the intellectual soul is mortal or that there is a single soul for all men. We condemn those who raise doubts about this matter. For the soul is not only truly, of its own nature, and essentially the form of the human body . . . but also it is immortal.[48]

It is generally said that this conclusion refers primarily to the neo-Aristotelians of the Renaissance, such as Pietro Pomponazzi, who held that it could be positively proved that the soul was mortal.[49] This is no doubt true. What makes us think of Duns Scotus here are the two phrases "at least according to philosophy" and "those who raise doubts about this matter." We must rely on theologians to explain the mind of the Church in this connection. As an indication that this condemnation does not apply to Scotus we may cite the following text:

> From the theological viewpoint, Pohle remarks: 'While the Church upholds even the philosophical demonstrability of these truths, i.e., the existence of God, the spirituality of the soul, and the freedom of the will, . . . with regard to the immortality of the soul, she contents herself with this: that it is dogmatically settled as an established fact from the simplicity and spirituality of the soul,

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[48] Denziger, no. 738, trans. J. F. Clarkson *et al.* in *The Church Teaches* (St. Louis: Herder, 1955), p. 149.

[49] Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 323 ff.

> thereby (in deference to the Scotists) leaving open the further question about its philosophical provability or unprovability.'[50]

This is perhaps sufficient to clear Scotus himself of any charge of unorthodoxy, but the rise of a neo-Aristotelian current after Scotus' death is a sign of the direction which some philosophers took once the Scotist hesitations on immortality, along with those of other philosophers, had become known.

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[50] Hubert Klug, "Die Lehre des sel. Johannes Duns Skotus über die Seele," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch,* XXXVII (1924), 60 (trans. C. D. Weisser).

INNOCENT THUMAN, O.P.

THE REVOLUTION OF COPERNICUS

And so, I too began
to meditate upon the mobility
of the Earth.
De revolutionibus orbium caelestium

Before the sixteenth century, astronomy was regarded as a universally established science. Its principles were summarized in the writings of Ptolemy. According to his astronomical system "the spherical earth was fixed at the center of the universe, and the heavenly bodies moved around it in paths which were combinations of circular motions."[1] Unfortunately the system was not that simple. "The extreme cumbrousness of the system had long been evident."[2] As knowledge of planetary motions became more acurate, the system became more complex.

Astronomy embodied diversified elements mingled in varying proportions. Most important, astronomy was not the autonomous science that we know. Practical astronomy owed allegiance to Ptolemy, but this system differed from the Aristotelian. Astonomers felt the need of establishing some degree of reconciliation.

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[1] Herbert Dingle, *Science and Human Experience* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1931), p. 30.
[2] *Ibid.*

Could the present complex arrangement correspond to the ultimate facts of the universe? Was the Ptolemaic system the inevitable way of interpreting the celestial motions?

Since the thirteenth century in Europe, and as early as the eleventh century among the Arabs, observations and revisions of astronomical calculations had been conducted. A simplified system was needed to "save the phenomena" and to describe the actual paths of the heavenly bodies. The revival of Platonism aided the march of new ideas. Medieval writers such as Oresme and Nicholas of Cusa suggested alternatives to the geostatic system. The Italian Celio Calcagnini (1479-1541) vaguely proposed a theory based on the earth's rotation. Girolamo Fracastoro (1483-1553) attempted to revive the scheme of concentric spheres without epicycles.

At the begining of the sixteenth century Nicolaus Copernicus formulated a system to replace Ptolemy's. By following the ancient view of Pythagoras (fl. 530 B.C.) and Aristarchus of Samos (fl. 280 B.C.), Copernicus postulated the earth as a planet revolving around an immovable sun.

I

The astronomer known as Nicolaus Copernicus "devised that appellation for himself, according to the scholarly custom of his day."[3] He Latinized his Christian name (Niklas) and the family surname (Koppernigk).

Copernicus was born on February 19, 1473, at Thorn (Torun) on the Vistula, in present-day Poland.[4] When Nicolaus was ten years of age, his father died. The Koppernigk children were adopted by their maternal uncle, Lucas Watzelrode. Nicolaus continued in school at Thorn until 1491, when he entered the University of Cracow.[5] Here he became a pupil of Albert Brudzewski, one of the leading astronomers of the time. It was probably at Cracow that Copernicus "became accustomed to the practical use of astronomical instruments, and to the practice of observing the heavens."[6]

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[3] Angus Armitage, *Copernicus: Founder of Modern Astronomy* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1938), p. 43.

[4] A discussion regarding the nationality and ancestry of the Koppernigk family can be found in Armitage, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-45, and in H. Dingle, *The Scientific Adventure* (London: Pitman, 1952), p. 58.

Nicolaus returned home after three years. His uncle had been named Bisshop of Ermland.[7] Bishop Lucas, anxious to provide for his nephew's future, sought a canonry for Nicolaus at Frauenberg Cathedral. When the first attempt proved unsuccessful, the young astonomer resumed his studies.

Departing for Italy in 1496, Copernicus proceeded to study law in Bologna. The following year he learned of his appointment to the canonry. In 1500 he taught mathematics privately in Rome.

He then returned to Poland and obtained a further leave of absence to study medicine.[8] Except for the interval in 1503 when he completed his doctorate in canon law at Ferrara, Copernicus studied from 1501 to 1505 at the medical school at Padua. When he completed his intellectual pursuits he was not only "a humanist learned in Greek, mathematics, and astronomy, but also a jurist and a physician."[9]

Just as Copernicus was settling down to his official duties as canon, he was summoned to Heilsberg. For the next six years he acted as medical adviser to his uncle whose health was uncertain. It was probably here at the Bishop's palace that Copernicus began to give a definite literary form to his "new" system of cosmology. In 1512, when Bishop Lucas died, Copernicus returned to the Frauenberg Cathedral. He resided here "with occasional interruptions" for the remaining thirty years of his life.[10]

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[5] The University of Cracow was then in the forefront of university education in Eastern Europe in the fields of mathematics and astronomy.

[6] Armitage, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

[7] Ermland was one of the four dioceses into which Prussia had been divided. It formed a little principality enjoying a large measure of independence. The Bishop's palace was situated at Heilsberg, and the Cathedral at Frauenberg on the coast.

[8] It was not unusual at that period for a cleric to learn medicine, although he was forbidden to practice surgery.

[9] Nicolaus Copernicus, *De revolutionibus orbium caelestium*, trans. with notes by Charles Glenn Wallis, in *Great Books of the Western World*, vol. XVI, ed. Robert Maynard Hutchins (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), translator's introduction.

Copernicus became the official representative of the cathedral chapter in many disputes, both ecclesiastical and civil. Nicolaus also served as commissary for the diocese of Ermland, and offered free medical advice to the bishops and the destitute of the district. He even presented a scheme to the Diet of Graudenz in 1522 for the reform of the currency. In the midst of this busy life he proceeded to reform astronomy.

> By 1514 his reputation as an astronomer led to his being invited by the Lateran Council to give his opinion on the proposed reform of the calendar. He declined on the ground that the movements of the sun and moon had not yet been determined with sufficient accuracy.[11]

During these years Copernicus was developing the details of his planetary system. He was slowly perfecting the manuscript in which the fruits of his labors were to be presented. Copernicus was planning to reform the elaborate study of the universe.

II

"The problem upon which Copernicus expended half a lifetime of intellectual labor, was of ancient standing."[12] The technique he employed, and much of the data upon which he relied were also an inheritance from antiquity. Considerable information was obtained from the *Epitome in Almagestum* (1496) of Peurbach and Regiomontanus, and from Gerard of Cremona's Latin translation of the *Almagest.* Copernicus revolutionized science by looking at old facts in a new way.

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[10] A. Wolf, *A History of Science, Technology, and Philosophy in the 16th and 17th Centuries,* 2nd ed. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1950), p. 11.

[11] C. G. Wallis, *loc. cit.,* pp. 499-500.

[12] A. Armitage, *op. cit.,* p. 13.

Before initiating his project, he authorized the liberty he was about to take. Commensurate with the custom of the time, he searched ancient authorities for possible alternatives. Copernicus had long considered the uncertainties of traditional mathematics and astronomy.

> Wherefore I took the trouble to reread all the books by philosophers which I could not get hold of, to see if any of them even supposed that the movements of the spheres . . . were different from those laid down by those who taught mathematics in the schools. . . . I found first in Cicero that Nicetas thought that the earth moved. And afterwards I found in Plutarch that there were some others of the same opinion. And so, I too . . . began to meditate upon the mobility of the Earth.[13]

Did Copernicus really derive his inspiration from these classic passages? Dreyer maintains that this *may* have been the way followed by Copernicus.[14] Armitage advances the possibility that "he merely quoted them for the sake of the impression which they would produce upon the readers."[15] Nevertheless, in the *De revolutionibus*, Copernicus makes these references the points of departure for his own exploration of the problem.

Copernicus felt that he too, like his predecessors, could search for an answer:

> And although the opinion seemed absurd, nevertheless because I knew that others before me had been granted the liberty of constructing whatever circles they pleased in order to demonstrate astral phenomena, I thought that I too would be readily permitted to test whether or not, by the laying down that the earth had some movement, demonstrations less shaky than those of my predecessors could be found for the revolutions of the celestial spheres.[16]

III

While studying at Bologna, Copernicus had become the pupil of Domenico Maria de Novara, professor of mathematics and astronomy.

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[13] Nicolaus Copernicus, *op. cit.*, p. 508.

[14] J. L. E. Dreyer, *History of the Planetary Systems from Thales to Kepler* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1906), p. 312.

[15] A. Armitage, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

[16] Nicolaus Copernicus, *op. cit.*, p. 508.

Novara, a leading Platonist, criticized the Ptolemaic system as too cumbersome to satisfy the principle of mathematical harmony. Master and student discussed the limitations of the *Almagest* and the possibility of improving upon the Ptolemaic system. Novara taught Copernicus "the desire to conceive of the constitution of the universe in terms of simple mathematical relationships."[17] Roused by Platonic philosophy, which included Pythagorean elements, Copernicus resolved to effect this mathematical harmony.

He soon became convinced that by acknowledging the earth's mobility he could convert "the heterogeneous mass of celestial motions into a single organized system."[18] Copernicus was assured that "in no single part could one thing be altered without confusion among the other parts and in all the universe."[19] This consideration appears to have convinced him that the hypothesis was justified.

Difficulties still remained; objections had to be refuted. The geocentric theory of Hipparchus and Ptolemy had been successful in explaining the facts "with that degree of accuracy which the observations of the time demanded."[20] Its only fault from the geometric point of view was the complication of cycles and epicycles. Ptolemy's postulate of the immobility of the earth had ben supported by arguments from experience. "These arguments had to be met—and met moreover, without violating the Aristotelean principles of motion."[21]

IV

Ptolemy's system, in its physical conceptions, was basically Aristotelian. The latter's influence may be seen directly in the preface to the *Almagest.* There were elements of Ptolemy's system, however, which conflicted with important Aristotelian principles. Beyond the fundamental axioms and postulates, the two systems had little in common.

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[17] A. C. Crombie, *Medieval and Early Modern Science* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1959), vol. II, p. 167.

[18] H. Dingle, *Scientific Adventure,* p. 72.

[19] Nicolaus Copernicus, *op. cit.,* p. 508.

[20] William Dampier, *A History of Science* (New York: Macmillan, 1951), p. 19.

[21] H. Dingle, *Scientific Adventure,* p. 72.

Ptolemy did not deny spheres, but he ignored them, and by accepting eccentrics he proceeded beyond anything Aristotle contemplated. This was necessary if he was to "save the phenomena." In following centuries, when Aristotelian authority grew more absolute, and the phenomena more difficult to explain, even with Ptolemaic liberties, the problem of reconciling the systems became more acute.

Aristotelians seemed to present the greatest difficulty for Copernicus. Had Aristotle made no pronouncement on the movements of the heavenly bodies, it is reasonable to suppose that Copernicus' doctrine would have met no great opposition. Many scholastic philosophers had almost bodly conceded that it was easier to doubt the wisdom of God than that of Aristotle.

Copernicus had now to discuss the problem of the nature and cause of movement. He had to move from geometry and the idea of mathematical harmony to issues which belonged to physics.

Copernicus felt that the earth and the heavenly bodies had to move. This was due, as he asserted, to their sphericity or to their attachment to spherical orbs. Put a sphere anywhere in space and it will revolve, for the substantial form of a spherical body naturally tends to move spherically.[22]

A rotating earth presented difficulties however. If the earth rotated, a falling body could no longer move rectilinearly. A circular motion of the earth must be added to its apparent rectilinear motion.[23] Copernicus replied that "although, as Aristotle had said, there were natural and violent motions, all natural motions wre circular."[24]

As long as a body remains in its natural place, this is the only motion it possesses. Rectilinear motion, however, is superadded to this in any body which is out of it natural place. As a result, rising and falling bodies appear to move perpendicularly upwards or downwards. Since they are parts of the earth, they share the earth's circular motion. When they are at rest on its surface, they possess only this motion.

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[22] James A. Weisheipl, O.P., "The Celestial Movers in Medieval Physics," *The Thomist*, XXIV (1961), 318.

[23] Cf. Aristotle, *De caelo*, I, 2.

[24] H. Dingle, *Scientific Adventure*, p. 72.

Secondly, if the earth rotated, would there not be a mighty east wind? Clouds and objects thrown into the air would be left behind Copernicus maintained that the air must share the earth's rotation. In such a case everything floating in the air would be carried along.

According to Dampier, a third argument resulted from the assertion that "a moving earth would fly to pieces."[25] Copernicus could not properly answer this problem.[26] He replies that a moving sky would have more serious consequences. The sky is larger in circumference and therefore, if it revolves, it must move faster.

Ptolemy had reasoned that the earth must be at the center of the universe. First, bodies which move to the center of the universe move toward the center of the earth. Secondly, the celestial sphere appears equally far off in all directions, and at all times of the year. More simply, the stars show no parallax.

In reply, Copernicus employs the Platonic and Pythagorean theory of gravitation. He conjectures that gavity is a local phenomenon. Even objects on Mars would move to the center of Mars, and not necessarily toward the center of the universe. But this was only a guess. Copernicus provided no certitude.

Secondly, he attributes the absence of observable stellar parallax to the great distance of the stellar sphere compared with the dimensions of the earth's orbit. Again he could afford no evidence to support his conviction. Nicolaus' system, while not demonstrable, "at least made the best of a bad job, and was therefore to be preferred."[27]

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[25] W. Dampier, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

[26] Nicolaus Copernicus, *op. cit.*, I, c. 8.

[27] H. Dingle, *Scientific Adventure*, p. 73.

In the first nine chapters of the *De Revolutionibus* Copernicus clears away "the chief objections to regarding the earth as one of the planets."[28] He refutes the arguments by which Aristotle has asserted that the earth is at rest at the center of the universe. At the same time he preserves Aristotle's principles and uses some of them as the basis of his own arguments. His synthesis was remarkable.

V

The Copernican theory consisted fundamentally in assigning the diurnal motion of the heavenly bodies to the rotation of the earth on its axis. The annual motion of these bodies was then ascribed to the earth's revolution about the sun. The astronomical consequences of these postulates were worked out by the traditional devices of eccentrics, deferents, and epicycles.

Copernicus was convinced that there were no compelling objections to the earth's mobility. "Therefore since nothing hinders the mobility of the earth, I think we should now see whether more than one movement belongs to it. . . ." (*De Revolutionibus* I, 9)

He next specified what motions could be attributed to the earth to account for the "diurnal and seasonal phenomena, for certain slow changes in the earth's axis of rotation, and in the elements of its orbit."[29]

Three motions were assigned to the earth. These were to prove "a great stumbling-block to many who might have been prepared to grant it one."[30] The first motion was a diurnal rotation from west to east about the polar axis. This accounted for the rising and setting of the heavenly bodies. The second was an annual motion about the sun from west to east in the plane of the ecliptic. The third motion was a variation in the inclination of the earth's axis to the line joining sun and earth. The celestial pole would move in an annual circle unless a counteracting movement were provided. This third motion also accounted for the precession of the equinoxes and their illusory trepidations.

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[28] Cf. Armitage, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 91.

[30] H. Dingle, *Scientific Adventure*, p. 73.

By postulating the annual rotation of the earth, Copernicus made his most strategic advance in astronomical theory. This analysis facilitated the full mathematical development of a new system. Accordingly, the change introduced by Copernicus was the substitution of a heliostatic for a geostatic view.[31]

The sun and not the earth was now the center of the universe. The first and highest sphere was that of the "fixed stars, containing itself and everything, and therefore immovable." (*De Revolutionibus* I, 10) Then follow Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the Earth with its lunar orbit, Venus, and Mercury.

> But in the midst of all dwells the Sun. For who could set this luminary in another or better place in this most glorious temple, than whence he could at one and the same time lighten the whole? Which some not unsuitably call the light of the world, others the soul or ruler. Trismegistus calls it the visible God, the Electra of Sophocles the all-seeing. So indeed the Sun, sitting on the royal throne, governs the revolving family of the stars.[32]

Copernicus now provided eccentrics, deferents, and epicycles to account for the observed movements of the sun, moon, and planets. His system had a great advantage over Ptolemy's: the retrograde motions of the planets were accounted for as mere appearances due to a single movement of the earth. Consequently, he was able to reduce the number of spheres required to explain the celestial movements. By the end of the fifteenth century Ptolemy's system had consisted of more than eighty spheres. Copernicus now reduced these to thirty-four.

He still retained a few minor epicycles to make his system agree with the facts of observation. Buckley notes:

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[31] *Ibid.*, p. 75.

[32] Copernicus, *op. cit.*, I, c. 10.

> That all the epicycles did not disappear was due to the fact that Copernicus did not entirely free himself from the effect of the notions of the earlier philosophers, as he still believed in the old doctrine that "the movement of the heavenly bodies is uniform, perpetual, or else compounded of circular motions."[33]

Neither Copernicus nor anyone else had so far dared to challenge Aristotle's statement that the planets must move in circular orbits. All acknowledged the circle as the only intelligible curve. Copernicus was elated to find that in his system all circles moved in the same direction.

VI

Such was the system to which Copernicus devoted the greater portion of his life. He had obtained conclusions largely by the use of mathematics and logic, rather than through observation. Copernicus was well aware that he had only initiated the reform of astronomy. Considerable labor and research must be expended to complete this "revolution."

Most authorities agree that Copernicus' mathematical system was at least as accurate as Ptolemy's, with both advantages and disadvantages. It was certainly simpler theoretically and qualitatively. Copernicus presented a "unified explanation of a number of different features of planetary motion" which were arbitrary and disconnected in Ptolemy's system.[34]

To effect some degree of reconciliation with the Aristotelians, Copernicus interpreted Aristotle's *Physics* in a different sense from that of most of his contemporaries. He had realized the prodigious influence of Aristotelian philosophy. "The elements of the astronomical universe could not break the shell of Aristotelean physics until they were formed into a living, organic system."[35] Copernicus was now organizing these elements. Astronomy was being revolutionized.

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[33] H. Buckley, *A Short History of Physics* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1927), p. 19.

[34] A. C. Crombie, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 177.

[35] H. Dingle, *Scientific Adventure*, p. 80.

VII

Eventually it was rumored that Copernicus had developed a theory of heliocentricity and planetary motion. This accomplishment was realized despite the fact that "he held no chair, lectured nowhere, and published nothing."[36]

Although continually making observations and elaborating doctrine, Copernicus was reluctant to publish the results of his work. It was not until 1530 that he provided in the *Commentariolus* a preliminary outline of his heliocentric theory. But the *Commentariolus* was distributed to a close circle of friends.

Copernicus was eminently modest and humble; he was not overanxious to publish his research. There is no evidence that he himself feared the reactions of the Church to his assertion that the earth moved. "The popular idea . . . of fear of persecution is entirely baseless," says Dingle. "The only fear, if it may be so classed, was a shrinking from the ridicule of the unlearned."[37]

By 1533 the Pope had been introduced to the recently published details of the system. Johann Widmanstad, Papal secretary, explained the Copernican theory to Pope Clement VII in the Vatican gardens in the presence of "Cardinals Orsini and Salviati, Johannes Petrus, Bishop of Viterbo, and Matthaeus Curtius, the well-known medieval writer."[38] The Pope expressed his enthusiasm. Three years later Cardinal Schonberg strongly urged Copernicus to publish the complete details of the system. At least Copernicus was asked to send full particulars to the Cardinal himself, at the latter's expense.

Not all the reactions to the *Commentariolus*, however, were favorable. As early as 1531 Nicolaus was satirized in a play staged at Elbing, a few miles from Frauenberg. He was called "A star-gazing ecclesiastic with extraordinary opinions."[39] Later, Nicolaus was ridiculed by such diverse personalities as the Italian mathematician Francesco Maurolyco, and the German reformer Martin Luther. "The fool," said Luther, "will overturn the whole science of astronomy."[40]

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[36] Mark Graubard, *Astronomy and Alchemy—Two Fossil Sciences* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1953), p. 176.

[37] H. Dingle, *Scientific Adventure*, p. 62.

[38] Lynn Thorndike, *A History of Magic and Experimental Science* (New York: Columbia, 1941), vol. V, p. 410.

Copernicus' sensitive nature was hurt by such misunderstandings. He had once said: "The contempt which I had to fear because of the novelty and apparent absurdity of my view nearly induced me to abandon utterly the work I had begun."[41] This consideration detained him from propagating his discoveries until early 1543.

VIII

In the spring of 1539, Copernicus was visited by a young mathematician from the Protestant University of Wittenberg. Georg Joachim Rheticus (1514-1576), a protégé of Melanchthon, sought authentic information about Copernicus' astronomical system. Rheticus was cordially welcomed by Copernicus, who allowed him to study the still-unpublished work. Almost immediately the young enthusiast composed a lengthy review of it. Rheticus' account, published with Copernicus' approval, appeared in 1540. Entitled *Narratio prima de libris revolutionum*, the treatise was accorded an enthusiastic reception.

This immediate reaction encouraged Copernicus. Nicolaus, moved also by the youthful fervor of Rheticus, by the persistent entreaties of friends, and by his own approaching death, finally consented to the publication of his manuscripts and notes.

The text was entrusted to Nicolaus' friend, Tiedemann Giese, Bishop of Culm, who sent it to Rheticus. The *De revolutionibus orbium celestium* appeared in 1543 and was dedicated to Pope Paul III. The author, however, was not to realize the full impact of his work.

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[39] A. Armitage, *op. cit.*, p. 40.
[40] A. C. Crombie, *op. cit.*, II, p. 168.
[41] Copernicus, *op. cit.*, p. 506.

> During the winter, Copernicus had been overtaken by a serious illness. A paralytic stroke supervened, leaving no hope of recovery. For weeks he lay awaiting the final summons. At length, on May 24, 1943, an advance copy of the newly published book was brought to him. He saw and handled his completed work, and some hours later passed away.[42]

IX

Copernicus was undoubtedly convinced of the truth of his heliocentric theory. Circumstances critically helped to distort this conviction.

Rheticus, before completing his assignment, assumed a new professorship at Leipzig. Copernicus' manuscripts were entrusted to Andreas Osiander (1498-1552), a Lutheran theologian. Intending to placate both Catholics and Protestants, Osiander inserted an unauthorized preface to the *De revolutionibus*.[43] He described the book as "a mathematical exercise rather than an astronomical treatise."[44] Again Osiander writes:

> The hypotheses of this book are not necessarily true or even probable. Only one thing matters. They must lead by computation to results that are in agreement with the observed phenomena.[45]

Notwithstanding this declaration, Luther and Melanchthon vehemently disapproved of the "new" hypothesis. It did not, however, immediately excite any opposition on the part of Catholic authorities. The Church took no positive action against the Copernican view until the teachings of Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) drew attention to its consequences on Church doctrine. Objections were then raised against some sentences which represented the heliocentric hypothesis as a certainty. Consequently the *De revolutionibus* was banned in 1616 and remained in the Church's disfavor until 1822.

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[42] A. Armitage, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

[43] Frederick Copleston, S.J., *History of Philosophy* (Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1953), vol. III, pp. 282-3.

[44] *The Origins of Science*, in *Moments of Discovery*, ed. G. Schwartz and P. W. Bishop (New York: Basic Books, 1958), vol. II, p. 219.

[45] Copernicus, *op. cit.*, p. 506.

X

Osiander's discreet preface may have been the reason why Copernican ideas failed to have an immediate revolutionary effect. This unauthorized addition had confused critics of the *De revolutionibus*. Did Copernicus regard his theory as a mere computing device which intended to facilitate the construction of improved planetary tables? Or did he believe that the earth actually possessed the motions assigned to it?

These queries are directly answered by referring to authentic passages from the *De revolutionibus*. Armitage cites several points:

1) Copernicus designates his doctrine of the earth's mobility by such words as *opinio, doctrina,* and *cogitatio*.

2) He refers to himself as the man who dared to conceive some notion of the earth "contrary to the received opinion of the mathematicians and contrary to common sense." He would scarcely have written in such terms about a mere computing device, since such an artifice is exempt from all physical restrictions.

3) Copnericus compares his attitude to that of Lactantius, an early ecclesiastical writer who scorned the idea of the earth's sphericity. Copernicus writes: "It ought not to surprise scholars if they pour such scorn on us also."[46] Copernicus implies that his doctrine is comparable to that of the earth's sphericity.

4) When describing or suggesting alternative eccentric and epicyclic systems, Copernicus refers to tradition or convenience. "Which of the [two] systems exists in the heavens," he writes, "it is not easy to distinguish." (*De revolutionibus* III, 15)[47]

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[46] *Ibid.*, p. 509.

[47] A. Armitage, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-7.

If Copernicus had regarded his system as merely a mathematical device, he would have had no reason "for composing arguments in behalf of the natural possibility of the movements of the earth."[48]

There is little doubt that Copernicus' theory was designated as a system of physical fact. At the same time he achieved a "geometric scheme that would save the phenomena in terms of circular motions."[49]

XI

To form a just estimate of the greatness of Copernicus, we must turn to his contemporaries or to the generations which immediately followed. Dingle has stated: "Whether or not greatness is an absolute quality, it can be determined only in relation to its immediate surroundings."[50]

It would take the Copernican system the better part of a century to become firmly established in scientific thought. But then, as Armitage asserts, "within a century and a half of its formation by Copernicus, the heliocentric theory had gained almost universal acceptance. . . ."[51] Charles Glenn Wallis summarizes sixteenth century sentiment toward the *De revolutionibus*:

> People were divided for and against it. Those who received it favorably numbered astronomers and ecclesiastics; those who received it unfavorably numbered ecclesiastics and astronomers.[52]

The strictures stigmatizing the earth's mobility were from theology and natural science. The sixteenth century Reformation had made both Catholic and Protestant sects "fearful of any scandal which might appear to undermine respect for the Church or the Bible."[53] The theologians became too literal in their reading of the Scripture.

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[48] C. G. Wallis, *loc. cit.*, p. 483.
[49] Armitage, *op. cit.*, pp. 86-7.
[50] Dingle, *Scientific Adventure*, p. 81.
[51] Armitage, *op. cit.*, p. 163.
[52] Wallis, *loc. cit.*, p. 489.
[53] *Ibid.*, p. 490.

They were inclined to condemn any assertion which apparently contradicted the literal interpretation of some Biblical passage.

Copernicus was first opposed (even before the *De revolutionibus* was published) by Luther, Melanchthon, and other reformers. While the Catholic Church first tolerated the Copernican theory, as we have seen, resistance rose later.

Almost a century after Copernicus' death his work became the center of a violent controversy. Copernicus had undermined the unity of medieval thought. Violent resistance to the heliocentric theory came from Aristotelian physics and from theology. Religious objection to the hypothesis was based on its supposed incompatibility with the Sacred Scriptures. The earth's mobility was rejected not because it was impious but because it was absurd.

XII

The earliest of Copernicus' disciples was in all probability Rheticus, the mathematician from Wittenberg. But the first salient contribution to the spread of Copernican ideas after 1543 came from Erasmus Reinhold (1511-1553), a colleague of Rheticus. Reinhold revised the cosmic tables of the *De revolutionibus* in 1551. His lengthy edition, entitled *Tabulae prutenicae caelestium motuum*, eliminated some of Copernicus' arithmetical errors. "His praise of Copernicus was of course, boundless and came earliest."[54]

Numerous English scientific writers favored the heliocentric theory. In 1556 John Field published an ephemeris for the ensuing year: *Ephemeris anni* 1557 *currentis iuxta copernici et Reinholdi canones supputata.* Field describes Copernicus and Reinhold as authors "whose writings are established and based upon true, sure, and authentic demonstrations."[55]

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[54] M. Graubard, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

[55] A. Armitage, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

That same year Robert Recorde published his cosmological treatise, *The Castle of Knowledge.* This volume contains a passage which indicates an apparent recognition of the Copernican theory.

Perhaps the most enthusiastic English disciple of Copernicus was William Gilbert, the Royal physician. His book of 1600, *On the Loadstone and Magnetic Bodies and on the Great Magnet the Earth,* sought to establish a relation between magnetism and the Copernican theory.

Other writers such as Gemma Frisius (1508-1555), Michael Maestiln (1550-1620), and Christopher Rothmann recognized the outstanding contributions of Copernicus. Caspar Peucer (1525-1602) assessed Copernicus as the "greatest of all writers on astronomy since Ptolemy."[56]

The Copernican doctrine found another fearless champion in Giordano Bruno. Bruno, however, proceeded considerably beyond Copernicus in the novelty and boldness of his teachings concerning the universe.

Next to Copernicus himself, the greatest sixteenth century astronomer was Tycho Brahe (1546-1601), a Danish aristocrat. Although sharing Copernicus' objections against the Ptolemaic theory, Brahe never accepted a system involving the motion of the earth. He devised a system of his own: the sun revolved around the earth as in the Ptolemaic universe, but Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn compassed the sun in epicycles. Despite his dissention from the Copernican doctrine, Tycho clearly acknowledged the contributions of Nicolaus: "The earth has not produced his equal for many centuries. . . . He has done what it has not been given to any mortal to accomplish since the beginning of the world."[57]

Shortly before Brahe died, he engaged a young assistant, a German astronomer named Johann Kepler (1571-1630). Kepler was to make the first substantial improvement on the Copernican theory. He accounted for the movements of all the then known planets by substituting ellipses for the Copernican circles. One ellipse was assigned to each planet. Epicycles were unnecessary and the theory of planetary motions was exceedingly simplified.

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[56] M. Graubard, *op. cit.,* p. 175.

[57] Armitage, *op. cit.,* p. 167.

The great Italian physicist, Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), also made apodictic contributions to the establishment and refinement of heliocentricity. He substituted a more sound system of dynamics for the traditional Aristotelian scheme. Next, he discovered certain celestial phenoma which authenticated some Copernican ideas. Finally, Galileo excelled as an irrepressible champion of the heliocentric theory.

> Galileo was quite convinced of the absolute truth of the heliocentric theory, maintaining that it was not merely a possible explanaation . . . but rather that it expressed a certain truth with which one could even contest traditional interpretations of Sacred Scripture.[58]

But despite numerous experiments and observations, Galileo never proved that the earth went around the sun. No one actually *demonstrated* heliocentricity until after the work of Foucault and Bessel in the nineteenth century.[59]

In the seventeenth century the consummate effect of Copernicus' work was perceived. Galileo's telescope had inaugurated experimental support. By formulating the modern principles of mechanics and applying them to the problems presented by the solar system, Isaac Newton (1642-1727) would give these reformative ideas that scientific explanation which was the crowning achievement of Copernicus' scientific revolution.

XIII

The Copernican revolution is symbolic of the transition from the medieval to the modern world.

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[58] William A. Wallace, O.P., "St. Thomas Aquinas, Galileo, and Einstein," *The Thomist*, XXIV (1961), 8.

[59] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

> Seen across the centuries through the smoke arising from three hundred years of scientific activity, his figure looks a little dim and strange, but its greatness survives our scrutiny.[60]

Copernicus' contribution was important for what it made possible, not for what it actually was. It was no new idea—no new discovery—only a new way of looking at things. Copernicus undertook the complete reform of astronomy. The Copernican revolution did not end by replacing the earth as the master of the universe by the sun. This was only the first step in a series of revolutions that culminated in depicting the democratic order of the universe in which all the celestial bodies play an equal part.

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[60] H. Dingle, *Scientific Adventure*, p. 83.

THOMAS AQUINAS O'MEARA, O.P.

PAUL TILLICH AND ECUMENISM

Faith, if it takes symbols
literally, becomes idolatrous.
Paul Tillich

Between the Calvinist Neo-Orthodoxy of Karl Barth and the religious sociology of the Niebuhrs lies the theological realm of Paul Tillich. Born, educated, and employed as a professor of theology in Germany but living his most important years a a theological writer in the United States, Tillich combines the European interest in speculative theology with the American sense of the necessary practical import which a theology must have.

For Tillich, Nazi Germany linked America to Europe. His opposition to Hitler forced him to leave Germany in 1933. And it was this same problem of totalitarian government which once brought him close to the Catholic Church. When it seemed that the Protestant Churches in Germany were not going to take a firm stand,[1] the only two choices seemed to be "Christian or heathen Catholicism, the Roman Church or national heathenism in Protestant garb."[2]

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[1] For a good study of the conflict between Nazism and the Protestant Churches of Germany see Arthur Cochrane, *The Church's Confession under Hitler* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1962).

For the past forty years (Tillich is now over seventy-five) his theological thought has been evolving and maturing.[3] Beginning in 1951, it found expression in a modern summa, his *Systematic Theology.*[4] The first volume discusses the nature of religious systematic thought, the work of theology, and God; the second volume is focused on Jesus Christ and the life he brings to mankind; the third volume has yet to appear.

TILLICH'S SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

Tillich is not afraid to let reason, philosophy, systematic presentation, and theology touch the content of divine revelation. Indeed, he feels that today's world needs a particular type of the theological treatise, the systematic form, which he employs.

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[2] Paul Tillich, *The Interpretation of History* (New York: Scribners, 1936), p. 24-25.

[3] A complete catalogue of Professor Tillich's works up to 1952 can be found in C. W. Kegley and R. W. Bretall's *The Theology of Paul Tillich* (New York: Macmillan, 1952), pp. 353-362. Tillich's most important works are *Systematic Theology* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1951 and 1957), 2 vols; *The Protestant Era* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1942); *The Courage to Be* (New Haven: Yale, 1952); *The New Being* (New York: Scribners, 1955); *Dynamics of Faith* (New York: Harpers, 1957).

The work edited by Kegley and Bretall offers interesting early studies of Tillich; Nels S. F. Ferré, *Searchlights on Contemporary Theology* (New York: Harpers, 1961) has several good, recent essays on Tillich. Another study on Dr. Tillich, in German, is Christoph Rheim, *Paul Tillich* (Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1957). It contains a large bibliography.

Essays by American Catholic theologians have appeared: G. Weigel, S.J., "Contemporaneous Protestantism and Paul Tillich," *Theological Studies,* XI (1950), 177-202; also his "The Theological Significance of Paul Tillich," *Gregorianum,* XXXVII (1956), 34-54; Edward D. O'Connor, "Paul Tillich: An Impression," *Thought,* XXX (1955-1956), 507-525; Avery R. Dulles, S.J., "Paul Tillich and the Bible," *Theological Studies,* XVII (1956), 345-367); Fr. Tavard has expended some of his articles which appeared in *Thought* and *Theological Studies* into a book: *Paul Tillich and the Christian Message* (New York: Scribners, 1962).

[4] References to this two volume work will be abbreviated S.T., I or S.T., II.

> System stands between *summa* and essay. The *summa* deals explicitly with all actual and many potential problems. The essay deals explicitly with one actual problem. The system deals with a group of actual problems which demand a solution in a special situation. In the Middle Ages the *summa* was predominant, though by no means exclusively so. At the beginning of the modern period the essay became predominant, although the systematic trend never ceased to exist. Today a need for the systematic form has arisen in view of the chaos of our spiritual life and the impossibility of creating a *summa*.[5]

The system deals with a special "situation," that is, with the particular environment, the special social pressures, the individual psychological drives and defects which life in a special age and culture produces. The system "does not tell us what people have thought the Christian message to be in the past; rather, it tries to give us an interpretation of the Christian message which is relevant to the present situation."[6]

Tillich is important to the ecumenical movement because he is important to contemporary Protestantism. Nels Ferré's words show just how far-reaching the influence of Dr. Tillich may be.

> The most profound and far-ranging among contemporary theologians is Paul Tillich. During the later years of his teaching career he has poured forth a vigorous and full stream of theological writings. It seems likely that he and Barth will leave behind well-fashioned theological positions to represent our day; and yet Tillich, in many senses, is beyond our day—the voice of the theological ages.[7]

It seems that Ferré would rank Tillich above Karl Barth; most Protestants would not; nevertheless, the influence of both will extend, if not beyond, at least to the limits of the twentieth century.

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[5] S.T., I, p. 59.

[6] S.T., I, p. 53.

[7] Nels Ferré, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

Because of his rigorously logical and systematic theology, because of his use of philosophical terms, because of his attempt to organize all of the various key concepts of four centuries of Protestantism into a coherent unit, Tillich finds a sympathy in Catholic readers.[8] Many sins (such as his ideas of faith without an object and Christ without Jesus) are forgiven him by Catholics, because he has placed himself with Augustine and Aquinas in constructing a theological edifice.

> A Catholic theologian, trained to orderly procedure and conceptual precision, can read his book and in spite of its non-Catholic emphases and positions find himself at home because of its method, whereas much Protestant theology strikes that Catholic reader as, in large part, meaningless and quite irrelevant. . . . It is the singular contribution of Dr. Tillich that he brings out the first principles of Protestantism, analyses them, and builds a system around them.[9]

The trend to a true theological way of thinking in Protestantism, a trend begun by the revolt of Barth and formed by the philosophical bequest of Kierkegaard, contributes much to the ecumenical movement, for the western Catholic mind cannot abandon its formation by logic and its respect for the validity of knowledge and the soundness of reason. Below we shall cite Tillich's censure of the Reformers' rejection of human reason in matters of revelation. This new respect for theology and sound epistemology will ultimately prove to be a great foundation for extensive dialogue. Tillich and Barth place themselves in the forefront of Protestantism's ecumenical approach to Catholicism by their respect for theology as it has been understood by the western and Catholic tradition over the past centuries.

Besides this respect for a real theology, two other topics which are prominent in the Catholic-Protestant dialogue are touched on in an interesting way by Paul Tillich—*the theology of the Blessed Virgin,*

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[8] Tillich found more sympathy among Catholic critics before the publication of the second volume of the *Systematic Theology* with its unorthodox Christology.

[9] Gustav Weigel, S.J., "Protestantism and Paul Tillich," *Theological Studies,* XI (1950), 199.

and the concept of ultimate authority in revelation. Protestant writers are unanimous[10] in seeing these topics as crucial in discussions of Christian unity; they embody what is most objectionable in Roman Catholicism. Both Marian theology and absolute authority appear poorly founded on Scripture, and they exalt the creature in the place of the transcendent God of Calvin. The following essay discusses the two topics of Marian theology and ultimate authority over the content of divine revelation as Dr. Tillich considers them; a brief critique of his ideas follows. An introductory survey of his theology together with the discussion of these two topics should delineate his prominence in ecumenism, and at the same time call attention to his distance from Catholicism, orthodox Protestatism, and the Neo-Orthodoxy of Barth and Brunner.

TILLICH'S THEOLOGICAL ELEMENTS

Three elements form the name, nature and structure of Tillich's thought: revelation from God (for it is the study of God and man which is theologically systematized by the theologian); reason (a "system" is theology-using-reason); and, finally, the existential situation which influences and governs the system.

How does Tillich conceive revelation; how does he conceive the science of revelation which is theology?

The first one hundred pages of his *Systematic Theology* offer his views on the interplay of revelation and reason. For Tillich theology unites the data of revelation to organize it, to explain it, and to make it meaningful to the individual man on the street. Theology must be based on God's special revelation to man. There is no natural theology, no metaphysics which can begin with creatures and reach the true God.[11] Revelation alone reaches God. It is God's self-manifestation to man, and this manifestation comes to the individual through his emotions, his mind, and his existential experiences.

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[10] A sample of the importance which major Protestant theologians give to Mariology in the ecumenical movement is the following: "There is probably no place where the difference between the two understandings of Christianity become so plain as in their different conceptions of the Virgin Mary." K. Skydsgaard, *One in Christ* (Philadelphia, 1957), p. 126; ". . . the most agonizing problem for ecumenical thought," Max Thurian, "Mariology," in *Ways of Worship* (New York: Harpers, 1951), p. 289; ". . . a diseased construct of theological thought . . . the one great heresy of the Roman Catholic Church," Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics* (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1956), I, 2, pp. 139, 143; "the most obnoxious feature of Roman Catholicism," Jaroslav Pelikan, *The Riddle of Roman Catholicism* (New York: Abingdon, 1959), p. 129.

Tillich's philosophical background is professedly and thoroughly existential. "It was easy for me . . . to accept the analysis of human existence as given by Kierkegaard and Heidegger."[12] However, "it took years before I became fully aware of this impact on my own thinking."[13] Tillich went through several stages in his appreciation of existentialism and its various prophets. A summary of this progress is given by Tillich himself:

> The third and contemporary form of existential philosophy has resulted from a combination of this philosophy of life with Husserl's shift of emphasis from existent objects to the mind that makes them its objects, and with the rediscovery of Kierkegaard and of the early developments of Marx. On the one hand Heidegger and Jaspers, and on the other the existential interpretation of history found in German "religious socialism" are the main representatives of this third period of the philosophy of experienced Existence.[14]

Existentialism, Tillich thinks, is neither so novel nor so pagan. St. Thomas Aquinas glimpsed the light.

> They [the scholastics, especially the Franciscans] called theology a "Practical" knowledge, pointing to what today is called "Existential" knowledge. It is unfortunate that ever since the day of Thomas Aquinas this emphasis increasingly has been lost . . . and that the Reformers combined their rediscovery of the existential character of theology with a badly defined rejection of reason.[15]

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[11] S.T., II, p. 14.

[12] Paul Tillich, *The Interpretation of History, ed. cit.*, p. 32.

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] S.T., I, p. 155. St. Thomas speaks of theology being both speculative and practical, but "magis speculativa," in the *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 1, a. 4.

But existentialism is a philosophy, a metaphysics. Where is Tillich's Protestant protest against the ability of human reason to explore the depths of revelation? The Reform overthrew the pretense of philosophy to speak of God. Tillich does not accept, however, this tenet of traditional Protestantism. Philosophy does have a legitimate place in theology. The following two passages show Tillich's attitude towards the Reformers' banishment of reason:

> It is unfortunate . . . that the Reformers combined their rediscovery of the existential character of theology with a badly defined rejection of reason. It is understood that reason receives revelation and that it is an object of salvation like every other element of reality, a theology which uses theonomous reason may again be possible.[16]
>
> It is not only bad theology but also a kind of ascetical arrogance when theologians—since Tertullian—indulge in nonsensical combinations of words, demanding of all true Christians that in an act of intellectual destruction they accept nonsense as divine sense. The "foolishness" of the cross has nothing to do with the assumedly good but actually demonic work of the sacrifice of reason.[17]

The elements, then, with which the Systematics begins, are *revelation* telling us about God and *existential philosophy* explaining this revelation and making it relevant to twentieth century man.

To continue in our survey of the outline of the Systematics, the subject of theology is God. God is presented to us under two aspects. First, there is what Catholic theology might call the speculative aspect: God is "the ground of being." Tillich uses the Thomistic phrase *being itself*. God is the being which is the foundation of all thought and reality, the point of reference of all things. Secondly, God (we might say in the context of practical or moral theology) is the object of man's ultimate concern. What concerns man ultimately, what ultimately guides his life, what is the ruling force of his humanity—that is the object of his ultimate concern, and that is God, the object of theology.

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[16] S.T., I, p. 155.

[17] S.T., I, p. 151.

It is revelation which introduces us to God. Man meets God, the ground of being and his ultimate concern, in an immediate, existential, non-conceptual experience. Between the believer and God there is no medium; this experience with God is described as existential because it takes place in man's emotions, in his mind, his fears and hopes. The experience is existential in the anxious sense of Sartre or Heidegger. The threatening environment of man's existence sparks and influences his encounter with God.

This existential experience of an individual man with God is not revelation. It is the condition of man's learning about God's revelation. Each man's individual experience of God is only a sharing in the continuous and corporate human experience of God. Revelation itself is known by means of three channels: the Scriptures, the life of the Church, and the milieu surrounding a man.

Tillich possesses a new contemporary Protestant approach to the Bible. Gone is the omni-intelligible and dominating letter of the Scriptures. Weigel writes:

> We have the newer Protestant conception of the Bible. Its propositions are not revelation, which is carried only by experience, original or dependent. In the Scriptures witness is given to the original experience, which as a stimulus excites a similar experience in others who thus depend on the revelation of others. Hence the Scriptures are pointers whereby the reader can be led to the encounter with the self-revealing God. The Bible considered as a collection of propositions can be called revelation only in an improper sense; for revelation is always an existential experience.[18]

So, the Bible is not a norm for the content of revelation, but only a source. It is only a book through which faith can bring us to Christ and to his gifts.

After this predominance of the human side of the encounter with God revealing himself, we are not surprised if the traditional dogmas of faith and the truths of theology become subjectivized. Tillich—like traditional Protestant theology—does not feel that human concepts can tell us much about *God in himself*. God is not personal but "supra-personal." The Trinity is not really three persons in one God existing beyond the human mind and emotions, but a "phenomenological statement about man in terms of his ultimate concerns."[19] It is man who is triune. Man is oppressed by three anxieties: death, guilt, skepticism. To combat these drives man projects a Trinity into God. Tillich's attitude towards the rest of orthodox Christianity, whether it be the orthodoxy of the twenty ecumenical councils or the Neo-Orthodoxy of twentieth-century Protestantism, will be explained below.

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[18] Gustav Weigel, S.J., "The Theological Significance of Paul Tillich," *Gregorianum,* XXXVII (1958), 40.

TILLICH AND MARIAN THEOLOGY

The references cited above show the importance which the Protestant side of the ecumenical dialogue attaches to Roman Catholic interest in Mary. There is little explicit reference to the Mother of God in Tillich's writings. Only one passage, in fact, in the *Systematic Theology* explicitly mentions her. However, Tillich's system is not a list of dogmas which he accepts or rejects but a total picture of Christianity as he conceives it. His thought touches the Catholic viewpoint on Mary in many of the general sections of this theology.

Mary stands or falls as Christ does. And Christ, it would seem, falls. Man was and is immersed in the misery of human existence; in God's plan he was to be given "New Being." Jesus, who is called the Christ, came to do this. Jesus, according to Tillich, was a man like all others and to call him God is idolatry. "What do you mean if you use the term, "Son of God"? If one receives a literalistic answer to this question, one must reject it as superstitious."[20] Although Jesus was not the Son of God, nor did he become divine, he did become the Christ. He became the Christ at his death when he accepted his destiny even when it upset all his own desires and plans. Jesus became the Christ as he rose above the fears and anxieties of human existence. At this plane he reached a divine and new dimension of reality and life, New Being. New Being is the ability to live serenely with the vicissitudes of life. During the Passion Jesus transcended the finiteness and awfulness of the human situation in which we are all immersed. Consequently, the resurrected life of Jesus is not a physical reality, nor a real supernatural life given to men (called grace), but the courage to disregard the problems of life. "The Resurrection shows the New Being in Jesus as the Christ as victorious over the existential estrangement to which he has subjected himself."[21] Tillich objects to a "supernaturalistic frame of reference" which has made the Resurrection something miraculous, a second physical life of Christ. In reality it was only the courage to overcome the fearful existential situation. Jesus is not a "divine-human automaton"; rather he is capable of error, sin and doubt, which "are taken into the participation in the divine life. . . . Both error and truth are taken into the transcendent truth."[22]

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[19] *Ibid.*, p. 39. Cf. Tavard, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

[20] S.T., II, p. 110.

The source for Tillich's division between Jesus and the Christ lies in the devastation which historical criticism, culminating in Schweitzer's quest, visited on Christology. Although the pendulum is swinging the other way, Protestantism is still afraid to base its religion on the historical events of Christ's life. Consequently it wishes to establish the basis of its religion on non-historical foundations. All we know about Jesus, Tillich says, is that he lived and died early in our era. Very little of the New Testament can be called a historical record. The crucifixion under Pontius Pilate is an example of an historical fact. What we know about Jesus is the Christ. Everything we know was preserved and transmitted because he became the Christ. *It is the fruit of faith.* There is no photographic picture of this man. The object for the photograph did exist. But the picture was taken by a lens that changed the object—the belief and existential demands of the early Christians. "While the historicity of the divine revelation is a matter of immediate certainty of faith, the historicity of the

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[21] S.T., II, p. 159.
[22] S.T., II, p. 134.

Bible reports is a matter of the grades of probability reached by historical research."[23] The historical Jesus neither supports nor shakes the certainty of Christianity.

Obviously, in this Christology Mary plays none of the role which Catholic theology assigns to her. The man she bore was born in sin, ignorance and anxiety, like all men. He was not divine; consequently the divine motherhood, the principle of Marian theology, is a myth.

> The story of the virgin birth belongs to the symbols corroborating the resurrection. . . . It is the same motif which led to Logos Christology. . . . The factual element in it is that historical destiny determined the bearer of the New Being, even before his birth. But the actual story is a myth, the symbolic value of which must be seriously questioned. It points toward the docetic-monophysitic direction of Christian thinking and is itself an important step in it.[24]

The virgin birth and its exaltation of Mary are an evil influence in Christian thought if it is understood as depriving Jesus of "full participation in the human predicament."[25] Protestanism should

> . . . not deny the idea of Incarnation, but it should remove the pagan connotations and reject its supranaturalistic interpretations. As Protestantism asserts the justification of the sinner, so it demands a Christology of the participation of Christ in sinful existence.[26]

The virgin birth must not point to either divinity or sanctity in Christ. Jesus and his mother are both—for the sake of future generations—fully immersed in "sinful existence." The virgin birth was a useless attempt to exclude sin and a full humanity from Jesus.[27]

The activities of Mary in the gospels, like those of Jesus, would be more symbolic than historical. Mary's sole contribution to the Christ was, perhaps, her acceptance of this psychological metamorphosis in the Apostles after the crucifixion, and her offering of the material for some of those beliefs, for instance, the early chapters of St. Luke, which the primitive faith attached to the dead Christ.

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[23] A. T. Mollegan, "Christology and Biblical Criticism in Tillich," in C. W. Kegley and R. W. Bretall, *op. cit.*, p. 234.

[24] S.T., II, p. 160.

[25] *Ibid.*

[26] S.T., II, p. 149.

[27] S.T., II, p. 129.

The theory may seem to destroy devotion to the Mother of God and a tract in theology concerned with her. Tillich, however, would say that there is no need to destroy this ancient Marian tradition.

Tillich's idea of revelation, of how God speaks to man and of the means by which man can encounter this message, allows his strange attitude towards Mariology. In fact, Mariology in all its Catholic splendor can be placed within his system, or it can be completely excluded. For Tillich there is no need to list the Marian prerogatives of virginity, sanctity, the Assumption, and so forth, and then to check them off as to whether he accepts them or does not. He accepts them all, and he accepts none of them; that is, a Christian may hold either point of view. This capacity for affirmation and negation of belief lies at the bottom of his theology just as it is at the bottom of existentialism. Everything is affirmed and yet can be denied; not in an analogical way,[28] but rather in a pragmatic, or better, existential way.

This simultaneous denial and affirmation happens because revelation is for the creature. It is God's gift to the creature, and so when it helps the creature, it continues; when it does not help him, it dies. Although Christ is in some sense a final revelation,[29] revelation occurs again and again through history. It takes place in individuals and in groups represented by individuals. "If groups of persons become transparent for the ground of being and meaning, revelation occurs."[30] We cannot be wrong if we deduce that Christ is not *the* one and unique revelation of God outside the created universe. The passage of St. Paul which says that God has definitely spoken through his Son (Hebrews 1:1-3) must be, for Tillich, only a relative statement. The revelation of God is "transformed by every new group, and in an infinitesimal way by every new individual who enters it. . . ."

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[28] Gustav Weigel, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

[29] S.T., II, p. 163.

[30] S.T., I, p. 120.

> Both . . . the complete disappearance of the unchanging point of reference . . . and . . . a complete loss of power to create new correlations, have been actualized innumerable times in the history of religion. Sectarian and Protestant movements in all the great religions have attacked given religious institutions as a complete betrayal of the meaning of the original revelation, although they have still kept it as their point of reference. On the other hand, most of the gods of the past have lost even this power; they have become poetic symbols and have ceased to create a revelatory situation. Apollo has no revelatory significance for Christians; *the Virgin Mother Mary reveals* nothing to Protestants. Revelation through these two figures has come to an end.[31]

This is the foundation upon which Marian theology both stands and falls: subjective appreciation. If this Marian aspect of the Christian message has revelatory significance for you, then it remains as a symbolic expression of God, man, and their relation. If it reveals nothing of value to help you to reach God and to overcome the problems of the human condition, then it is not so much false as valueless. Tillich's theological concepts and statements, we must stress again, are value judgments. It is not the truth or falsehood of historical and supernatural events which he seems to be treating, but their meaning for man. Mariology has had no meaning for a large segment of Christians since Luther and Calvin. Protestants are not helped in their existential situation by devotion to the Mother of God; rather, it obscures their Christ.

Tillich has formed a fundamental *Protestant Principle*. The attitude of this underlying *élan* of all Protestantism, past, present and future, towards Marian theology will be examined below, after the treatment of authority in revelation.

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[31] S.T., I, p. 128.

TILLICH, AUTHORITY, AND REVELATION

A discussion of the transitory value of all revelations and of the subjective and existential interpretation of these messages introduces us to Tillich's ideas on authority and revelation.

Although in many senses revelation can be called "final" with Christ, it is neither complete nor immutable. What Tillich would admit as the content of Christian revelation is, after all, largely the product of the early Christian community, the pagan milieu, the Catholic Middle Ages, and the reaction of the Reformation and Enlightenment. It is, therefore, man-made. Revelation is for man, and Tillich's theology, I believe, centers around *value* rather than *truth*. What leads man to God, what brings the New Being of Christ to man, what overcomes an individual's existential estrangement—this is the criterion of revelation.

These criteria are subjective, and they exclude the former objective and absolute criteria: the Bible, the words of Christ, the councils of bishops, the Papacy, the writings of the second-century apologetes, of the third-century fathers, or of the fourth-century doctors.

For Roman Catholicism the Bible and the Apostolic Traditions are the media of revelation; they transmit the message of Christ by letter and by word. The Holy Spirit, speaking through Peter's successor, the Pope, determines the ultimate definition of what was revealed by the Incarnate Logos to the Apostles. In this way God's message is given to men, and it is preserved through the storms of history.

The Reformers rejected all these sources but one, the Bible, and Tillich (but not he alone among Protestants) has abandoned the Bible in the sense of orthodox Protestantism. The Bible is not a clear statement of truth and practice but only a manifestation of God. It is filled with symbol, myth, legend, and indifference to history.[32]

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[32] Gustav Weigel, "Protestantism and Paul Tillich," *Theological Studies*, XI (1950), 200.

"Biblical research in Protestantism has shown the many levels of Biblical literature and the impossibility of considering the Bible as containing the infallible truth of faith."[33] The Bible, then, is not the ultimate criterion of the content of revelation—that criterion which Protestantism placed on the throne of Peter. Nor is it a medium of revelation in the sense which Catholics consider it; it is far too erroneous, too subjective, too human, too un-"inspired" for that role.

Nor are the Councils and Apostolic Traditions a medium of revelation or a norm for systematic theology. Tillich's attitude towards the dogmas of the Councils is, like his approach to the Bible, one of demythologizing. The Councils, and their formulations, dogmas, are only symbols pointing to the Christian message. These symbols were formulated into rational statements.

> Combining these symbols they constructed Christian myths. Thus the Creeds . . . are mythological epics. Their truth does not lie in the historical exactness of every detail of the picture but in the ability of those symbols to express the Unconditional appearing under the conditions of existence. Their value to the Church lasts as long as, and no longer than, their symbolic meaning is perceived. Dogmatic truths must be 'broken,' that is, understood symbolically. If we take them literally, we undermine their religious dimensions. Creeds and dogmas then become intellectual taboos that must be defended without regard to scientific honesty.[34]
>
> The systematic theologian cannot claim validity for the norm he uses by pointing to the Church Fathers, councils, creeds, etc. The possibility that all these have fallen into error must be maintained by Protestant theology as radically as Rome maintains the opposite.[35]

This passage summarizes Tillich's attitude towards Rome's concept of authority. From this he draws the conclusion that respect for tradition "is the reason for the dogmatic sterility of the Roman Catholic theology in contrast to its liturgical and ethical creativity and the great scholarship it develops in the area of Church history which are free from dogmatic prohibitions."[36]

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[33] Paul Tillich, *Dynamics of Faith, ed. cit.*, p. 92.
[34] Tavard, *op. cit.*, p. 116.
[35] S.T., I, p. 51.

To cling to dogmatic formulas, to hope for immutable truth in religion, to search for an accurate and meaningful theology is to look for new idols. Man must reject his greatest temptation to idolatry, the temptation to think he can know God or truth. True to the Reform, Tillich must reject the ability of sinful man to mirror God's work among men;[37] true to Kierkegaard, he must reject the possibility of Christ's effecting a real change within man, within the world.

Tavard points out that Barth called his theological synthesis "church dogmatics" whereas Tillich calls his a "systematic theology."[38] Tillich developed his intuitive principles into a system. In doing so, he denies traditional Christian dogmas. The creeds were adopted as a "protective formulation;"[39] Christianity had to accept them in those barbaric ages to survive. It was a necessary stage in the development of the Church, but it was only a stage. Tavard points out that for Tillich dogma is a product of theology, not a source. No revealed dogmas ever existed; there was no deposit of faith, no list of truths and practices, given to the Apostles and handed down. "There are no revealed doctrines, but there are revelatory events and situations which can be described in doctrinal terms."[40]

We can summarize in three points Tillich's attitude toward the nature of intelligible and immutable revelation and its determining norm.

First of all, revelation is doomed to change because it is an event rather than a truth. Every statement of it may or may not contribute to the religious life of an individual; value rather than truth is the norm. Catholics and orthodox Protestants make a very basic mistake. They "confuse eternal truth with a temporal expression of this truth."[41] It belongs to Protestantism to protect against any absolutizing of revelation by dogmatic statements.

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[36] S.T., I, p. 37. It is strange to have Tillich label Catholic theology as sterile, while Barth calls Mariology an "excresence" of theology, and Pelikan deplores Mariology as displayed in the "multi-volume theological opus."

[37] Paul Tillich, *Dynamics of Faith, ed. cit.*, p. 25.

[38] Tavard, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

[39] S.T., I, p. 38.

[40] Tavard, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

Secondly, the Bible and Councils are not, as they were traditionally thought to be, accurate norms and sources for theology.[42] They are sources along with later writings of Eastern and Western theologians and even alongside "the material presented by the history of religion and culture."[43] None of them may be turned into a norm. No statement is infallible. The norm is the vague expression "New Being."[44] If a truth contributes something toward understanding and living Christ's "New Being", then it belongs. to Christian revelation.

Thirdly, for man to think that there is a final norm, and especially for man to place that norm in his own mind or in the decisions of a person is blasphemy and idolatry—vices against which God has set Protestantism.

TILLICH'S PROTESTANT PRINCIPLE

Even before he had written his *Systematic Theology,* Tillich had discovered and propounded his Protestant Principle. The primary rule of life and action for the Churches of the Reform is also a matrix for Protestant theology. The principle has direct bearing on both of the topics which we have chosen to discuss: Mariology and revelation.

Paul Tillich's principle holds that it belongs to Protestantism to protect agianst idolatry. The idolatry which Protestantism opposes is the affirmation that man-made action, man-made formula or dogma can be ultimate and unreservedly meaningful or true when it touches God. This universal protest affirms God's transcendence, but denies man a stable position in relation to God. Tavard writes:

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[41] S.T., I, p. 125.
[42] S.T., I, p. 3.
[43] S.T., I, p. 38.
[44] Cf. Tavard, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-26.

> The principle of protest must make us deny man's self-complacency in respect to beliefs or doctrines that he can grasp and label his own. It must urge us to affirm God's victory in man's defeat, God's truth in man's untruth. No intellectual work justifies; what justifies the intellect is faith alone, grace alone.[45]

Certainly the first topic of this essay, Marian theology, must be conceived by the Protestant principle as possessing much which must be destroyed by protest. Norman Pittenger has written that Mariology since the proclamation of the Dogma of the Assumption is "mythology gone rampant."[46] As Tillich has pointed out, Mary as a medium of revelation contains little of "revelatory significance" for our age, and much (as the Papal pronouncements of the past century seem to show) of the "idolatrous side." This idolatrous aspect, however, is always being destroyed by the process of revelation through history. For the Protestant, Mary ceased to have revelatory significance by the middle of the sixteenth century. We would suppose, then, that four hundred years later her significance is drawing to a close for Catholics too.[47] Regardless, Mary as a medium of union with God and Christ reveals little to Protestantism.

It belongs to the Protestant principle, first and foremost, to protect against absolute formulations of God's message. No formula can be absolute; Tillich writes:

> Their function [i.e., credal formulations] is to point to the ultimate which is beyond all of them. This is why I call the Protestant principle the critical element in the expression of the community of faith and consequently the element of doubt in the act of faith. . . . The criterion of the truth of a symbol of faith is that it express the ultimate which is really ultimate. This criterion contains a Yes—it does not reject any truth of faith in whatever form it may appear in the history of faith—and it contains a No—it does not accept any truths of faith as ultimate except the one that no man possesses it.

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[45] *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.

[46] Norman Pittenger, "The Devotion to the Mother of Christ in Catholic Spirituality," *Anglican Theological Review* (1951), p. 71.

[47] It would be interesting to have Dr. Tillich's comment on the increase within the past century of Catholic Marian devotion and theology.

> The fact that this criterion is identical with the Protestant principle and has become reality in the Cross of Christ constitutes the superiority of Protestant Christianity.[48]

Tillich has said that even the Protestant sects made their credal statements of religious truth, of revelation, too absolute and thus betrayed the Protestant principle. But the Principle was preserved by the rational criticism of the Enlightenment. Protestantism itself had to be reformed from its absolutism. The nineteenth century performed this work.[49]

It is by constant progress in dogma that man remains somewhat true to God; the catalyst in this evolution is the Protestant principle.

> Every revelation is mediated by one or several of the mediums of revelation. None of these mediums possesses revelatory power in itself; but under conditions of existence the mediums claim to have it. This claim makes them idols and the breakdown of this claim deprives them of their power . . . if the revelation comes to an end the idolatrous side is destroyed. That which was revelatory in it is preserved as an element in more embracing and more purified revelations, and everything revelatory is potentially present in the final revelation, which cannot come to an end because the bearer of it does not claim anything for himself.[50]

This is a very compact statement of Tillich's unique terminology in expressing the substantial evolution of dogma. Eventual permanence and ultimate truth seem to be hinted at but not explained.

BRIEF CRITIQUE

The following critique must be brief for this reason. Tillich omits or contradicts so much of orthodox Christianity that to respond would demand the defense of huge segments of Catholic belief. The following criticism will point out only several arguments against Dr. Tillich's system in general, against his Christology and Mariology, and finally against his theory of dogmatic evolution without authority.

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[48] Paul Tillich, *Dynamics of Faith*, *ed. cit.*, pp. 29, 98.

[49] *Ibid.*

[50] S.T., I, p. 128.

REALITY

I

Basically Tillich's Christian theological system is neither Christian nor theological.[51] *It is not Christian because it has not accepted the message of Christ either in toto or in its essentials.* It has chosen certain elements while denying too many others: Christ is not divine; Christ did not extend himself and his message in time through the Church; Christ did not teach truths which men could grasp nor did he *impose* a moral code. Most Protestant groups, too, would place the above beliefs within the bounds of Christian faith. Catholicism would add still others. It seems that both sides of Christianity which claim to be orthodox must reject Tillich's system. For Christians, all that remains of his work is insights into the nature of contemporary human life, all that remains is existential terminology applied well to religious thought.

If Tillich's system is not Christian, it is also not really theological. It is a natural theology, but a metaphysics that came through faith. It is a phenomenology or ontology discoursing about theological terms.

> The first feeling of uneasiness the Catholic (and Protestant) experiences on reading Tillich is that his supernaturalism (a term he does not like) is upon ultimate reduction the purest naturalism. He rejects natural theology on principle but his whole theology is not only a natural theology, but more ominously a naturalistic theology.[52]

It is natural because, ultimately, there is no supernatural revelation, no supernatural way of life. If revelation can be contradictory, if it can cease to have any meaning at all for some men, yet still retain relevance for others, if God's message makes no demands, possesses no unity and logic, then either God did not reveal at all, or He did a very poor job of it. Secondly, there is no superatural life or destiny for the Christian. Existential philosophy does not look beyond this life; it is concerned wholly with the problems of this life; and because it is so immersed in this life, it can never offer a good answer. Is the "New Being" any more than Stoicism placed on sale for twentieth-century man? It certainly does not explain life or make it worthwhile. The Stoic ability to overcome difficult events in life could be, and has been, acquired without the message, mysteries, and life of Jesus Christ. Finally, the encounter with God through revelation is not a special gift of God, but an emotional, psychological, existential experience.

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[51] Here we are using "theological" in the more common sense of revealed religion, not in the sense of metaphysics or natural theology which so many Protestants deny.

[52] Gustav Weigel, "The Theological Significance of Paul Tillich," *loc. cit.* pp. 46-47.

Fr. Weigel warns against dismissing Tillich as "a naturalist or even as an atheist who speaks in biblical terms linked together by a shallow ontology."[53] Whether Tillich's ontology is shallow or not, it is nevertheless hard to follow Fr. Weigel's warning. In his use of philosophy Tillich offers theological and ethical treatises on God. Whether Tillich's system is based on the New Testament or not, his conclusions could have been derived from reason alone.

II

Mary plays, for Catholics, a part in the economy of salvation because of her divine motherhood. Through this she becomes associated with her Son; because of this is she sanctified and honored. "Her divine motherhood is her greatest treasure; all the other graces she has ever received in time or eternity converge on this."[54] However, for Tillich, Jesus is a man and the Christ is not divine. How important can Mary be?

It is difficult to argue against Professor Tillich's Christology upon which Mariology must be based. The sinful man, Jesus, dead forever on the cross, somehow became the idol, the *Kyrios,* the God of the early community as they wove story after story to satisfy psychological needs. What sources, written or spoken, can we bring against this theory; as far as Tillich is concerned they are all warped by faith.

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[53] *Ibid.*

[54] C.X.J.M. Friethoff, O.P., *A Complete Mariology* (Westminster: Newman, 1958), p. 208.

The only response to this is to go directly to the heart of the theory and say that it would be impossible for the various elements which made up the early Christian community—Judaeans, Galilleans, men, women, sinners, Pharisees, proselytes, childhood friends—to have agreed on the unified picture which the Gospels, the Epistles and the Apostolic Fathers offer us. The unanimous creation and presentation of the kerygma alone would have been impossible. The argument is still sound that the martyred contemporaries of Christ died not for an illusion, not for their own dream, but for a person whom they were hurrying to meet, and whom they believed worth their sacrifice. "May nothing visible or invisible prevent me from reaching Jesus Christ. Fire and cross, battling with wild beasts—let them all assail me, so long as I get to Jesus Christ.[55]

It is impossible for St. Paul's mysticism and St. Ignatius of Antioch's passionate religious love of Christ and ardent longing for martyrdom to have grown around a dead man or an escapist complex; it centers around a living person who is in the center of the superhuman, the apex of all things and the object of love.[56]

The writers of the New Testament claim to be witnesses to what they are relating whether it be miraculous or not. Their office of witness *to the Truth* is so sacred and important that the witnesses become the martyrs. They do not stop with their own testimonies, but call upon their contemporaries to corroborate their strange claims.

St. John wrote in his Gospel: "And he who saw it has born witness, and his witness is true; and he knows that he tells the truth, that you also may believe (John, 19:35) . . . This is the disciple who bears witness concerning these things, and we know that his witness is true (John, 21:24)." In his first Epistle, the same Apostle joins the spiritual with the concrete: "I write of what was from the beginning, what we have heard, what we have seen with our eyes, what we have looked upon and our hands have handled: of the Word of Life" (1 John, 1:1-2). St. Paul says that "if Christ is not risen, vain then is our preaching, and vain too is your faith." And then he relates not myths but facts: "Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures and that he was buried and that he rose again the third day according to the Scriptures, and then he appeared to Cephas and after that to the eleven." St. Paul adds emphatically, "Then he was seen by more than five hundred brethren at one time, many of whom are with us still . . ." (1 Cor. 15:13, 4-7). Their attitude seems to be exactly contrary to that of men who have no factual basis for their claims, men who realize occasionally in moments of truth that this whole scheme, this world-wide ecclesia with all of its historical, dogmatic, ethical, and liturgical claims is one huge deception. These early writers' attitude towards Christ is realistic and sound. It is rather Dr. Tillich's ideas which are someone's mental construct.

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[55] St. Ignatius of Antioch, "Letter to the Romans," PG 5, 692.

[56] Cf. Tavard, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

Must faith warp historical fact? Must belief eliminate knowledge? The relation of revelation-events and historical occurences, the interplay and contrast between faith and knowledge in contemporary Protestant theology is an inviting field. Without investigating it fully we can safely state that Dr. Tillich has not offered any reasons (other than his inheritance of the wreckage of Albert Schweitzer) why faith must falsify all other knowledge; why history and fact must disappear whenever faith draws near to them. Part of the Gospels are faith—we must believe that Jesus the man is also God; part of the Gospels are history—the multiplication of loaves before thousands; part of the Gospels are history for some and faith for others—Mary knew that Jesus was born of a virgin. Faith and historical knowledge exercise an interplay in Christianity; we do not feel that Dr. Tillich has demonstrated that faith for the early Christians or for us is a Kantian category which changes reality into creed by falsification. St. Thomas makes an interesting statement about faith, denying to it that Kantian aspect of divorce from reality which Tillich seems to embrace.

> The creed mentions things about which faith is, since the act of the believer is terminated in them. Now the act of the believer does not terminate in a mental proposition, but in reality. For just as in science we do not form propositions except in order to have knowledge about things, so it is in faith."[57]

Dr. Tillich's inability to find the historical Christ is simply a further wandering step in the quest for the historical Jesus, which quest Protestantism has frantically pursued for eighty years. Recent Biblical criticism is not of greater value than the unanimity of the early witnesses.

The metaphysical structure of Christ and the fact of Mary as *Theotokos* developed out of the controversy with Nestorius. Some are tempted to say that Tillich is a Nestorian, but this is not quite true. Nestorius held that there were two persons in Christ loosely joined, but he also held that they had been joined from the beginning of Christ's conception. He also held that one of these was the Second Person of the Trinity, God in the literal sense. Tillich's denial of the literally divine in Jesus or in Christ makes him less a Nestorian. His transformation of the sinful man, Jesus, to the exemplar, Christ, makes him more an Adoptionist.[58]

Before the end of the first century Christian heretics were claiming that Christ was a man adopted by God. Pope St. Victor had already condemned this sect in 190, although Paul of Samosata[59] (living around 260) was the outstanding proponent of this doctrine. "He denied the divinity of Christ and declared that Jesus was but an ordinary man to whom God had revealed Himself more than to any other prophet; to call him God was but a rhetorical figure of speech."[60] This sentence could have been taken from Tillich's Christology. Wellhausen, in the last century, revived this doctrine when he argued that Jesus became the Messiah at his Baptism. Tillich has changed the place of Jesus' adoption to Calvary, but the theology is the same.

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[57] St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae,* II-II, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2.

[58] F. Cayré, *Manual of Patrology* (Paris: Desclee, 1935), pp. 175-176.

[59] See Gustave Bardy, *Paul de Samosate* (Louvain: "SSL" Bureaux, 1923), pp. 242-279, 370-380.

[60] Cayré, *op. cit.,* p. 176.

Tillich's critique of Mariology as having or not having religious significance is an argument which is valid only if religion is purely subjective. Catholic Mariology—though it may appear to be so to Protestants—is not established on mental constructs. It is based upon certain reciprocal actions of God and a creature, Mary, who was chosen for a special mission in the work of salvation. Marian theology is based upon historical events, upon existential involvements such as Mary's acceptance of her maternity, her co-operation with grace, her day-to-day life, her attitude at Calvary. It is one thing to deny the historicity of Mary and her life, or most of it as we know it; then she has no meaning for anyone. But, if she is, as the Gospels of St. Luke, St. Matthew, and St. John describe her, she demands what Catholicism gives to her.

III

Tillich's acceptance of the evolution of dogma, and his denial of the expressibility of revelation by a human authority is also, oddly enough, best answered by an appeal to Scripture. In Scripture—from beginning to end—Jesus is portrayed as a teacher. He is called Rabbi, and even his opponents do not begrudge him that title. "Well answered, Master . . ." (Mark 12:32),[61] "Why do thy disciples . . ." (Mark 6:5), "No disciple is above his teacher . . ." (Matthew 10:24). Jesus always considered himself a teacher. He came to teach the truth, as a light, as a teacher, as a master, as a shepherd. All of these terms and all of the language of the New Testament center around either teaching or sacrifice. "You call me Master and Lord and you say well for so I am" (John 13:14). Christ is the Doctor, Teacher and Master of all nations. "In the days of His mortal life all the graces of light coming from the Divinity were united in His intelligence before being scattered among all men to illumine and enlighten them. . . . 'For I say to you, many prophets and just men have desired . . . to hear the things you hear and have not heard them'" (Matthew 13:17).[62]

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[61] The Greek word translated here as "master" is *didaskolos;* this word is often found so translated but sometimes the original New Testament word is the Aramaic for teacher, *Rabbi.*

Jesus was not only by vocation a teacher, but he was a new kind of teacher. St. Mark puts it very well. "And they were astonished at his teaching; for he was teaching them as one having authority, and not as the Scribes" (Mark 1:22). Jesus ordered his apostles to speak with authority. He was sending them to the world and to all ages as the Father, Truth itself, had sent Jesus. Whoever heard them heard Jesus. It is hardly likely that the message of the Rabbi Jesus or the Logos Jesus was that there could be *no* message in human terms. The Gospels give the impression that Jesus had a determined and detailed message, not that he censured all unwavering theology. That Christ should have left redeeming truth to the infinite discussions of men is not the message of the Evangelists; that it is unimportant and undiscernible whether a man was God or was not is incompatible with the notion that our God is loving or provident.

The Apostles, especially St. Paul, manifest a consciousness of the office of teacher. As the Father sent Jesus, Jesus sent Peter and the others; their work was propounding the same teaching.[63] The *kerygma,* Tillich has forgotten, was instruction in a creed and in an ethic. The early Christians after they had been received into the Church on Pentecost did two distinctive things: "They continued steadfastly in the teaching of the Apostles and in the communion of the breaking of the bread . . ." (Acts 2:42). Fr. Cerfaux has pointed out that St. Paul's concept of the Church steers a middle course between the schools of philosophers and the emotional mystery religions. One enters the Church through faith, that word which is identified by Paul with the Gospel, and which is also connected with the *didache* and *paradosis*.[64] The Church, then, professes a creed, and it is by acceptance of this creed that one enters the Church of Christ.

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[62] C. Journet, *The Church of the Word Incarnate* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1954), vol. I, p. 123.

[63] L. Cerfaux, *The Church in the Theology of Saint Paul* (Freiburg: Herder and Herder, 1959), p. 169.

It is also with the Apostles—Peter and Paul to be exact—that the notion of heretic enters. The Greek word means one who separates himself, one who belongs to a sect. The Christians were a sect and are at times designated by this term in the New Testament. But St. Paul and St. Peter inveigh against the sects, the heresies denying Church discipline (1 Cor. 11:9) or doctrine (Titus 3:10; II Peter 2:1), threatening the unity of Christ's body. From this we can draw the conclusion that Christian belief and practice were not left to the individual's whim, but that salvation and Church membership depended upon something objective, something real and immutable, not upon "individual revelatory significance."

Later in the Acts we see the definition of dogma and practice at the meeting of the Apostles in Jerusalem. False "teaching" is destroyed by the decision which "the holy Spirit and we" make (Acts 15:24). The attitude of the New Testament reflects a line of teaching —truthful and absolute. It begins with the Father sending Jesus Christ, the Rabbi and the Word; it continues with the Apostles who are fearful of "running . . . in vain" (Gal. 2:2). It enters the conciliar form early, and becomes embodied in the Papacy (as far as written records alone can show) with the first non-Petrine letter of a Bishop of Rome.

St. Clement writing to the divided Corinthians in A.D. 95[65] bases true Christianity, obedience to God, and ecclesiastical unity upon "firm faith . . . Christian piety . . . fullness and soundness of knowledge (*gnosis*).[66] The idea of an evolving revelation is alien to him; Tillich's idea of a faith without an intelligible and immutable object is unheard of.

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[64] *Ibid.*, pp. 198-204.

[65] J. Quasten, *Patrology* (Westminster: Newman, 1950), I, p. 49.

[66] St. Clement of Rome, *Letter to the Corinthians*, PG 1, 224 .

The Didache, "the most important document of the subapostolic period," is not a collection of meditations but a Church-Order. The title might lead us to think that it would contain the evangelical preaching of Christ. Instead it is a compendium of precepts of morality, of regulations pertaining to liturgy, and of beliefs.[67] The eleventh chapter makes unity in doctrine as the standard for reception into the Church. "If anyone comes to you and teaches all the aforesaid things, receive him. But, if a wicked person comes and teaches another doctrine to contradict this, do not listen to him."[68]

Finally, the early episcopacy, men ordained by St. John and St. Peter, are in dead earnest about the diamond-like immutability of teaching. It is upon doctrine, St. Ignatius says, that the Christian stands or falls: "Make no mistake, brethren. No one who follows another in schism inherits the Kingdom of God. No one who follows heretical doctrine is on the side of the Passion." "I beseech you to do all in the light of Christ's teaching. . . . For me, Jesus Christ is the written word, His cross and death and resurrection and faith through Him make up the untampered documents."[69] Christ is the central point of St. Ignatius' ideas, just as he is the source of Tillich's Systematics. Yet Christo-centricity moves Ignatius to depict the *innovators* in the darkest colors: False doctrines are the stench of the devil.[70]

Ignatius of Antioch is a mystic, and an existentialist; it is persons, events, sufferings which concern him just as they concern Protestant theology of today. Original, powerful and bold in rhetoric, the Bishop of Antioch is a deeply religious personality who remains concerned with the significance in doctrine of that Person and His events. St.

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[67] J. Quasten, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

[68] *The Didache*, from *The Apostolic Fathers*, edited by L. Schopp (New York: Heritage, 1947), p. 180.

[69] St. Ignatius of Antioch, *Letter to the Philadelphians*, PG 5, 700 and 704.

[70] St. Ignatius of Antioch, *Epistle to the Smyrneans*, PG 5, 782. For a complete list of St. Ignatius' epithets for innovators in doctrine, see Cayré, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

Ignatius' faith is alive and meaningful, but it is also intelligible and unchanging.[71]

Paul Tillich has with insight and originality formed a system which answers many Protestant doubts, stimulates minds, and inspires their hearts. But his "Christianity" is far removed from these men we have just quoted, men who were either real "witnesses and martyrs" of Christ or unbelievably deceived. Tillich's world is not the world of the New Testament or of the Apostolic Fathers. Tillich may be Protestant, but is he a Christian in the usual sense of the word, and in the last analysis is Christ really present in this theology? To phrase it differently, we might ask: Can Tillich be a Christian theologian of the twentieth century and contradict the theologians of the first century?

George Tavard has recently written a book on Paul Tillich: it is an adequate if not too well organized survey of his thought.[72] Fr. Tavard, however, omits any substantial critique. The critique of this very influential Protestant thinker remains to be written. Two trenchant lines of thought seem open. The first is to oppose the early writings —inspired and patristic—to Tillich's theories. The early writers propound a different notion of Christ and of revealed religion in general. Can these witnesses be brushed aside? The authority of the Apostolic Fathers and their writings is very important in any ecumenical work. These men are reliable witnesses as to what Jesus really taught and what the Church received in its constitution not only because of the period in which they lived but because of the character of their works. Their writings are not the fruit of their personal speculations but reflections of the practical circumstances which surrounded them. Their authority and apologetic value is thus greater than their intrinsic value. And, although they are inferior to the inspired Scriptures, they are free from that mass of controversy which surrounds the exegesis of important texts. Often the echo can be clearer and louder than the original voice; Ignatius and Clement are the echo of the Apostles' teaching.[73]

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[71] Protestant scholarship has found Ignatius' letters a field of controversy. "From the Protestant side the authenticity of the seven Letters was [in the 19th century] almost unanimously rejected, because they clearly proved the monarchical episcopate and the division of the hierarchy into bishop, presbyters and deacons. Today, after the brilliant defense of T. Zahn, F. X. Funck, J. B. Lightfoot and A. Harnack, the Letters are almost universally recognized as authentic." B. Altaner, *Patrology* (Freiburg: Herder and Herder, 1959), p. 107.

[72] Tavard, *op. cit.*

The second line of thought is to show how Tillich's insights frequently touch the truth. How are "New Being" and grace similar? Cannot Tillich's denial of original sin be reconciled with the triple distinction of the state of original justice, pure nature, fallen nature? Is he as opposed to analogy as he claims to be?[74]

Paul Tillich is of great ecumenical importance today. Few Protestant professors or pastors accept him completely; all read him and are influenced by him. His thought waits not only to be answered, but to be baptized.

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[73] Cayré, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

[74] Weigel discusses Tillich and analogy in his "Protestantism and Paul Tillich," *art. cit.* Tillich's remarks on the subject at the end of the essay are encouraging.

THOMAS CLEATOR, O.P.

THE MORALITY OF PRIZE-FIGHTING

Fighting ain't fun.
It's like war.
Either I'm gonna hurt him
or he's gonna hurt me.
Sonny Liston

On March 31, 1962 Welterweight Champion Benny (Kid) Paret stepped into the ring at Madison Square Garden to defend his title against Challenger Emile Griffith. At 12:30 a.m. the following day, doctors were operating in a desperate attempt to relieve the enormous pressure of blood collecting under the lining of Paret's brain. The effort to save his life was futile. Emile Griffith had killed Paret in the 12th round with a succession of some twenty punches to the head. Despite the fact that Ruby Goldstein, a veteran of more than 19 years and 500 fights as referee, was in charge that night, it had been a massacre.

No sooner had the ring been cleared and the television sets turned off, than the American people began to question once again, "Was this just an unfortunate accident? Could prize-fighting still be considered the manly and praiseworthy art of self-defense? Or was the Paret case another 'shocking reminder of boxing's basic brutality,'[1] a sign that there was, after all, something intrinsically immoral in the sport?" This paper is an attempt to answer these questions.

We may begin by saying that the sport is "innocent until proven guilty," for the general consensus of opinion appears to be that prize-fighting is licit. This clearly places the burden of proof on those who claim that it is immoral. For this reason we will devote a greater part of the article to an examination of the arguments against the sport, and in the light of their truth or falsity we will make a final evaluation. It should be remembered that unless the context indicates otherwise, we will be talking only about prize-fighting, that is, the professional aspects of boxing.

ARGUMENTS FOR BOXING

"There must be some good in the life of battle," Chesterton once said, "for so many good men have enjoyed being soldiers." The advocates of prize-fighting are not slow to apply this to their sport. For boxing is not only a unique and exciting contact sport, they maintain; it is also an invaluable asset to our country's well-being. They point to the role which prize-fighting has played in developing soldiers. They bring out the fact that it is a delinquency deterent, keeping boys off the streets and enabling young men to rise from destitution to respectable positions in society. Prize-fighting also builds character, they say, because it teaches the important lesson of standing alone, and provides the conquest of fear, "the greatest conquest of all." Finally, this sport teaches the extreme value of hard training and top-notch physical conditioning, and gives Americans that spirit of rough and ready competitiveness so necessary for a vital society.[2] Theodore Roosevelt summed it up when he wrote:

> . . . I regard boxing, professional and amateur, as a vigorous, healthful sport that developes courage, keenness of mind, quickness of eye, and a spirit of combativeness that fits every boy who engages in it for the daily tasks that confront him.

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[1] *Time*, 79 (April 6, 1962), 52.

[2] See Harvey L. Miller, *Would You Call This Murder?* (Washington, D.C.: C. K. and H. L. Miller, 1951), *passim*.

> It is not half so brutalizing or demoralizing as many forms of big business, and certain legal work that is often carried on to help such business.
>
> I have often thought that if we had more boys' clubs where the manly art was taught, we would have fewer youthful criminals, the street corner type of hoodlum, and would breed a better class of young American citizens—the future voters. Boxing develops elements of character that are difficult to obtain in other sports—fairness, the spirit of give-and-take, courage and alertness.[3]

While pointing out its value, even the proponents of professional boxing concede that it is also a rough sport. Nevertheless, as Father Michael O'Donnell has stated, the game is encouraged by men who stand well in society and who are by no means advocates of disorder, brutality or violations of the fifth commandment.[4] The knockout implies no more than the incapacity to get on one's feet within the short space of ten seconds, it is said, and "if this were sufficient reason to brand boxing as immoral there would be no reason why football and other games too, should not be similarly branded."[5]

ARGUMENTS AGAINST BOXING

That the Object Is to Injure

Despite these arguments, the non-enthusiasts of prize-fighting continue to repudiate the sport. Two of their accusations are especially important. The first is that the very object of the sport is to injure the opponent. The fifth commandment prohibits deliberate harm to the human body except when necessary to save life or health, or as a just punishment. It would be immoral to intend physical damage on behalf of sport. Prize-fighting could, of course, be merely an exhibition in self-defense whereby two men test their ability to get by the opponent's guard and at the same time to block his thrusts, without any intention of striking him severely or of doing injury. In this event the prize-fight is quite legitimate. But is this the case? There is only one way to answer that question. We must make a close examination of the rules and their interpretation by the officials, the boxers, the sports writers and fans themselves.

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[3] Quoted by Nat Fleischer, *Fifty Years at Ringside* (New York: Fleet Publishing Corp., 1958), p. 23.

[4] Michael O'Donnell, *Moral Questions*, ed. Sebastian Lee (Dublin: Standard House, 1945), p. 129.

[5] *Ibid.*

The Rules: The rules certainly do make some provision for the safety of the fighters. For example, when knocked down the contestant must take an eight count; the ring must be properly padded; the referee has the right to stop the fight when a contestant is in danger of serious damage by continuing. However, there seems to be a little more involved than the mere giving and parrying of light blows. In the third section of the New York State Boxing Rules, we read:

> The decisions of the referee and judges shall be based primarily on effectiveness, taking into account the following points: 1. A clean, forceful hit, landed on any vulnerable part of the body above the belt line should be credited in proportion to its damaging effect.

And again:

> It shall be discretionary with ring officials to award the contest to a boxer who has won a lesser number of rounds than his opponent only in cases where in the judgment of the ring officials said contestant has inflicted the greater amount of damage and has proven his definite superiority over his opponent, during the contest, and finished in better physical condition.[6]

That the word "damage" is to be taken literally as meaning physical damage we know through the testimony of boxing's number one authority, Mr. Nat Fleischer.[7]

The officials. The officials themselves do not seem to have any doubt in their mind about the interpretation of these rules. One famous boxing coach said that there was only one rule by which to judge the winner of a bout. He said that he selected the contestant he would prefer to be at the end of the bout—the one who got knocked down or whacked around less. Points and rounds mean nothing.[8]

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[6] Cited by John Grombach, *The Saga of Sock* (New York: A. S. Barnes, 1949), p. 342.

[7] "The rule to which you refer means that the effectiveness of a blow—how hard it is delivered and the damage incurred—must be taken into consideration when scoring. Yes, it refers to bodily damage."—Statement in a personal letter dated July 17, 1961.

Ruby Goldstein also revealed his philosophy of scoring:

> No matter what happens, the knockdown is going to be worth at least two points (out of a possible three), even if the fighter who scored it is outfought at all other times during the round. The clean, sharp knockdown is one of the major thrills in boxing.[9]

Harold Barnes, ex-senior official of the New York State Athletic Commission judged prize-fights for thirty seven years. He estimates that he officiated at six thousand fights, including two thousand main events and one hundred championships. Such a prominent authority as this is now leading a campaign to abolish boxing, and he too has stated: "The worst thing about ring damage, as far as I am concerned, is that it is premeditated. . . . It is the only sport in which the definite objective is to injure an opponent sufficiently to knock him out."[10]

There are also various broadcasters who have given the home fans some advice as to how they should score the bout. What do they recommend? Ed Pazur tells them that

> the most important single factor is clean, forceful punching to any vulnerable part of the body above the belt line. The blows should be judged on the basis of their damaging effects. . . . A clean knockdown, being the closest approach to a knockout, should be scored heavily. . . . When a physician is summoned by the referee it indicates a fighter has been hurt and your scorecard should be marked accordingly. Try to judge the extent of the injury.[11]

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[8] Cited by J. Grombach, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

[9] Cited by Joseph Williams, *TV Boxing Book* (New York: Van Nostrand Co., 1954), p. 178.

[10] Harold R. Barnes, "Let's Abolish Boxing," *Look*, 31 (October 25, 1958), 133.

[11] Ed Pazur, "How to Score That Fight," *Television Boxing Guide* (Chicago: Windsor Press, 1954), pp. 30-31.

Jack Dress believes that the first criterion to consider is a good punch, and he regards Marciano as an excellent fighter because he can knock out anyone.[12] Jack Gregson also counsels the television listeners that aggressiveness overrules defense, that they should watch the number and the *impact* of the blows, that they should check for damaging wallops. "Keeping a tight tally on these damaging punches," he says, "is perhaps the most important element in scoring a ring battle. All the fancy swings and wild haymakers can be discounted."[13]

The boxers. It would seem, then, that if the boxer wants to get anywhere in his profession, he must do a little more than make a brilliant break through the opponents's defense. He must hit the adversary with all his might. The boxers themselves admit this. Most of them might not enjoy hurting their opponent, but they rationalize it as a business necessity. And they certainly all agree that there is nothing which builds up their prestige more than a long list of victories by knockout. But again, let us hear the affirmation of the pugilists themselves.

In his advice to prospective fighters, Jack Dempsey urges, "To protect yourselves with your fists, you *must* become a knockout puncher." Following his instructions, "You'll be able to use your fists so destructively and practically that, with experience, you'll be able to move into amateur and even professional competition."[14]

Peruse the autobiography of Joe Louis and you will see him describe one thrilling knockout after the other and tell you that, "I was glad to have another K.O. to add to my record."[15]

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[12] Jack Dress, "My TV Champion," *Television Boxing Guide* (Chicago: Windsor Press, 1954), p. 16.

[13] Jack Gregson, "TV Can Be Deceiving," *Television Boxing Guide* (Chicago: Windsor Press, 1954), pp. 23-24.

[14] Jack Dempsey, *Championship Fighting—Explosive Punching and Aggressive Defense* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950), p. 21.

[15] Joe Louis, *The Joe Louis Story* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1953), p. 21. Even in a private gym with his sparring partners, Joe Louis hit so hard that no one would go more than a round with him. *Ibid.*, p. 66.

We might also quote from an article in *True* by Jake La Motta:

> What happened next was all reflex, like what happens in the ring when you know you have your opponent in trouble and want to finish him off. You see the opening and before you can think about it the punch has landed. . . .
>
> Only in the third did I accomplish something that made me feel like the oldtime La Motta. I banged his body good, then staggered him with a right to the heart, one of my favorite punches.[16]

Gene Tunney described prize fighting as "two men on public exhibition, paid to beat each other to the floor, unconscious or helpless."[17] Ezzard Charles told Joe Williams that he hoped to cut up Marciano so badly that the referee would have to stop the fight.[18] After killing Jimmy Doyle in the ring, Sugar Ray Robinson was asked if he knew that Doyle was in trouble. His reply was: "Hurten people is my business."[19]

Finally, Gus Lesnevich, *Ring* magazine's 1947 boxer of the year, describing one of his fights, declared:

> Right after the bell he tagged me, and I stepped inside the blow and hit him right on the potato. He showed no signs of being hurt but a couple of seconds later I saw one leg slide as though he would go down. That punch was just catching up with him. I took a quick look at his eyes and figured it was a good spot to move in. I did.[20]

The sportswriters. The men outside the ring, the sportswriters and fans, also concur on what is the object of the "manly art". Grombach, in his *Saga of Sock*, gives a few instructions on how to box. Like

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[16] Jake La Motta, "Honest Fighters Finish Last," *True*, 42 (April, 1961), 110, 119.

[17] Gene Tunney, "Courage Is a Business," *Saturday Evening Post*, 212 (June 1, 1940), 58.

[18] Cited by Joseph Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

[19] Cited by Nathan Hare, *art. cit.*, p. 27.

[20] Quotation in *Ring*, later cited by Dr. Arthur H. Steinhaus on a radio debate, June 3, 1950. See, "Is Boxing Legalized Murder?" *American Forum of the Air*, XIII, n. 28 (Washington D.C.: Ransdell, 1950), p. 11.

Jack Dempsey, he too advises that the primary purpose of boxing is hitting, and he defines hitting as "the art of obtaining maximum power in a blow with the fist."[21]

Nat Fleischer delineates the qualities that make a good fighter. They are the ability to deliver a crushing blow, the ability to stand up against punishment, and the ability to avoid punishment through ring cleverness.[22] The emphasis here is certainly not on technique.

Bill Stern also recognizes that ring cleverness is important for a good fighter, "but it takes the killer instinct to make a great one. The man without the urge to murder the man in the ring with him may find the road to fame and fortune an elusive one."[23] Mr. Stern proffers an example of what he means. Hughey Walker, a promising young middleweight, faced the experienced Jack Dillon, and won an easy decision. However, sentiment for the Giant Killer kept him from knocking Dillon out. Our reporter comments upon this:

> It was, in a way, a sad day for Hughey Walker, too. Failure to score the knockout which was in his grasp spelled the finish of his own title aspirations. Hughey could never again work himself up to great heights in the ring. . . . The spark of genius had fled, the spark kindled in the Dillon fight that might have led to a championship.[24]

Many sportswriters have directly criticized the ethics of the ring. Their opinion is no different from what we have seen so far. For instance, Joe Williams in his work, *TV Boxing Book,* noted:

> The fighter's code of ethics is hard to rationalize. He will hit after a break or commit some comparable indignity and right away he must take time out to apologize, briefly touching his oppent's gloves while he murmurs his regrets for all to see, even if they cannot hear. But give him an open wound to work on and he will keep punching away at it all night in the detached, unemotional hope of

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[21] J. Grombach, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

[22] Nat Fleischer, *op. cit.*, p. 274.

[23] Bill Stern, *Bill Stern's Favorite Boxing Stories* (New York: Pocket Books, 1948), p. 45.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 47.

> the professional fighting man that his oppenent will either get sick of the whole thing or the referee will be forced to stop the fight. Far from inviting total scorn as a savage barbarian, the fighter who has a special talent for working on an open wound is admired and esteemed in the trade for his ruthless sharpshooting.[25]

Paul Gallico wrote in the *Daily Mail* of September 6, 1955:

> I have covered boxing, promoted boxing, watched it, thought about it, and after long reflection I cannot find a single thing that is good about it from the point of view of either participant or spectator. It brings out the worst in human beings.
>
> As entertainment it is uncivilized; as exercise it is contradictory and ridiculous, as a means of self-defense it is wholly absurd. . . .
>
> The first rule of the sport is to weaken the opponent by belaboring him in painful and vulnerable spots such as the kidneys, the stomach, the solar plexus, and the heart, as well as the head. If a cut or abrasion appears on the face, this must be enlarged. A broken nose is to be hammered, a torn ear further lacerated.
>
> Yet the low punch is barred and called foul and when used causes the sportsmen among the spectators to seethe with indignation and cry out in anger, demanding punishment for the guilty party while every wallop to the head and jow, eyes, nose, and ears, all of the delicate sensory organs, is hailed with delight and cheered, particularly when those blows bruise, maim, cut and tear.
>
> I reproach myself when I recall that I invented and started the Golden Gloves Amateur Boxing Tournament and, by glamorizing and publicizing a useless, dangerous sport, am responsible for hundreds of young men becoming professional prize-fighters. If there is a chapter in my life I would care to erase it is this one.[26]

The spectators. Jack Dempsey once told an Englishman, "In your country fighting is a gentleman's business, but here . . . it is that of a dog. All that the people on this side want to see is blood."[27]

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[25] J. Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

[26] Cited by Dr. Arthur H. Steinhaus, "Should the Sport of Boxing be Discontinued, Yes!" *Physical Educator of Phi Epsilon Kappa*, 14 (December, 1957), 131. I have inverted paragraph order for greater cohesion of thought.

[27] Trevor Wignall, *The Sweet Science* (Chapman and Hall, 1926), p. 138.

Jack could speak from experience. When he knocked out Fred Fulton in eighteen seconds the crowd took such delight that the police had to be called out to protect the hero.[28] After Dempsey knocked Jess Willard down for the seventh time in the first round, the cheers of the appreciative crowd were so loud that no one heard the bell.[29]

Gene Tunney gives what he considers a revealing case of spectator reactions. He was matched with Eddie Josephs at a fight club on Staten Island, New York. Eddie was a local boy and the throng was all for him. But by the last round Eddie had two teeth knocked out and three ribs broken. His strength was gone. In a clinch he asked Gene not to disgrace him by knocking him out. Gene agreed. However,

> the crowd wanted a knockout. The crowd always does. Having screamed for their home town boy to kill me, they now wanted him killed. Paradoxical, but they wanted the kill. They yelled to me, "Knock him out." When I failed, the crowd became uglier. "Fake, fake, throw the bum out!" Referee Parsy Haley said: "Come on, Gene, don't spoil a good fight." I was so disgusted with the bloodthirsty yap of the mob that I refused to lay a glove on Eddie Josephs until the final bell rang. The bout ended in a storm of howling and booing."[30]

When the referee stopped one of the Rocky Graziano-Charlie Fusari fights because Fusari could no longer defend himself, the fans booed for five minutes. They started throwing pop bottles when the Tuzo Portugues-Paddy Young match was halted because of a three inch cut over Young's eye which could have meant blindness.[31]

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[28] Gene Schoor, *The Jack Dempsey Story* (New York: Julian Messner, 1954), p. 96.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 113.

[30] Gene Tunney, *Arms for Living* (New York: Wilfred Funk, 1941), p. 184.

[31] George Bernard, C.S.C., *The Morality of Prizefighting*, The Catholic University of America Studies in Sacred Theology, Second Series, No. 71 (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1952), p. 28.

And they booed La Motta too: once when he could not knock out Mitri, and another time when he would not hit Tommy Yarosz, who was helpless on the ropes.[32]

Evaluation. We cannot forestall the accusation that the object is to injure by saying that the object is rather to win, for entertainment, money or the like. We are not judging an individual's reasons for entering the ring (the *finis operantis*); we are evaluating the actions he performs when he is in there (the *finis operis*). In this regard the examples given are certainly illustrative. And they indicate that although speed, footwork and the other boxing skills may have their place in prize-fighting, the power of the punch is the primary thing; that although the opponents do not want to maim each other for life, they have no objections to cutting an eye, breaking a nose, or beating the other helplessly to the floor. Granted, not every spectator is bloodthirsty and at times skill plays a more important role than power. Yet, these seem to be the exceptions rather than the rule. It is in fights such as the one in which Dempsey battered Willard for three brutal rounds, or when Joe Louis destroyed Schmelling in 2:04 of the first round, that are considered "the moments that brighten the pages of boxing history."[33] This is the testimony of the boxing world itself, and if the men who play the game do not know what it is all about, who does?

That It Is a Dangerous Act

Not only is the intent of prize-fighting injury to the opponent, its adversaries maintain, but the injury produced is actually far worse than was ever intended. For boxing consistently causes severe bodily damage of a definite type and pattern. This gives its decriers their second argument, namely, that prize-fighting is a dangerous exhibition cultivated without sufficient reason. Even conceding all the advantages presented at the beginning of this paper, they are not sufficient to justify prize-fighting as such. But again, we must seek the facts. Let us present a very brief survey of what the doctors have reported.

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[32] J. La Motta, *art. cit.*, p. 117.
[33] Nat Fleischer, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

Types of injury. One very delicate organ often subject to direct blows in boxing is the eye. According to Dr. C. Albaugh and several other opthalmologists who have studied the situation, these blows are "usually severe enough to cause profound pathological changes," which hamper and often effect of complete loss of vision.[34] The neighboring structures of the eye also sustain injury quite frequently. For example, Dr. Favory claims that there exists in fighters a traumatic ocular malady, quite individualized, and characterized by a paralysis of the superior oblique muscle of the left eye. This in itself is sufficient to hinder eyesight.[35]

Regarding the nose, Doctor E. Laforet stated quite poetically that, "It is the rare boxer whose nose retains for long its pristine configuration."[36] The nose of the pugilist is considered a distinct clinical entity and performing surgery upon it is similar to working a jig saw puzzle.[37] Still, extreme disfiguration is only part of the story. Defacement of the nose also affects the air passages, either partially or completely closing them by permanent swelling or abnormal growth of new cartilage or bone. This in turn has its effect on the other nasal passages and processes, producing discomforting and painful afflictions such as sinusitis and pharyngitis throughout the rest of life.[38] Many ring combatants completely lose their sense of smell.[39] Moreover, one doctor alone has witnessed at least two occasions where the perpendicular plate of the ethmoid was fractured, with penetration of the cribiform plate and consequent injury to the brain substance.[40]

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[34] C. H. Albaugh, "Eye Problems in Boxing," *Journal of the International College of Surgeons,* 17 (February, 1952), 191. See also, Boshoff and Jokl, "Boxing Injuries of the Eyes," *Archives of Opthalmology,* 39 (1948), 643-644; and J. Doggart, "The Impact of Boxing upon the Visual Apparatus," *American Medical Association Archives of Opthalmology,* 54 (August, 1955), 161-169. It is interesting to note that Jack Dempsey would not agree to a third bout with Gene Tunney because of the battering he had taken around the eyes. "He dread the horror that has befallen so many ring fighters and is the terror of them all—the damage that comes from too many punches around the eyes, blindness." Gene Tunney, "The Truth About My Fights with Jack Dempsey," *Sport,* 6 (May, 1949), 107.

[35] Albert Favory, "Les Lesions Oculaires Dues a la Boxe de Combat," *La Presse Medicale,* 45 (1937), 254.

[36] Eugene Laforet, "Boxing: Medical and Moral Aspects," *Lincare Quarterly,* 25 (May, 1958), 60.

[37] Samuel Cohen, "The Nose of the Pugilist," *The Eye, Ear, Nose, and Throat Monthly,* 28 (1949), 319.

The kidneys also take their punishment. No study has yet been made as to the long range consequences, but tests have demonstrated that fighters experience acute trauma of the kidneys, and the severity is in direct proportion to the length of the fight. Exercise alone will not do this.[41]

Yet all these injuries fade into relative insignificance when compared to the danger of mutilation to the brain. It is not necessary to fracture the skull in order to damage the mental organ. First of all, the skull possesses a considerable degree of elasticity. Under a force, such as a powerful blow to the chin, the skull undergoes momentary change of shape. Intracranial space is reduced, causing tremendous pressure on the brain. Injury results.[42] Secondly, jarring of the brain itself may cause damage. The brain is not tied down but rests loosely in a fluid within the cranium. A blow to the head, then, will cause the brain to knock against the walls of the cranium. If it is severe enough, damage will occur.[43] The impact of the brain against the cranium walls is especially dangerous when we realize that the base of the skull is very irregular with fossae and arches, some of the latter having sharp angles, like those about the sphenoids, and still deeper depressions, such as those about the foramina and dural septa.

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[38] G. Bernard, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

[39] Jokl, *Medical Aspect of Boxing* (Pretoria, South Africa: Van Schaik, 1941), p. 113.

[40] Albert P. Seltzer, "Surgery of the Pugilist Nose," *Annals of Otology, Rhinology and Laryngology*, 59 (1952), 924.

[41] R. Amelar and C. Solomon, "Acute Renal Trauma in Boxers," *Journal of Urology*, 72 (August, 1954), 147.

[42] Harry E. Mock, *Skull Fractures and Brain Injuries* (Baltimore: Williams and Wilkings, 1950), pp. 137 f., 162; see also, Jokl, *op. cit.*, pp. 155 f. concerning the 1939 experiments of Dill and Isenhaur.

[43] H. Mock, *op. cit.*, pp. 164 f.; and Jokl, *op. cit.*, pp. 100 f.

There are many types of injury which may result in the brain through the sport of prize-fighting. The most serious, of course, would be death produced by hemorrhages and severe concussions. But once again, this is not the complete picture. Any heavy blow is likely to cause minute hemorrhages in the brain which will destroy nerve tissue. Most vulnerable, perhaps, are the frontal lobes, resting against the sharp sphenoidal ridge. These lobes, from the viewpoint of normal intellectual function, are the most important part of the brain.[44]

We must not think that because there is not an immediate paralysis or change in behavior no damage has occurred to the brain. The injury sustained in one or two fights might, in itself, be small. The damage, nevertheless, is permanent and accumulative, so that there will be gradual changes in the mental patterns of individuals.[45]

These transformations are commonly manifested in the syndrome termed "punchdrunkeness." Dr. E. H. Carroll studied this disease for two years in its natural habitat. He has drawn a composite picture of the typical punch drunk. A young man begins training in a gym, has thirty to forty amateur bouts and then graduates to the professional level. He meets stiffer competition and engages in longer fights, so that after about four years he begins to "soften up." After being struck on the jaw, he remains dazed for a longer period of time than before, his legs become shaky and numb, and he is more likely to be knocked out. His timing begins to fail, his defense becomes more sluggish. His knees tend to give way after a head blow, and a slight dragging of the feet becomes apparent. The manager and friends of the boxer notice changes in him, deterioration in attention, concentration and memory. He changes the subject frequently, goes into reverie, repeats the questions he asks, and becomes too sociable and voluble. An impediment develops in his speech and the eyes take on a staring expression. He always seems a little drunk.[46]

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[44] C. Shelden, R. Pudenz, and J. Restarski, *The Lucite Calvarium, A Method for Direct Observation of the Brain,* II: Cranial Trauma and Brain Movement, Research Project X-182, Report no. 2 (Bethseda, Maryland: National Naval Medical Center, Jan. 28, 1946); and Ward C. Halstead, *Brain and Intelligence—A Quantitative Study of the Frontal Lobes* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), p. 135. A man's ability to behave in an orderly way and to direct his actions toward a goal depends especially on these areas. The memories for skills and ways of doing things are also here.

[45] In a questionnaire sent out by the University of Illinois in 1940, 71% of the neurologists and psychiatrists who replied said that repeated blows to the head over a period of two to four years can cause gradual changes in the mental patterns of an individual. Cited by Bernard, *op. cit.,* p. 172. Dr. Steinhaus also claims that Dr. Pampus of the Neurological Institute of Bonn University discovered that brain waves taken after a second knockout remain abnormal for a much longer time than after

Many other doctors have written on this disease and there is an amazing unanimity among them. They all describe the symptoms in words rather similar (though more technical) to those of Dr. Carroll. They all assert that it is a brain injury coming from repeated blows to the head. They are all very careful to distinguish this disease from others which closely resemble it, such as syphillis.[47]

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the first. According to Dr. Steinhaus, this proves that the damage is accumulative. See, "Should the Sport of Boxing be Discontinued. Yes!" *ed. cit.*, p. 131. In his study, Dr. Edward Carroll states that in five years a full 60% of the boxers will develop nervous and emotional changes which are obvious to those who knew them previously. See, "Punchdrunk," *The American Journal of Medical Science*, 191 (1936), 709. Busse and Silverman also reported that fighters who had been knocked out showed more severe disturbance than those who had not. However, their study was too small to be conclusive. See, "Electro-encephalographic Changes in Professional Boxers," *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 149 (1952), 1522.

[46] Edward J. Carroll, *art. cit.*, p. 707.

[47] See A. Bourguignon, "La Cranio-encephalopathie traumatique des boxeurs (donees nouvelles)," *La Semaine des Hopitaux de Paris*, 26 (1950), 301-2; and H. Martland, "Punch Drunk," *Journal of the American Medical*

REALITY

Proximity of injury. These are the occupational hazards of the "manly art," but just how proximate are they? In reference to mortality there seems to be a ratio of approximately one death per thousand participants. According to Father George Bernard C.S.C., this would make boxing eighteen times more lethal than professional football.[48] Concerning other injuries, however, it is most difficult to determine. No statistics are available.

Yet this does not leave us without any norm for a moral judgment. The diseases and injuries possess enough regularity to be catalogued, analyzed, and even given the name of professional stigmas. It is true that one should be careful of medical reports, since doctors sometimes generalize too hastily. But in this case several doctors working independently of one another have come to the same conclusions. This seems to be a reasonable sign that the danger is rather proximate.

Some doctors have given approximations in regard to brain injury. Dr. H. Martland stated that almost fifty percent of boxers develop mental and presonality changes.[49] Dr. E. Carroll claimed that after five years a full sixty percent of the boxers will develop nervous and

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Association, 91 (1928), 1103-7; and J. Millspaugh, "Dementia Pugilistica," *United States Naval Medical Bulletin,* 35 (1937), 297-302; and H. Parker, "Traumatic Encephalopathy (Punch Drunk) of Professional Pugilists," *The Journal of Neurology and Psychopathology,* 15 (July, 1934), 20-28; and E. Sevileano, "Maladie de Parkinson de boxeurs professionnels," *Entretiens de Bichat, Médecine* (Paris: Expansion Scientifique Française, 1948), pp. 251-254; and G. Will, "Punch Drunk," *Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps,* 72 (1939), 289-92. These are some of the many articles which have been written on this subject.

[48] Bernard, *op. cit.,* pp. 98f. Mr. Nat Fleischer estimates (personal letter, July 17, 1961) that there have been about 400 deaths between 1900 and 1960 with approximately 500,000 participants. These statistics include amateur boxing. Although they give no statistics, an editorial in *Industrial Medicine and Surgery* claims that boxing is the nation's most dangerous trade. See 20 (1951), 571-2.

[49] Martland, *art. cit.,* p. 1103.

emotional changes which are obvious to those who knew them previously, and that five percent will be punch drunk.[50] Doctor La Cava came to the conclusion that twenty-five percent of professional fighters will be in one stage or another of this disease after eight years, and another twenty-five percent will show some chronic changes after a period of about ten years.[51] Unfortunately, we will probably never attain perfectly accurate statistics about brain injuries, but Millspaugh expressed a very common opinion when he said that "some escape the most and worst, but few, if any, escape all signs and symptoms."[52]

Millspaugh's statement seems quite reasonable when we consider, first of all, that in boxing the majority of blows are aimed at the head. Secondly, the constant pounding weakens the muscular support of the head. This leads to extreme flexion, extension and rotation of the head, and experiment has shown that the more the head is free to bounce around, the greater the damage will be.[53] Thirdly, the boxer strikes the head with a terrific amount of power. Marciano's punch has been measured as high as nine hundred and twenty-five foot pounds.[54] Even a one hundred and forty-five pound amateur packs up to six hundred foot pounds behind his punch.[55]

Injury to the brain is no new concept to the fighting world. The world of boxing was, in fact, the first to recognize and catalogue the various degrees of punchdrunkeness. As an indication of this, let us quote from two ex-pugilists. The first is unidentified, but he writes to Dr. Steinhaus, one of the crusaders against the sport:

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[50] Carroll, *art. cit.*, p. 709.

[51] See Bernard, *op. cit.*, pp. 82f.

[52] J. A. Millspaugh, "Dementia Pugilistica," *art., cit.*, p. 301.

[53] C. Harris, "Dangers for Boxers," (correspondence) *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 157 (1955), 612, citing the experiments of Tedeschi in *Procedings of the Society of Experimental Biology and Medicine*, 57 (1944), 264.

[54] J. Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 146 It is interesting to note that Bob Feller's fastest pitch has a power of only 900 foot pounds, and the most powerful handgun a power of only 690 foot pounds.

[55] Dr. Arthur H. Steinhaus, "Boxing—Legalized Murder?" *Look*, 14 (January 3, 1950), 39.

> All the best retired boxers agree with you on head blows and what damage they do to you in the ring. I fought in the ring for fifteen years. Now my hearing is gone. My eyesight is failing. I can notice by the talk and accent of retired boxers that they are losing their memory and their hearing.[56]

The second witness is Abe Simon who describes punchdrunkeness in these words:

> The changes are so slow and subtle that a fighter doesn't notice what is happening. One day he will realize that he can't step down from a curb with a spring, but he won't tell his manager. He won't tell a Boxing Commissioner or the examining physician. He thinks it'll go away. It never does. Instead, something else develops to plague him. Perhaps it will be his hearing. He never associates hearing with his brain. . . . He hasn't even a cauliflower ear, and can't remember getting slugged in the ear, so how can the faulty hearing be due to punches?
>
> Each subtle affliction is defended as it turns up and the fighter continues to give and take it. If there should be a head pain . . . he will take an aspirin and charge the pain to a particular punch. . . . Pretty soon his walking is affected, for he has trouble maintaining balance unless he spreads his legs and shifts the weight of his body from side to side as he walks. He is now "on his heels" as we say in boxing. The spring has gone with his step.
>
> The fighter, believe me, knows that something is wrong. He won't complain, because someone might call him yellow, and he trails the will-o-the-wisp "it'll go away," until he gets disgusted and tries to fight his way back to health. To cover up his secret fear, his horror and self-consciousness at feeling deficient among others, he forms the habit of laughing continually, throwing words and comments around until finally he hears: "Shut up! You're punchy. . . ."[57]

At the injury of her husband, Mrs. Lucy Paret declared that she hated boxing. She did not think that it should be prohibited, however, because if the Kid had not been hurt, "he would have continued to fight. He knows no other business. And that's true of many fighters. They know no other thing and they've got kids to support."[58] Sadly enough, this is too often the case. But it seems more to bespeak a weakness in our society rather than an argument in favor of a sport. A more important consideration in judging the fights would be the principle set down by Pope Pius XII when he stated that true sportsmanship

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[56] Cited by Dr. Steinhaus in "Is Boxing Legalized Murder?". *American Forum of the Air, ed. cit.*, p. 8

[57] Abe Simon, "I Couldn't Take It," *Esquire's First Sports Reader*, ed. Herbert Graffis (New York: Barnes and Co., 1945), pp. 30ff.

> . . . is also far from that proud folly, which does not hesitate to ruin, by mad excess, the player's health and energy just to gain a trophy in boxing or racing, and at times, recklessly exposes him to death. Sport, worthy of the name, makes a man courageous in face of danger but does not authorize him to take a serious risk without a correspondingly serious reason.[59]

CONCLUSION

Only in the past fifteen years or so has the problem of morality of prize-fighting come to the foreground. There is still much work to be done before the question is finally solved. But as more and more facts are brought to light, an increasing number of philosophers and theologians are coming to the conclusion that, granted all the advantages, prize-fighting can never be justified. It is doubtful whether they will be able to express the view more pointedly than did the elder brother of the famous fighter, Sam Langford. Sam's brother tried his hand at fighting. In his second bout, however, he was knocked down ten times in the first round, and in the second he went down and did not come to for an hour. When his eyes finally opened to daylight, he looked up at his brother painfully. "Sam," he muttered, "you were right. I should have retired with my winning streak of one. This fighting business ain't good for the soul—and it sure ain't good for the body either."[60]

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[58] Quoted in the *Chicago Daily Tribune*, March 27, 1962, IV, p. 1.

[59] "Ma come è anche aliena da quella follia di orgoglio, che non si rattiene dal rovinare con uno strapazzo insano le forze e la salute dello sportivo, per conquistare la palma in una gara di pugilato o di velocità, e lo espone talvolta temerariamente anche alla morte! Lo 'sport' degno di questo nome rende l'uomo coraggioso di fronte al pericolo presente, ma non l'autorizza as fidare senza una ragione proporzionata un grave rischio; il che sarebbe moralmente illecito." Address given on May 20, 1945, published in *Discorsi e radiomessagii di Sua Santità Pio XII*, VII (Rome: Tipografia Poliglotta Vaticana, 1955), p. 59.

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[60] Bill Stern, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

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

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